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       ABSTRACT 
This study seeks to explore the extent to which incentives as policy instruments intended to 
assist implementation are used by public managers in the post 1994 South Africa. It begins by 
providing the theoretical background within which the study will be conducted. This is 
preceded by outlining the scope of the inquiry highlighting not only its relevance but the 
specific objectives that it seeks to achieve; thus setting the foundation of the investigation. 
Having unravelled the evolution of the different paradigms of public policy implementation 
which has taken place over time, the thesis interrogates the phenomenon of incentives and their 
respective usage in various policy fields including heritage. Premised on the underlying aim of 
highlighting the deployment of incentives contemporaneous with the various phases of heritage 
policy development in the country, the thesis further explores the evolution of heritage policy 
in South Africa since the advent of formalised heritage management in the colonial era. 
Informed by this theoretical background provided thus far, the study explores the question of 
how incentives are deployed by heritage managers in the public sector and result in findings, 
whose implications are summarised in specific conclusions and recommendations, aimed at 
guiding the use of inducements in the implementation of heritage policy in the post 1994 South 
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             THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter of the thesis introduces what is going to be done in this study and why. It will 
provide the framework within which the work will be articulated. The introduction begins with 
the background information introducing the topic investigated; then continues to the problem 
statement1 and the purpose of the work. 
Once the problem has been identified and articulated, the chapter will posit research objectives 
to be attained in the course of the inquiry by specifically naming them.  The technique to be 
followed when naming the objectives will be to express them as ‘To’ statements to indicate 
action. Each objective will be explained; and after stating the objectives the chapter posits the 
thesis statement which will tell the reader about what is to be investigated. The investigation 
to be conducted will provide answers to the objectives of the inquiry (Hofstee, 2006:87). The 
proposition and explanation of the thesis will be followed by a short description of the approach 
the inquiry will take, subsequent to which delineation and delimitations will ensue, stating 
issues that are not going to be addressed by the conclusions reached by the study. From here 
the introductory chapter will pass on to define specific terms and abbreviations made in the 
dissertation. It is at this point where the introductory chapter will state some of the assumptions 
undergirding the thesis statement.  
Subsequently, the introduction provides a rationale as to why the inquiry is worth one’s while; 
and addresses the significance of the study both in terms of its theoretical and practical 
relevance. While probing the phenomenon of significance, the chapter attends to the issue of 
originality of the inquiry. Originality in the context of this study means that while the concept 
of incentives has been investigated before, this study however is going to examine its use in a 
slightly different industry altogether (Hofstee, 2006:90).The penultimate section of the 
introductory chapter presents the chapter outline (save the first chapter), and provides not only 
the logical sequence of the said chapters, but also furnishes the overview of the main points of 
what each chapter discuses. Finally, conclusions based on the foregoing will be made. 
1.2 BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The 88 year period in South Africa ranging from the enactment of the first heritage legislation 
in the post union era in 1911, that is The Bushmen’s Relic Act, No. 22 of 1911, to the advent 
of the National Heritage Resources Act, No. 25 of 1999, has been plagued by a dearth of local 
community participation in issues pertaining to heritage management and heritage resource 
administration; leading not only to a noticeable lack of transformation in the industry, but also 
to the marginalisation from mainstream heritage management, of a sizeable amount of heritage 
                                                 
1 The approach taken in the structuring of the chapters of this thesis particularly in this instance, takes its cue from 
the observation made by Erik Hofstee in his work, “Constructing a Good Dissertation”. Hofstee does not 




resources, belonging to previously suppressed groupings in the country (Kotze & Jansen van 
Rensburg, 2003:4). 
While the post 1994 era in South Africa has witnessed a proliferation of public policies 
intended to usher in a transformation of the public sector in general, and service delivery in 
particular, not enough has been noticeable in the participation of local communities in the 
implementation of such prescripts and policies. In fact, there is some evidence pointing to the 
direction of policy failure, steadily and sometimes violently rearing its head in the form of 
community protests and police reprisals, replete in both the print and electronic media reports. 
In a paper delivered at the annual round table of the African Association for Public 
Administration and Management held in Zambia, titled, Policy Implementation: Lessons for 
Service Delivery, the policy implementation scholar of the School of Public Management and 
Administration of the University of Pretoria, Petrus Brynard, maps out the contours of the 
South African policy context obtaining to date. According to Brynard, after the advent of 
democracy in 1994, the South African policy arena has gone through at least three phases. The 
first stage consists of the major policy review initiative which began in 1995 and lasted until 
1996. This is often dubbed, the ‘White Paper Era’ (Brynard, 2005:3). Part of this rigorous and 
extensive policy review process, it must be noted, gave rise to the White Paper on Arts, Culture 
and Heritage, adopted on the 4th of June 1996, which intended among others, to set out 
“government policy for establishing the optimum funding arrangements and institutional 
frameworks for the creation, promotion and protection of South Africa’s arts, culture, heritage 
and the associated practitioners.” (South Africa (Republic), 1996: Chapter 1). It is safe to 
conclude that this phase saw a preponderance of policies mushrooming as a result of new policy 
directions characteristic of the new dispensation in South Africa. 
Subsequent to this period, according to Brynard, followed a phase where a particular emphasis 
was placed on service delivery with a renewed focus and interest in public policy 
implementation. This was spearheaded by Thabo Mbeki, and lasted from 1997 until 2003. It is 
no sheer accident that this phase coincided with the adoption of a policy intended to transform 
service delivery in accordance with the principles enshrined in Section 195 of the Constitution 
(i.e. The Batho Pele White Paper). Brynard further observes that after 2003, the South African 
policy context continued to pay attention to service delivery more particularly within the local 
sphere of government.  
It can be conceded as Brynard demonstrates, that the initial phase of the post 1994 South 
African policy context primarily focused on the crafting and adoption of various White Papers, 
and to that extent witnessed the characteristic mushrooming of policies which included, among 
others, the emergence of new policy interventions intended to deal with challenges germane to 
the heritage industry.  There is at the same time a sobering indication to the effect that the 
burgeoning of policy prescripts did not necessarily translate to effective implementation.  
It can be argued that as early as 1998, an indication is provided by the Presidential Review 
Commission that all was, not as it were ‘hunky dory’, in the arena of public policy 
implementation in South Africa. In a report presented by a special commission to the then State 
President of the Republic of South Africa on the 27th of February 1998, titled, “Developing a 
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Culture of Good Governance: Report of the Presidential Review Commission on the reform 
and transformation of the public service in South Africa”, an important observation is made 
particularly with regard to the state of implementation obtaining at the time. The report states, 
“In its presentation on right sizing to the Commission, the DPSA acknowledged many of the 
above limitations and argued that these essentially reflected problems not of policy but of 
execution. Measures were designed and processes set in motion at the central level which were 
not implemented as planned, primarily because there were little incentives for managers to do 
so.” (South Africa (Republic), 1998: Section 3.2.4.4) The Observation of the commission that 
problems in the public sector were not necessarily arising from a lack of policy but from the 
implementation of the same have been well echoed by many a policy analyst in South Africa. 
However, could it well be that part of the failure to implement policies effectively in the country 
is not only the result of the lack of incentives for managers as the report alleges? Could it be 
that the lack of incentives for effective public participation complicates matters further for 
policy implementation, more particularly within the heritage industry which to a large extent 
continues to be plagued by indifference from a sizeable contingent of the South African 
populace?  
This question becomes even more important if one takes into cognisance the aim of the 
National Heritage Resources Act, 1999, as stated in the preamble. The National Heritage 
Resources Act 25 of 1999, is part of the legislative corpus currently regulating the industry. It 
is one of the first pieces of legislation enacted after 1994 with the intention of engendering 
transformation in the industry. The act claims that it seeks to, “promote good management of 
the national estate and to enable and encourage communities to nurture and conserve their 
legacy so that it may be bequeathed to future generations.” (South Africa (Republic), 1999:2). 
It is therefore evident that the act acknowledges the role of local community participation for 
effective management of the national estate at all levels. Section 3(1) of the National Heritage 
Resources Act No 25 of 1999 defines the national estate as, “those heritage resources of South 
Africa which are of cultural significance or other special value for the present community and 
for future generations.”However, the question which begs the answer in this regard could 
easily be: Are there enough incentives for communities to effectively participate in the heritage 
value chain as envisaged by the legislation? Or does the said piece of legislation simply indulge 
on ‘prescribing’ what communities need to do by regulation without providing relative 
inducements to ensure that such a participation is strategically solicited? Could it well be that 
contemporary South African heritage policy making and implementation has not yet made a 
shift from seeking to ensure that the implementation of such prescripts is based exclusively on 
decisions and activities which only impose constraints, and are in that sense construed as 
coercive rather than incentive based? (Knoepfel, Laure, Varone & Hill, 2007:29) 
Taking its cue from these issues the intended research project therefore seeks to answer the 
following question-cum-challenge: “It is uncertain to what extent are incentives used to solicit 
community participation in heritage policy implementation in post 1994 South Africa? 
Successful policy implementation would require among others, that there is a constellation of 
actors in the policy implementation arena who will be able to ‘make it happen’. While it is true 
that the existence of a comprehensive if viable theory of policy implementation, which while 
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providing a specific set of concepts and equally explains the interrelationships existing among 
such concepts, still eludes us; there is however a sense in which policy implementation scholars 
have made us aware that the critical role played by coalitions of individuals, which are in one 
way or the other affected by the policy and thereby have a greater potential to influence the 
way in which a given government intervention is implemented, is critical for any effective 
policy implementation.  The South African policy scholar Petrus Brynard is yet another 
example of such scholars who put a great price on the value of clients and coalitions in the 
policy implementation arena. Brynard (2005(a):20) argues that it is important to begin the 
process of implementation by identifying influential clients and coalitions from the potentially 
large number of possible actors related to a given policy.  In this instance, his observations 
resonate with other scholars. Knoepfel et al. (2007:192) for example make an illuminating 
remark in this regard.  They observe that the economic, political and social weight of various 
clients and coalitions in the policy arena determines the extent to which their cooperation may 
be considered necessary for effective implementation of policy.  To this extent therefore the 
economic, social and political standing of a given actor is a clear indication of the importance 
of the role a particular stakeholder is likely to play in the process of policy implementation.   
By the same token, the importance of soliciting participation from a wider front of actors in the 
policy implementation arena is further demonstrated by the need for implementation strategies 
to take cognisance of pre-authoritative decision dynamics in the preparation of the policy.  The 
opposing sides of a given policy having done battle at the legislative phase and its subsequent 
adoption, presages that when it comes to the implementation of the intervention, there is 
inevitably a shift of forum which has resulted in a change in the balance of power.    The battle 
which took place at the development of the policy and the choice of a viable policy alternative 
shifts to the implementation arena in the sense that competing interests, resource availability 
and competing views on how implementation should unfold contend with each other at this 
stage.  It is for this reason that policies emanating from the national sphere of government are 
stated in broad terms so that the wide range of possible implementers find a niche for 
themselves and commit to implementation. The participation of such a coalition of policy 
implementation actors and supporters would, among other things, require strategies to solicit 
and manage their respective participation in the process of policy execution.  For this to be 
realised, incentives could well be another tool used by policy makers to aid implementation.  
However, in spite of the fact that the use of incentives is an established phenomenon in other 
disciplines and policy areas as will be demonstrated in the literature review of this study, their 
deployment is not a widespread practice in the heritage industry; and the use of such a strategy 
has not been investigated within the South African heritage policy implementation context in 
particular.   
Having outlined the background which accounts for the ultimate provenance of this study, it is 
now time to pay attention to the research problem which informs the inquiry and the specific 





1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES 
The research project is intended to examine the extent to which heritage policy execution in 
South Africa uses incentives to solicit community participation in its implementation.  To this 
extent the topic of the research project is, “Examining the use of incentives for enlisting 
community participation in heritage policy implementation in South Africa.”   In order to 
consider the topic of the inquiry, the research project will seek to provide an answer to the 
overriding question, “It is uncertain to what extent are incentives used to solicit community 
participation in heritage policy implementation in post 1994 South Africa?  To provide some 
answers to the said question, the study will seek to attain the following specific objectives in 
its inquiry.  
1.3.1 Preliminary objectives 
The inquiry is a study in public policy implementation in particular. However, the fact that it 
seeks to understand the use of incentives within the context of public policy implementation 
presupposes that additional theory chapters be added in order to provide the relevant context 
for the inquiry. After the consideration of the evolution of implementation theory which forms 
the essence of this study and to which contributions are to be made, secondary attempts are 
made to account for the evolution of heritage policy in South Africa from the advent of 
formalised heritage management to the present; and also to account for the use of incentives in 
various policy fields. It is precisely for this reason that the present inquiry seeks to meet the 
following preliminary objectives to provide the aforesaid relevant theoretical background:- 
(a) To identify documented heritage policies and conduct a content analysis thereof.  
Policy positions are often expressed in the form of specific instruments and tools of 
governance. In the South African context white papers, acts of parliament and regulations 
provide an excellent expression of government policy as instruments intended to assist 
effective implementation. The first preliminary objective that this study will seek to attain are 
to identify all documented heritage policies expressed particularly in the form of the aforesaid 
policy instruments at the national sphere of government from 1911-1999; and to conduct a 
rigorous content analysis of the same with the intention of beginning to identify specific trends 
in the deployment of tools to aid effective implementation of heritage policies.  Within this 
wider scheme of things or context, the development of policy and its subsequent 
implementation has spanned over three epochs in South Africa and virtually informed by 
specific socio-political milieus germane to the different eras.   The identification and analysis 
of policies will focus on the post union era of heritage policy development ushered in by the 
Bushmen Relics Act No. 22 of 1911 up until 1948; which is the beginning of the second phase 
of heritage policy development and implementation under the aegis of apartheid. The advent 
of democracy in 1994 introduces yet another critical phase in the development of heritage 
policy and its implementation which forms the primary focus of this study.  What will be of 
great import in the pursuance of these study objectives will be to identify and highlight specific 
trends characteristic of the various periods in relation to the deployment of tools aimed at 
enabling effective community participation by the network of implementers or target groups 
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intended by the policy.  It will also be critical at this stage of the inquiry to ascertain the type 
of implementation theory presupposed by enacted policy within a given epoch.  This is 
important in the sense that such theories, however incipient, implicit or explicit in the policies 
concerned, will give some indication about the policy makers’ approach to public policy 
implementation generally; their particular ‘take’ on the participation of local communities in 
the implementation of policy, and by implication the use of incentives and disincentives to 
solicit such active involvement.   
There is a sense in which not only documented policies will be an exclusive focus of the study 
in this regard.  On the contrary, attempts will also be made in the study to identify 
undocumented policies in relation to the deployment of incentives at the level of heritage policy 
implementation, more particularly in the post 1994 era.  This focus is prompted by two 
important considerations.  On the one hand, policy has to do with a statement of intent and as 
a matter of fact not all statements of intents are always documented.  Some declarations are 
made in the executive wing of government by relevant actors without these being committed 
to pen and paper as documented polices; yet they inform the practice of service delivery within 
that particular sector.  On the other hand, Michael Lipsky’s development of the concept of 
street level bureaucrats in reference to policy actors in the implementation arena with a 
potential to ‘reinvent’ policy during the process of public policy implementation, presupposes 
that policy is sometimes made anew within a bottom up approach paradigm.  That is, in the 
process of public policy implementation, actors in the implementation arena are likely to add 
new nuances to existing policy which were not necessarily a part of the original 
pronouncement.  To a large degree such additions or reinventions are not documented but have 
the potential to determine the course of implementation drastically.  It is for this reason that the 
current study will also seek to identify such reinventions of undocumented policy in the course 
of conducting interviews with actors in the field.  The said inventions or nuances will also be 
subjected to the same rigorous analysis as part of the relevant policy pronouncements made by 
the bureaucracy. 
(b) To trace the development of the theory of incentives and the use thereof in various 
policy fields and disciplines.  
The second preliminary objective of the study will be to trace the development and use of 
incentives in various policy fields and disciplines over time.  A rigorous attempt will also be 
made to trace and analyse the use of incentives in heritage policy in the international sphere of 
heritage management.  This is the result of the fact that it is the theory of incentives in particular 
which is to be used as a methodological frame of reference in the study.   
1.3.2 Primary objectives 
Having created the theoretical context within which the inquiry will be conducted the study 






(a) To ascertain the type of incentives used by managers in implementing heritage policy 
The first primary objective of the study is to determine how heritage managers - who are 
charged with the responsibility of implementing heritage policies in the two spheres of 
government use incentives to solicit active participation from various actors in the 
implementation arena.  The inquiry will seek to find out the type of incentives normally used 
in relation to other tools deployed to assist the implementation of policies; how these incentives 
are deployed and the specific target groups they are intended for in the arena of public policy 
implementation. The determination of the type of incentives used and the specific actors they 
are intended for is important in so far as it will give an indication of the characteristic approach 
to implementation evinced by street level bureaucrats in the execution of policy, as well as the 
theories implicit in the said implementation.  
(b) To contribute to heritage policy analysis and to enhance service delivery in the 
heritage industry 
The last primary objective of this study is to contribute to heritage policy development and to 
enhance service delivery within the heritage sector in particular.  The search for a viable theory 
of public policy implementation is still raging on; and in the South African context which, 
comparatively speaking, still lags behind in terms of public policy analysis skills, the need to 
develop policies that will ensure that communities participate in their respective 
implementation cannot be overemphasized.  The inquiry will therefore seek to highlight the 
importance of the use of incentives in this context and by seeking to understand and preserve 
the perspective of actors in the field of heritage policy implementation; contributions are likely 
to be made to existing theory as well as to the enhancement of implementation endeavours by 
managers in the bureaucracy. This will inevitably improve the ability to implement and by 
implication enhance service delivery which is of major concern in the South African public 
service scenario.  
Having made an attempt to map out the research problem and the type of objectives to be 
attained in the process of research, it is now time focus attention on issues pertaining to design 
of the project; and that is the subject of the next section of the proposal. 
1.4 THE THESIS STATEMENT OF THE INQUIRY 
In the light of the above, there is the need to ascertain the extent to which heritage managers 
employ the use of incentives in order to solicit active participation for heritage policy 
implementation, and the stated research objectives that must be attained by the study. The 
overall goal of this study, is to investigate the use of incentives as policy tools intended to enlist 
community participation in heritage policy implementation in post 1994 South Africa.  While 
the current heritage legislation provides for community involvement in heritage management 
generally, it has been noted that no clear indication is given as to how that participation should 
take place and how it should be solicited.  The current study therefore will seek to find out the 
type of incentives that are used to encourage the envisaged participation.  This is partly 
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motivated by the fact that contemporary public policy implementation has to an extent made a 
shift from the exclusive use of sanctions to foster implementation to the active employment of 
specific inducements. However, there is a sense in which the use of incentives as policy tools 
remains to a large extent a black box in the South African heritage industry and needs to be 
investigated to inform policy development and enhance effective implementation.   
1.5 THE USE OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH FOR THE STUDY 
A comprehensive articulation of method and approaches adopted by this study are outlined in the fifth 
chapter of this thesis.  At this stage however, it will suffice to briefly summarise the seven important 
steps of the approach adopted and how they have informed and shaped the structure of some of the 
chapters of this dissertation.  
In order to conduct the intended inquiry, this study has adopted empirical phenomenology 
developed by the Swiss Scholar, Patrick Aspers. Phenomenology as an approach to scientific 
inquiry has undergone an evolution over the years of its existence and development. The approach 
unfolds through seven steps beginning with the definition and articulation of the research 
problem as outlined in chapter one of this thesis. The second step in the unfolding of the 
approach is the preliminary study conducted with the aim of ascertaining the feasibility of 
undertaking the project and the potential the inquiry has to solve the question it poses. 
Empirical phenomenology underscores the relevance of theory in scientific inquiry and to that 
extent the third step of the approach involves the choice of a theory which acts as a frame of 
reference for the study. While chapters two and four of the thesis constitute parts of the 
exploration of the theoretical framework within which the study is conducted, chapter three of 
in particular forms an important basis of the theory incentives adopted to guide this study.  
The fourth step of the inquiry focuses on the analysis of the first order constructs provided by 
the actual words respondents use to describe their social reality when interviewed and this is 
the focus of sixth chapter of this thesis. This is followed by the construction of second order 
constructs developed from the first level constructs provided by research data. The sixth step 
of the approach focuses on unintended consequences of social action and part of chapter seven 
of the dissertation deals with this aspect of the inquiry. While safeguarding the perspective of 
the actors in the entire process, the last step of the approach relates the evidence generated by 
the study to both scientific literature and empirical field; and this constitutes the bulk of the last 
chapter of this dissertation.  
1.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY. 
There are a few limitations which have been deliberately placed on the current study. The first 
limitation relates to the classification of heritage resources and the relevant sphere of 
government responsible for each category.   Section 7 of the National Heritage Resources 
Agency Act, 1999, establishes a three-tier grading system for the management of the national 
estate.  The grading system distinguishes between three categories.  Grade I of the national 
estate consists of heritage resources with exceptional qualities which make them to be of 
special national significance.  This category of resources is the responsibility of the national 
heritage agency that is the South African Heritage Resources Agency, a juristic person whose 
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sole responsibility is the coordination of the identification and management of the national 
estate.  Grade II heritage resources comprises the type of resources which while forming part 
of the national estate, are nonetheless considered to have qualities making them significant in 
the context of a province.  The coordination of the identification and management of this 
category of the national estate is the responsibility of a Provincial Heritage Resources Agency 
(PHRA), which is a statutory body corporate capable of suing and of being sued in its corporate 
name. The relevant legislation seeks to encourage all the nine provinces in South Africa to 
establish these entities to fulfil the said duties; although this is not obligatory. Grade III heritage 
resources comprises other resources considered worthy of conservation and which fall within 
the competence of local authorities. Consequently, the fact that the current study focuses on 
the use of incentives in the management of resources at both the national and provincial spheres 
of government, presages that the local domain of heritage management is not necessarily the 
central focus of this inquiry.   This presupposes that the study will not be able to ascertain if 
incentives are used by local authorities to solicit active participation from communities in the 
implementation of heritage policy.  
A criticism can be levelled against the approach evinced by the study in this regard.  That is, 
how can a study whose stated objective is to enhance service delivery shy away from exploring 
the use of incentives for heritage policy implementation where it matters the most; that is at the 
coal face of service delivery in the local sphere of government? A cursory look at the legislative 
framework intended to provide protection to the national estate in South Africa suggests that 
there are strong vestiges of the traditional top-down approach to public policy implementation. 
Section 7(2) of the National Heritage Resources Agency Act No 25 of 1999 for example 
observes, “A heritage resources authority may prescribe detailed heritage assessment criteria, 
consistent with the criteria set out in section 3(3), for the assessment of Grade II and Grade III 
heritage resources in a province.”   In typical top-down fashion, policy goals in relation to 
assessment and grading of both Grades I and II of the national estate are specified centrally by 
an authority situated at the national sphere of government. To this extent, the possible 
deployment of incentives in the implementation of heritage policy at the local sphere of 
heritage management is clearly a matter decided by policies crafted and enacted from above.  
For this reason there is a sense in which to seek to understand what happens at the upper 
echelons of the administrative hierarchy in terms of the deployment of incentives, is cascaded 
and replicated at the local sphere of government where policy actors are also expected to 
comply with national imperatives.  It is therefore the argument advocated by this study that a 
rigorous analysis and study about the use of incentives in the heritage policy implementation 
arena at both the national and provincial spheres of coordination will be replicated with slight 
nuances in the strategies used by local authorities for the same purpose. 
There is a sense in which repositories of public memory or memory institutions (Gaunt, 
2009:79), that is libraries, museums and archives in particular act as reservoirs of historical 
collective consciousness of a given community.  The social memory developed by such 
institutions consists of both artefact and text.  Libraries for example play a critical role in the 
development, preservation and transmission of cultural memory of a community.  Alberto 
Manguale once observed that, 
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… the library is a sort of autobiography in which we can read ourselves and others can 
read us.  The books that we accumulate throughout the years are like the words of a 
vocabulary that we use; the library represents a kind of syntax for this vocabulary and, 
in our memory, we construct an ideal and perfect library – perfect because this library 
contains only that which we wish to remember.  That is to say, a book, where the book 
has had, in our minds, a certain force – not of tomes, not of volumes, but of a few 
sentences, a few passages or even just a few words sometimes, and this is enough. 
(MacLennan, 2007:1).  
Libraries, museums and archives are repositories of heritage material in the form of texts and 
artefacts; and are for that reason an important aspect of the corpus of heritage material for a 
given community. The current study, however, will not investigate the use of incentives to 
solicit community participation in the implementation of polices intended to preserve heritage 
resources preserved within memory institutions.  While the study will focus on policies aimed 
at the preservation of both tangible and intangible or living heritage resources, the national 
estate whose management is regulated by such prescripts as applicable to memory institutions, 
will not form part of this study and as a matter of consequence, the findings and conclusions 
reached at the end of the study are not necessarily intended for that part of the national estate 
falling within the ambit of such institutions. Therefore, the corpus of legislation regulating this 
section of the national estate is also not going to form part of the legislative framework that is 
to be rigorously interrogated by the study. By the same token, the current study will not deal 
with natural heritage; and the reason for this limitation will be elaborated later in the chapter.   
1.7 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
There is a need to define some of the terms used in the dissertation. Of particular significance 
in this regard are terms used in the topic and the research questions which require some 
explanation. 
1.6.1 Understanding community 
The inquiry seeks to study how community participation in the implementation of heritage 
policy is solicited within a specific context.  But what is meant by community in this instance?  
On the one hand it needs to be acknowledged that like the concept of culture, there is a sense 
in which the word community is fairly nebulous, and as a result renders itself enigmatic and 
slippery to a fixed definition; and for that reason has clearly acquired polyvocal dimensions.  It 
can be argued that there is a possibility that the answer that could be given to the question, 
“What is community?”,is virtually shaped by both the premise from which it is posed and the 
intention of the question.  It is to a large extent a context specific concept defined by contextual 
boundaries ranging from consensus among individuals comprising a given community to 
political boundaries which get expression in the demarcation of districts, wards and towns.  To 
this extent Mancini et al. taking their cue from Teachman and Crowder (2002) subscribe to a 
lower case paradigm of community which places emphasis "... on locally anchored geographic 
conceptualisations of community, such as urban neighborhoods, suburban subdivisions, or 
single communities in rural areas ..."  (Mancini et al. 2005:571) 
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It is the clinical psychologist David McMillan who is attributed with the first attempt to 
conceptualise the notion of community in 1976 which is built on the idea of group 
cohesiveness. (McMillan and Chavis 1986:1)  Informed by the latter notion evident in 
McMillan’s understanding of community, McMillan and Chavis later developed a definition 
of community which while seeking to avoid the limitations of earlier understandings of the 
sense of community evinced by such scholars as Doolittle and McDonald (McMillan and 
Chavis, 1986:6); Riger and Laurakas (McMillan and Chavis, 1986:7); Riger, Le Bailly and 
Gordon (McMillan and Chavis, 1986:7), the two scholars seek to define community taking 
their cue from Gusfield (1975), territorial and geographical as well as the relational uses of the 
notion of community. (McMillan and Chavis, 1986:3) To this extent the two scholars work out 
a definition of community based on specific criteria of membership to the group, influence, 
integration and fulfilment of needs, and shared emotional connection. (McMillan and Chavis, 
1986:4) Thus community according to the two scholars “... is a feeling that members have of 
belonging, a feeling that members matter to one another and to the group, and a shared faith 
that members' needs will be met through their commitment together" (McMillan and Chavis, 
1986:4) 
However, in the context of this study, the concept of community primarily refers to members 
of civil society within a given socio-political setting. To this extent there are implicit 
geographical connotations (spatial dimensions), to the use of the concept.  While community 
consists of individuals, it is also equally true that it is sustained by smaller groups of which it 
is also made up (Brynard, 2009:314). For this reason the use of the concept of community in 
this thesis will also refer to existing heritage communities and organisations within a 
community.  Members of a given community often share a common cultural life and a common 
cultural heritage. In this sense, community in this study is construed as a phenomenon that has 
two major characteristics.  On the one hand it is a structural phenomenon which comprises  
people and their respective environment; whereas, on the other hand, the concept presages the 
existence of social networks which arise in communities as a result of everyday community 
life. Civil society is an integral component in a democratic dispensation, and the participation 
of members of civil society in the policy process, that is in the development and implementation 
of public policies in particular ensures good governance.   
By the same token, community in this study is not necessarily a homogenous entity where no 
differences exist.  On the contrary, community is also understood as an organization where 
difference, hierarchy and conflict are present and often negotiated or somewhat tolerated if the 
goals of being community are to be attained.   
1.6.2 Participation 
There is admittedly a sense in which the concept of participation is multidimensional and to 
that extent often renders itself to a multiplicity of definitions informed by a variety of motives. 
In a somewhat academically provocative article published by the AIP Journal in 1969, the 
American Scholar Sherry R. Arnstein provides what has at one stage been described as “the 
seminal theoretical work on the subject of community participation” (CAG Consultants 
2012:1). She defines the phenomenon as  
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… a categorical term for citizen power. It is the redistribution of power that enables 
the have not-citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to 
be deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which the have nots join in 
determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are 
allocated, programs are operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are 
parceled out. In short, it is the means by which they can induce significant social reform 
which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent society. (Arnstein, 1969:216).   
Arnstein’s definition provides a broader  framework for defining participation which 
underscores among others, the centrality of the distribution of power over against a 
participation which is fundamentally an empty ritual reinforcing the existing power dynamics 
in a given society.  To this extent the scholar simplifies the concept into eight gradations of 
participation illustrated by a ladder with eight rungs arranged hierarchically.  The rungs 
virtually represent manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, 
delegated power and citizen control. Each rung in the ladder represents a level of participation 
with the corresponding power wielded by citizens to determine the output or product (Arnstein, 
1969: 217). 
Some meanings of participation fall within the category of definitions which link the 
phenomenon to a homogenous cultural group. In an unpublished doctoral thesis, the Mauritian 
academic Sanjir Kumar Babooa, taking his cue from Bayat & Meyer (1994:156), defines 
community participation “as the actual act of taking part on the involvement of community 
members in specific community activities.” He further observes that in community 
participation, those who are participants are members of the same community with strong 
communal interests which bind them together as a cultural group of one kind or the other. 
(Babooa, 2008:29). Others define participation in a way that links it to about three critical and 
interrelated variables, namely the enhancement of development imperatives and service 
delivery, improvement of governance and the deepening of democracy.  To this extent 
participation is defined by the World Bank as “a process in which stakeholders influence and 
share control over development initiatives and the decisions and the resources affecting them” 
(Buccus et al. 2007:6) 
Within the confines provided by the legislative framework in South Africa, more particularly 
in the sphere of local government which is at the coal face of service delivery, participation is 
described as something that takes place within the context of both policy development and 
implementation.  To this extent, it is sometimes argued that the kind of participation framed by 
the South African legislative corpus primarily focuses on consultation (Buccus, 2007:9). While 
taking cognisance of the above cited dimensions of the concept, in the context of this study, 
the focus is on community members in a local area or region participating in the 
implementation of heritage policy as a result of the deployment of specific policy instruments 





1.6.3 Heritage Policy 
In order to do justice to the definition of this concept as it applies to the topic of the thesis, a 
piece meal approach has to be adopted in the sense that, first and foremost, an acceptable 
definition of the concept of heritage must be arrived at or assented to; and subsequent to this 
some effort must be expended to define what policy is. Only when the two primary tasks have 
been achieved will an attempt be made to define the composite concept, namely heritage policy. 
What is heritage?  The attempt to define heritage is yet another area characterised by creative 
fecundity which to some extent reveals some measure of consensus.  The South African Pocket 
Oxford Dictionary describes heritage as “property that is or may be inherited.”  However, in 
the context of this study, there are implicit specific managerial concerns with regard to how 
one manages the network of actors in the heritage policy implementation arena for effective 
policy execution. The deployment of incentives as tools to solicit community participation is a 
managerial issue in so far as it is likely to involve a great deal of planning, providing leadership, 
organising and control from the person or even for the public institution which manages the 
constellation of policy actors, that is the network of actors in the heritage policy implementation 
arena. It can be safely inferred therefore, that it is these very underlying managerial dynamics 
of the current study which virtually presage that the inquiry adopts a definition of heritage 
whose primary aim is not necessarily intended to satisfy lexicographic linguistic demands but, 
a definition which while remaining true to semantics, nonetheless satisfies the managerial 
concerns partly responsible for the raison d’etre of the inquiry. For this reason, the study is 
favourably disposed towards the United Nations Education, Science Organisation’s 
(UNESCO) definition of heritage which is to a large extent informed by the same managerial 
concerns characteristic of the current study’s sitz im leben.   
According to the world heritage body, The United Nations Education, Science Organization 
(UNESCO), heritage is classified into two broad categories of Cultural and Natural Heritage 
(UNESCO, 1972:3). Cultural Heritage is further categorised by the convention into three 
distinct types namely, monuments, group of buildings, and sites. The monuments category of 
cultural heritage includes such heritage resources as works of architecture, works of 
monumental sculpture and painting, structures of archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave 
dwellings and a combination of features which when viewed from the prism of history, art or 
science, are of outstanding universal value (UNESCO, 1972:3).  The second category of 
cultural heritage consists of buildings and covers such heritage resources as groups of separated 
buildings which as a result of their respective architecture, homogeneity, and place in the 
landscape, are considered to be of outstanding value when viewed from the perspective of 
history, art or science.  The third type of cultural heritage resources are heritage sites which 
countenance works of man or the combined works of nature and man, as well as areas which 
include archaeological sites of outstanding value from a historical, aesthetic, ethnological or 
anthropological perspectives.  
The 1972 Convention’s definition of heritage places an exclusive focus on physical heritage 
resources and it is the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage 
which posits yet another critical categorisation-cum-definition of cultural heritage on the basis 
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of tangibility and non-tangibility thereof; and virtually classifies cultural heritage into tangible 
and intangible heritage resources (UNESCO, 2003:2). According to this Convention, 
Intangible Cultural Heritage refers to "practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, 
skills - as well as instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith - that 
communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural 
heritage" (UNESCO Convention, 2003:3)  This category of heritage is, according to the said 
Convention manifested in such domains as oral traditions and expressions; performing arts; 
social practices, rituals and festive events; knowledge and practices relating to nature and the 
universe; and traditional craftsmanship (UNESCO Convention, 2003:3). 
On the other hand, natural heritage resources are further classified broadly by the 1972 
convention into three specific types.  The first type of natural heritage consists of natural 
features both physical and biological in nature and which are of outstanding universal value 
when judged from the vantage point of aesthetics or science.  The second type of natural 
heritage falls within the scope of geological and physiographical formations as well as 
delineated spaces or areas which comprise habitat of threatened animal or plant species which 
when considered from the prism of science or conservation is  of outstanding scientific or 
conservation value.  The third category of natural heritage consists of natural sites or delineated 
natural areas which are of outstanding universal value when approached from the prism of 
science, conservation or natural beauty.   
The current study is pursued within a particular background.  Its focus is the South African 
heritage policy management context; and for that reason the definition of heritage adopted 
should take cognisance of the extent to which the UNESCO definitions have been 
contextualised in the South African heritage policy setting.    Section 2(xvi) of the National 
Heritage Resources Agency Act No 25 of 1999, which focuses on the definitions of specific 
key concepts found in the legislation, defines a heritage resource as "any place or object of 
cultural significance" (South Africa (Republic), 1999:5).  Compared to the paradigm provided 
by the UNESCO Convention, the South African definition of heritage as reflected in this piece 
of legislation is limited in scope. It places more if not exclusive emphasis on cultural heritage 
as opposed to natural resources as envisaged by the convention's declaration.  To be sure, there 
are some references to natural heritage in Section 3 of the act where places or objects are 
considered as part of the national estate if they have cultural significance or any other special 
value as a result of their “possession of uncommon, rare or endangered aspects of South 
Africa's natural or cultural heritage” (Section 3(3)(b); or as a result of their “potential in 
yielding information that will contribute to an understanding of South Africa's natural or 
cultural heritage" (Section 3(3)(c); or "their importance in demonstrating principal 
characteristic of a particular class of South Africa's natural or cultural places or objects"  
(Section 3(3)(d). However, the primary focus of protection offered by the act is on cultural 
heritage which must be nurtured and preserved so that it may be eventually bequeathed to future 
generations.   
The limited scope of the said act is to a large extent caused by the fact that the protection of 
natural heritage resources falls squarely within the scope of environmental protection primarily 
regulated by the National Environmental Management Act, 1998 and The World Heritage 
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Convention Act No 49 of 1999 respectively, which are pieces of legislation administered by 
the National Department of Environmental Affairs.  Having assented to a specific composite 
definition of heritage, it is now time to focus attention to the concept of policy; and that is the 
subject of the subsequent section of this introductory chapter. 
What is public policy?  Numerous attempts have been made to define public policy and this 
has given rise to a multiplicity of definitions.  To this extent Knoepfel et al. (2007:23) cite the 
example of the French policy scholar, Jean-Claude Thoenig who as early as 1980, listed in his 
analysis of public policy about forty of such definitions.  After a careful consideration of 
various contributions made by various scholars over time, South African policy scholars De 
Conning and Wissink (2011:6) concur with Knoepfel et al. and other policy fundis that, 
“Analysis and assessment of the nature of the definitions in the field reveal that no universally 
accepted definition, theory or model exists”. 
There is quite a range of definitions of public policy offered by various scholars over time and 
they range from vague attempts to definitions with a high degree of precision and incisiveness.  
For example, Daniel McCool vaguely defines public policy as “some course of government 
action toward some goal, however broadly defined” (1995:9).  On the other hand, Dye’s 
definition demonstrates a measure of terseness and clarity which is obviously intended to 
discourage perplexingly detailed definitions of policy evident in such scholars as David Easton 
(Dye, 1972:1); Harold Lasswel and Abraham Kaplan (Dye, 1972:2) and others. For Dye 
(1972:1), “… public policy is whatever governments choose to do or not to do”.  While a 
simple definition like the one provided by Dye (1972:2) regards inaction from the side of 
government as a phenomenon falling within the realm of policy, other definitions characterised 
by the same brevity exclude failure to act and indecision as feature of public policy. A classical 
example of such a definition is offered by Mark Considine who aptly describes public policy 
as “… an action which employs governmental authority to commit resources in support of a 
preferred value” (Considine, 1994:3.)   
Perhaps a recent example of an elaborate definition of public policy has been offered by the 
policy scholars Peter Knoepfel, Corrine Larrue, Frederic Varone and Michael Hill.  According 
to these scholars,  
… public policy is defined as a series of intentionally coherent decisions or activities 
taken or carried out by different public-and sometimes – private actors, whose 
resources, institutional links and interests vary, with a view to resolving in a targeted 
manner a problem that is politically defined as collective in nature.  This group of 
decisions and activities gives rise to formalised actions of more or less restrictive 
nature that are often aimed at modifying the behaviour of social groups presumed to 
be at the root of, or able to solve, the collective problem to be resolved (target groups) 
in the interest of the social groups who suffer the negative effects of the problem in 
question (final beneficiaries). (Knoepfel et al. 2007:24) 
There is also some evidence suggesting that other definitions are likely to be informed and 
shaped by the perspective from which they are crafted and the interlocutors intended by the 
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definition concerned.  A case in point in this regard is Catherine F Smith’s definition of policy.  
Writing from the perspective of communication which takes place during the policy process 
Smith, a teacher of professional communication and public policy writing simply defines policy 
as a goal with a plan which specifies how a problem is going to be solved (Smith, 2005:1). 
By the same token, there are different types of public policies (education policies, health 
policies, etc.); and the focus of this study is on heritage policy as part of the corpus of public 
policy in South Africa.  Wayne Parsons has aptly demarcated the scope of this genre of policy 
and argued that public policy is a type of policy which concerns itself with spheres which are 
regarded as public as opposed to those which involve the notion of private (Parsons, 1995:3).  
However in spite of the characteristic multiplicity of definitions and types of public policies, 
there is a measure of consensus regarding certain generic aspects of public policy evinced by 
various scholars.  That is, different definitions seem to emphasize the notion of policy actors 
who have been given public power to act, the idea of a collective problem which needs a 
solution, as well as the intervention provided by the state as a solution to the identified social 
problem.  
One such definition which encapsulates the said dimensions of the nature of policy and which 
is adopted in this study for reasons that will be outlined in the following section of the same, is 
that which is offered by the South African policy scholars De Coning and Wissink (2011:7) 
which defines policy as “A public sector statement of intent, including sometimes a more 
detailed programme of action, to give effect to selected normative and empirical goals in order 
to improve or solve perceived problems and needs in society in a specific way, thereby 
achieving desired changes in that society.”   
The current study is evidently biased towards this definition of policy for a number of reasons.  
First and foremost, it is a definition of policy which while taking particular cognisance of the 
developments made thus far in the discipline, is nonetheless crafted within the South African 
context and to that extent largely informed by the exigencies of policy processes germane to 
the said developmental country’s context.  There is an indication given by scholars that policy 
processes which unfold within a third world developmental context are not the same as those 
which can be expected in first world democracies.  The South African policy scholar, Fanie 
Cloete perceptively observes that there exists a relationship between the level of development 
noticeable in a given society and public policy in that same society (Cloete, 2011: 66).  By the 
same token, the Nepalese scholar Narendra Raj Paudel, operating from the same premise also 
argues that translating policy into practice in a country that is still developing, has its peculiar 
challenges (Paudel, 2009:48). However, while Cloete acknowledges this phenomenon of 
characteristic difference, he nonetheless offers a necessary caveat.  Taking his cue from 
Horowitz (1989:197), he warns that while it is true that differences exist between public policy 
processes in developing countries and developed states. It is not clear whether such differences 
are categorical and not country specific; and to that extent can be safely regarded as differences 
of degree rather than of kind (Cloete, 2011: 69).  Notwithstanding such caveats from scholars 
like Cloete and Horowitz, it can still be safely inferred that there exists a possibility that the 
definitions of policy generated by scholars of third world countries like South Africa, are to an 
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extent informed and shaped by the needs of what Cloete (2011:67) refers to as developmental 
levels germane to such a context.   
Secondly, the acknowledged bias towards this South African definition of policy in the study 
is prompted by the fact that it is in keeping with common parlance in public policy analysis in 
the sense that its definition of the phenomenon is futuristic, problem-resolution oriented, 
transformational and dynamic (De Conning and Wissink, 2011:7); and to this extent presents 
policy as a viable theory of social change concerned with solutions to perceived public 
problems.   
Thirdly, implicit in the definition is a relevant theory of the state.  Policy is defined as “…A 
public sector statement of intent…”(De Conning and Wissink, 2011:7); and it can be argued 
that the definition operates from a prism of a service hatch notion of the state which implicitly 
depicts the state as responding indiscriminately and in an egalitarian fashion to the needs of 
society without prejudice (Knoepfel et al. 2007:21).  There is a sense in which the notion of 
state as a service hatch is deeply embedded in the supreme law of the country.  A careful 
reading of Chapter 10 (Section 195) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
envisages public administration governed by specific values and principles intended to act as a 
guide in government’s endeavours to provide services impartially, fairly and without bias.  It 
must be noted, however, that other scholars reject the notion of a state as a service hatch on the 
basis of the fact that it is not all social problems that eventually give rise to the adoption of 
specific policy alternatives, simply because not all social problems render themselves amenable 
to identification and clear articulation to see their way into the relevant policy agenda; or there 
is no state intervention that can deal effectively with the challenge.  It is also argued by the 
same school of thought that the existence of various filtering mechanisms and processes at all 
levels of the policy process makes it virtually impossible that all social problems will 
eventually give rise to policy interventions.   It is for this reason that some scholars take a 
position in this regard which is midway between the extremes.  
As stated in the first section of this book, our position lies somewhere between these 
two extreme visions of a neutral ‘service hatch’ state that is attentive to all social 
demands, on the one hand, and a ‘captive’ state manipulated by an organised group on 
the other. (Knoepfel et al. 2007:22) 
The fourth characteristic feature of this definition is that the programming of a given policy is 
not part of the implementation process, but virtually belongs to the process of crafting a social 
intervention.  Furthermore, the definition’s reference to ‘perceived problems’ as the focus of 
policy, adds an element of subjectivity to a policy alternative; and to that extent underscores 
the value laden nature of policy as a social theory of change. 
Our focus in the study is on heritage policy as part of general public policy.  It is in the context 
of the foregoing that in this inquiry, heritage policy derives its meaning.  For the purposes of 
this study, heritage policy refers to all government policies, documented or unwritten as well 
as acts of parliament enacted in South Africa with the aim of identifying, protecting and 
preserving cultural heritage resources so that they are bequeathed to future generations.  
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1.6.4 Incentives and disincentives 
The 2006 United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) capacity development 
conference paper 8 defines incentives as “external measures that are designed and established 
to influence motivation and behaviour of individuals, groups or organizations.” Incentive 
systems or structures on the other hand “… are combinations of several more or less coherent 
incentives” (UNDP, 2006:5).  Incentives therefore are devices often used in a principal agent 
relationship where the former seeks to motivate and encourage the latter to adopt a specific 
behaviour aligned to the goals of the former. Incentives work at different levels to motivate 
behaviour.  There are incentives targeted to motivate individuals (UNDP, 2006:7), 
organizations or societies (UNDP, 2006:8).  
On the contrary, disincentives are used in the same context to discourage and demotivate agents 
to desist from certain behaviour patterns considered not amenable to the realisation of the goals 
set by the agent. A disincentive acts as a deterrent to discourage actors in a given policy field 
to desist from a particular undesired behaviour which is not congruent to set policy goals. There 
are also incentives which can serve both purposes. The disbursement of financial policy 
implementation tools like grants, tax and loans are some of the classical examples of incentives 
which have the capacity to encourage desired behaviour while at the same time discouraging 
the behaviour that is contrary to the realisation of set goals and objectives.  
1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
There are four interrelated reasons why it can be considered as worth one’s while to seek 
possible answers to the question probed by this inquiry. The report of the special Presidential 
Review Commission alluded to earlier on alleges that most problems in the sector are not 
necessarily arising from a lack of policy but from the lack of effective implementation of the 
same (South Africa (Republic), 1998: Section 3.2.4.4). Could it be that the challenges relating 
to public participation in heritage matters is the result of lack of incentives soliciting such a 
response in heritage policy?   
As noted earlier on in this chapter, this question becomes even more relevant if one takes into 
consideration the fact that one of the stated aims of the National Heritage Resources Act No 25 
of 1999, is to encourage community participation in the management of heritage resources. It 
is evident that the act acknowledges the role of local community participation for effective 
management of the national estate at all levels.  However, the question still remains as to 
whether there are adequate policy incentives to solicit effective community participation in the 
heritage value chain as espoused by the said legislation.  The enquiry will seek to provide some 
answers to these critical issues relating to heritage policy in South Africa.   
The third reason why this research project is important is related to the two already alluded to 
above and emanates from the nature of the network approach to public policy implementation.   
For any effective implementation of public policy, a constellation or network of actors is 
required.  Managing networks in the policy implementation arena is such a complex task replete 
with all sorts of challenges.  In the decade of the 1990s scholars of Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, W. J. M. Kickert, E. Klijn and J. F. M. Koppenjan pioneered research on the 
19 
  
development of the network approach to the policy process.  Klijn and Koppenjan (2000:2) 
trace the ultimate origin of the network approach to two fairly distinctive developments in the 
evolution of public management science.  The two scholars argue that the network approach to 
public policy arose out of a realization by policy analysts that government was no longer the 
cockpit from which societies are governed; and that public policy processes in general (not 
least the implementation phase), are the result of a characteristic interplay between a network 
of actors  in the policy arena.  The two scholars further argue that, on the other hand, the 
fundamental realization that government is not the only role player in public policy making 
and implementation, has conveniently fused itself with discussions on managerial reform 
epitomized by the New Public Management paradigm.  According to these scholars, this fusion 
has led, among others, to network management that tends to focus on “mediating and 
coordinating interorganizational policy making” (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000:2); thus giving 
rise to the network approach to the management of the policy process.   
One of the most critical assumptions of the network approach to policy management is that the 
actors in the policy game are mutually dependant on each other; and as a result policy objectives 
can only be realized in the presence of sustained cooperation between various actors.  For this 
reason the intended collaboration does not happen all by itself, but requires sustained skills in 
game management and network constitution.  Consequently, it is the argument advanced by 
the intended thesis that one of the tools that can be used to enhance network management in 
the policy process are the type of incentives that will need to be incorporated to heritage polices 
so that the involvement of targeted stakeholders is ensured for effective implementation.  The 
attempt by heritage policy makers therefore to incorporate deliberately specific incentives for 
implementation in heritage policies is of cardinal importance if recognizable participation is 
going to be elicited from relevant actors.  Put differently, effective implementation would 
require effective mobilization of the network of target groups whose behaviour needs to change 
for results to happen.  It is the argument advocated by this study therefore that incentives are 
an important tool to engender implementation particularly in instances where effective 
execution hinges on wider participation from local communities. 
The fourth rationale for undertaking the study is a combination of both practical and theoretical 
benefits that accrue to the study of this nature.  On the one hand, the methodology used to 
conduct the inquiry seeks to take seriously the experience of actors in the field. Consequently, 
that presages that the findings made by the inquiry are intended to enrich the practice of heritage 
policy implementation and enhance service delivery in the sector.  This occurs when the theory 
or an addition thereto emanating from the study is served to practitioners in the field for their 
input.  The fact that practitioners will be able to see themselves as it were, in the theory or 
addition to an existing implementation theory generated from their own structure of meaning 
during research will enable them to learn from the experience and incorporate the findings in 
their own implementation endeavours. On the other hand, there is a sense in which the study is 
going to benefit the theory of public policy implementation generally.  The attempt to relate 
the findings to an existing implementation theory will contribute positively to the quest to 
eventually develop a viable theory of implementation.  
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There is also a sense of originality which characterises the current study.  This can be accounted 
for in two related ways.  On the one hand, there has never been a study which sought to 
interrogate the use of incentives for heritage policy implementation in South Africa.  This is 
caused by the fact that the use of incentives as tools for policy making and subsequent 
implementation is a new phenomenon in most policy areas.  On the other hand the originality 
character of the study lies in the method of inquiry used.  There has never been a study that has 
been able to make use of empirical phenomenology as a research method to investigate the use 
of incentives in heritage policy implementation in South Africa.  The method itself is not 
widely used in the social sciences and has been refined fairly recently as a scientific method of 
inquiry (Aspers, 2009) .   
Having explored the various parts of the introductory chapter in the above sections of the 
dissertation, it is now time to turn one’s attention to the sequence of chapters envisaged for the 
study. 
1.8 CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter two of the dissertation presents the development of public policy implementation 
theories. It presents the different paradigms of public policy implementation and concludes 
with a recent contribution made by Mnculwane and Wissink, (2014) in the form of a model 
intended for use when interrogating implementation case studies. The following chapter (i.e. 
chapter 3), is a second theory chapter which is an analysis of the theory of incentives and its 
application to various types of disciplines and policy areas over time. This will be followed by 
a critical presentation and analysis of the development of heritage policy in South Africa 
beginning from 1911 to the post 1994 era. This is the third theory chapter of the dissertation 
scans through and summarises the different phases of heritage policy enacted in the country 
beginning with the advent of the Bushmens’ Relics Act No 22 of 1911 to the present.  The 
intention of the chapter is to present a comprehensive summary of heritage policy and to 
identify specific trends in its implementation vis-à-vis the theory of incentives.  
The fifth chapter will interrogate the question of research methodology and method adopted 
for the inquiry. The study is a qualitative paradigm adopting empirical phenomenology as a 
method of inquiry; whereas the sixth chapter of the dissertation focuses attention on the 
presentation of research data generated from in-depth unstructured interviews which have been 
used as instruments for gathering relevant data for analysis.  The last chapter of the thesis makes 
conclusions and recommendations based on the findings yielded by the study. 
1.9 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has set the parameters of the dissertation by firstly providing the background 
which accounts for the ultimate origins of the study, and defining the research problems as well 
as the specific objectives the entire study will seek answers to.  Subsequent to this, the chapter 
stated the thesis of the inquiry followed by a brief summary of the approach adopted by the 
inquiry while also specifying the limits of the study as well as the definitions of specific terms 
in the research theme.  The chapter further explained the significance of the study and presented 
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an overview of the entire dissertation.  The subsequent chapter of the dissertation presents the 




























              CHAPTER 2 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION THEORIES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous section of this dissertation has provided the scope of the inquiry thus laying the 
foundation of the study. This chapter traces the development of the theories of public policy 
implementation.  It begins with a survey of implementation studies over the years and 
subsequent to this, interrogates the paradigms of implementation theory. The penultimate 
section of the chapter introduces an implementation model developed by Mnculwane and 
Wissink (2014), known as the PFI Model, later used in the study as a tool of analysis to 
interrogate research data gathered by the inquiry. Lastly, conclusions are made based on the 
foregoing. 
2.2 DEFINING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN CONTEXT 
There is evidence to the effect that while implementation as a concept is widely used in the 
field of public policy analysis, its definition nonetheless varies among different countries and 
clearly depends on the type of political and administrative school defining it (Knoepfel et al. 
2007:187). To this extent definitions vary from simple lexicographic explanations such as that 
provided by Pressman and Wildavysky in 1973 who defined policy implementation as an 
activity aimed at carrying something out, fulfilling or completing (Brynard et al. 2011:137); to 
the most complex and elaborate definitions which seek to capture the myriad intricacies 
involved in the policy implementation process. A case in point is where implementation is 
regarded as:- 
…the set of processes after the programming phase that are aimed at the concrete 
realisation of the objectives of a public policy. (Knoepfel et al. 2007:188)  
This study is biased towards the definition of public policy implementation provided by South 
African scholars which regards implementation “… as the conversion of mainly physical and 
financial resources into concrete service delivery outputs in the form of facilities and services, 
or into other concrete outputs aimed at achieving policy objectives” (Brynard et al. 2011:137).   
The strength of this definition lies in the fact that it is more aligned to the systems approach to 
management in the sense that implementation is linked to the attainment of policy goals and 
objectives. This accords well with the new approach to the management of the policy process 
implicit in the model which the South African Treasury currently advocates for strategic 
planning purposes. This emphasizes among others a change of paradigm from managing policy 
programmes for outputs and compliance; to a model where processes and outputs are still 




Fig. 2(a).  Source. National Treasury South Africa 2014 
2.3 TRACING THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
THEORIES. 
A critical focus in this study has to do with the investigation of how the use of incentives or 
lack thereof assists in the process of implementing heritage policy in post 1994 South Africa. 
There is evidently a fair amount of consensus among different scholars that the evolution of 
policy implementation theory has gone through at least three recognisable phases beginning 
from the early 1970’s to the present (Pulzl & Treib, 2007:89; Winter, 2006:151; deLeon, 
1999:315-316; Conteh, 2011:123-124). The configuration of this evolution of implementation 
theory into three generations or paradigms is also evident even among scholars who, as a result 
of operating from a premise that any endeavour to seek to arrange implementation literature 
has an intrinsic propensity to arbitrariness (Brynard, Cloete & de Coning, 2011:138), present 
such an evolution in a slightly nuanced fashion. It is beyond the scope of this study to present 
an exhaustive entire range of the development of policy implementation theory because a 
multiplicity of outstanding reviews has already been conducted over the last thirty years. For 
this reason the present work will seek to highlight some of the important paradigmatic 
contributions in the synthesis of such literature in order to provide a context within which the 
relevant heritage policy corpus is to be examined at a later stage. 
2.4 A SURVEY OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES 
The majority of policy implementation scholars trace the ultimate origins of policy 
implementation studies and by implication the humble beginnings of the first generation of 
scholarship in the field with Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavysky’s causa celebre in the 
early seventies. For this reason the analysis-cum reviews of implementation literature 
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undertaken by scholars on the subject overwhelmingly take this starting point as a given and 
operate from its suggested premise.  It can be argued that this stereotype demonstrates the 
seminal influence of the same two scholars, who in the said publication claimed that 
implementation had not been comprehensively studied prior to their work in the seventies. 
However, a few dissenting voices have been heard over time.   
As far as the author of this thesis is aware, the first salvo challenging this well-established 
status quo in public policy implementation studies was fired by Judith N. Shapiro (1978), in 
her doctoral thesis five years after the publication of Pressman and Wildavysky’s book in 1973.  
Shapiro argues that the inaccuracy of the two scholars’ claim regarding the state of 
implementation studies at the time, was caused by the fact that the survey of literature they 
conducted was based on a semantic reductionist perspective of the implementation concept. 
The search through literature that these scholars conducted was predicated upon 
finding the word “implementation” or any reasonable synonyms, such as “execution” 
or “administration” in the titles searched. The criterion was, perhaps, too arbitrary 
since a number of studies of public policies deal with the problems of implementation 
without specifically mentioning implementation or any of its synonyms in their titles.  
(Shapiro, 1978:29). 
The English scholar Michael Hill and the University of Rottendam don, Peter L. Hupe, in their 
work published twenty four years after Shapiro’s indictment, also argue that policy 
implementation has always been central to policy studies; and thus concur with the fact that 
the word ‘implementation’ itself was seldom used in the existing studies of policy 
implementation of various kinds, and that this state of affairs accounts for the conclusions 
reached by the two eminent scholars at the time. In order to bolster their criticism of Pressman 
and Wildavysky in this regard, Hupe and Hill cite specific works which in their view, could 
have been studied by the two academics in the much celebrated survey, before arriving at any 
conclusion on the subject. 
Pressman and Wildavysky’s bibliography, ostensibly demonstrating the absence of 
implementation literature, did not contain such classic American works as Blau’s The 
Dynamics of Bureaucracy (1955), Kaufman’s The Forest Ranger (1960) and, above all 
Selznick’s TVA and the Grass Roots (1949) (Hupe & Hill, :2002:18-19) 
The Nowergian scholar Harald Saetren having indicted previous literature reviews on the 
subject for among others, failing to explain how they arrived at certain interpretations and 
factual statements about the status of policy implementation research, further challenges the 
view that it was Pressman and Wildavysky who first used the concept of implementation as an 
analytical research term (Saetren, 2005:569)  According to this Bergen scholar, the two eminent 
scholars made their conclusions in good faith, based on the paucity of library resources that 
were available at the time. Although according to Saetren the earliest pioneers of 
implementation research were doctoral students dating as far back as the 1930s, their works 
cannot be clearly classified as typical first generation studies of policy implementation. 
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In order to “set the record straight” Saetren (2005:560), challenges the constant perpetuation 
of the dubious account about implementation research in general, and specifies his data sources 
and the methodology adopted for his inquiry. He observes in this regard that, 
… digitalized, scientific literature databases presently available at most universities as 
well as a related research instrument called bibliometrics, proved to be the most 
important by far. Three databases in particular, the Expanded Social Science Index, 
World Catalogue, and Digital Dissertations (Dissertation Abstracts), were utilized 
because they are interdisciplinary and together they cover all major types of 
publications. (Saetren, 2005:561) 
Saetren (2005:569) argues that by the time Pressman and Wildavysky published their book in 
1973, already about thirty books, well over two hundred journal articles and doctoral theses 
which make use of implementation as a title word had already been published or defended.2 
Table 2(i). Publications on policy implementation by type and two time periods. 
Type of Publication 1933-84 1985-2003 Total 
Articles 1 094 2 429 3 523 
Books and chapters 323 682 1 005 
PhD dissertations 1 091 1 682 2 773 
Total 2 948 4 803 7 301 
Note: Absolute values are used for data presented in this table. (Saetren, 2005:563) 
Saetren’s study has shed even more light into this by providing evidence that the majority of 
articles on the subject of policy implementation are not published in what could be regarded as 
core journals on the subject. As the table below indicates 76% (838) of articles on 
implementation published between 1948 to 1984, appeared in what can be regarded as non-
core journals; whereas 73% (2 593) of such articles published between 1985-2003, appeared 
in the same category of non-core journals. 
Table 2(ii). Articles by type of journal and time periods 
Type of Journal 1948-1984 1985-2003 Total 
Core 15% (159) 12% (295) 13% (454) 
Near Core 9% (97) 16% (379) 14% (476) 
Non-core 76% (838) 72% (2 755) 73% (2 593) 
                                                 
2 It is worth noting that while Saetren makes such a conclusion, but in the same vein he issues an important caveat 
stating that his study had not investigated closely the actual usage of implementation as a concept in the early 
publications yielded by his research (Saetren 2005:569) 
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Type of Journal 1948-1984 1985-2003 Total 
Non-Core Specified 
Health 12% (126) 16% (384) 15% (510) 
Education 17% (178) 14% (330) 15% (508) 
Law 12% (131) 5% (131) 7% (262) 
Environment 4% (41) 6% (144) 5% (185) 
Economics 3% (31) 3% (74) 3% (105) 
Other non-core 29% (331) 28% (692) 29% (1 023) 
Note: Absolute values are indicated in parenthesis (Saetren, 2005:564) 
Notwithstanding the criticisms offered by the above named scholars with regard to the 
evolution of the discipline, the Austrian scholars Helga Pulz and Oliver Treib admit that the 
notable achievement of first generation scholars like Pressman and Wildavysky, lies in their 
raising of awareness of the phenomenon within the wider scholarly community and the public 
in general (Pulz & Treib 2007:89). By the same token, both Michael Hill and Peter Hupe 
acknowledge that it was with the advent of Wildavysky-Pressman and Hargrove’s publications 
where a “a distinct approach to the study of implementation did emerge at the time.” (Hill & 
Hupe, 2002:41) 
Taking their cue from the pioneer work by Malcolm Goggin (1986), who arguably led the way, 
Goggin and his colleagues (1990) identified three generations of scholarship already in 
existence at the time (Pulz & Treib, 2007:89). Subsequent scholars have followed suit and 
acknowledge the three phased evolution of policy implementation theory over the years 
(Winter, 2006:151; Brynard et al. 2011:138; Paudel, 2009:38; Lester, Bowman, Goggin and 
O-Toole, 1987:201; 210; deLeon, 1999:315-318). 
2.5 THE MECHANISTIC CLASSICAL PARADIGM OF POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The first generation of implementation theorists based their conclusions on case studies. By 
simply studying a variety of cases, theorists were not only hoping to discover the uncertain 
relationship existing between policies and programmes aimed at implementing them; but they 
also sought to understand the factors which either facilitated or constrained effective policy 
implementation. It is this analysis which indicated that contextual factors like size, intra-
organizational relationships, commitment, capacity and institutional complexities shaped an 
actor’s response in the policy implementation arena 
Initial inquiries conducted from 1970 onwards focused on how a single authoritative decision 
got executed in a single locus or in many loci (Lester et al. 1987:201). It is for this reason that 
in this approach, implementation is understood as something which happens automatically 
once the policy has been announced. In this classical theory of public policy implementation, 
public administration is a scientific, rational, machine-like bureaucracy which does not defy 
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the laws of order in its functioning. It is for this reason that  its machine-like mode of operating 
makes it fairly predictable; and in this scheme of things, policy implementation is – out of 
necessity – regarded as a cog in the administrative machinery known as public administration 
(Brynard et al. 2011:138). Understood in this manner, the phenomenon of public policy 
implementation is nothing more than a simple automatic function, directly flowing from the 
pronouncements and directives of those high up in the echelons of power within a given 
administration. This school of thought argues that once a policy has been enacted, it is ‘thrown 
to’ the administrative machine, where it is neither subjected to scrutiny nor to question; but 
simply implemented as has been ordered. In an essay partly intended to trace the evolution of 
public policy studies, and more particularly public policy implementation, Barrett and Fudge 
capture the fundamentals of this development aptly when they observe that:  
Much of the organizational literature treats the implementation of policy as a separate 
process more or less in a vacuum. Policy is made somewhere else and handed in, so to 
speak, to the administrative system which then executes it. The implementation process 
is seen as inextricably bound up with organizational structures and processes, that is, 
policy comes in at the top and successively refined and translated into operating 
instructions as it moves down the hierarchy to the ‘operatives’ at the bottom. (1981: 9) 
The South African policy scholars Brynard, Cloete and de Coning (2011:135) argue that the 
classical approach to implementation theory evinced by the first crop of implementation 
theorists, demonstrates the seminal influence from specific forces which have shaped the 
progress of management as a science over time. These policy scholars identify at least three 
prominent influences which determined the nature of the first generation theorists’ approach to 
public administration, and by implication to the development of research on policy 
implementation theory.  
According to these scholars, the first influence shaping the mechanistic first generation 
approach to policy implementation depicts an influence from the German sociologist Max 
Weber’s model, which conceived bureaucracy as a firmly ordered, rationalised, legalistic and 
authoritarian system. This view informed the understanding of the public service as a system, 
“where a small group of decision makers at the top create policy and surbodinates at the 
bottom dutifully carry it out” (Brynard, 200:167). The Weberian legacy ultimately ensured a 
top-down understanding of implementation, while it simultaneously demonstrated a conviction 
that policy development is a preserve of the powerful elite within the administrative oligarchy.  
It is within this context that the pervasive influence of this legacy on policy implementation 
theory inevitably gave rise to sharp criticism from thinkers such as Barret and Fudge in their 
short analysis of the administrative approach to implementation. 
Weberian ideas about hierarchical organization and management are so firmly 
embedded in the conventional wisdom of public organizations that it is difficult to stand 
back and examine critically some of the assumptions made. Many of the attempts to 
improve performance of public agencies follow the logic of organizational studies, 
assuming that if management structures and processes, channels of communication and 
clarity of communication are ‘right’, effective action will be assured. (1981:9) 
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The second influence is traced from the publication of Taylor’s work on scientific management 
which is understood to have ushered in a new paradigm in the evolution of management theory 
generally. In a rather erudite and abridged history of the development of management theory, 
organization theorists Robins and Barnwell aptly observe,   
The publication in 1911 of Fredrick Winslow Taylor’s Principles of Scientific 
Management marked the beginning of serious theory building in the field of 
management and organizations. (2002:39) 
This view presents bureaucracy as a closed system and it inevitably gave rise to a perception 
of government efficiency and policy implementation failure as challenges attributable to 
management; and as a result attempts to salvage the situation in this regard consisted of re-
engineering of internal management processes such as improving the policy content of 
government decision making in all spheres, improving decision making within government, 
administrative operations and service delivery (Barret & Fudge, 1981:5).  
The last critical influence in this development according to Brynard et al. (2011:138), can be 
identified with Professor Woodrow Wilson. In 1887, Wilson of Yale University delivered an 
influential paper which, to an extent, determined the course of public administration in Western 
democracies. This paper titled, “The Study of Administration”, sought to separate public 
administration, that is “… the practical operation and functioning of government…” (Link 
1968:1) from politics. The approach tended to enforce the notion that a given administration’s 
responsibility was to implement what politicians had already decided in terms of policy. To 
this extent, no particular role is played by ‘street level bureaucrats’ in the shaping of policy, 
save its implementation without any deviation from what the legislator ordered. 
First generation policy implementation scholarship also highlighted the fact that policy failure 
was not only the result of bad implementation. On the contrary bad policy instruments 
contributed to programme failure (Winter, 2006,:152). For Levitt (1980:160) the first two 
critical concepts she regards as important for policy implementation analysis are instruments 
of policy and enforcement. Policy instruments refer to laws, people, organizations as well as 
other devices used to express policy (Levitt, 1980:153). While policy instruments and 
enforcement may be two distinct concepts, they are nonetheless interrelated and interacting; 
and the distinction may not be as clear as the concepts suggest in the implementation of policy.  
What makes policy instruments critical for policy implementation is manifold. In the first 
instance they are not necessarily nor automatically established by the policy being implemented 
and for that reason they may or may not be arbitrarily chosen. It is for this reason that the choice 
of a relevant policy instrument is a matter of great interest in policy studies because, “It is 
reasonable to assume that the less this aspect of policy process is left to chance, the less likely 
there are to be unforeseen difficulties in implementation arising from this aspect.” (Levitt, 
1980:160).  Secondly, the nature and form of the instrument chosen should take cognisance of 
the individuals and organisations (i.e. capacity) who will take part in operating it; and according 
to Levitt this is an aspect of the policy process that is not always well developed. Consequently, 
the fact that the choice and the design of the instrument to be used to express policy is not 
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always made by the organization which will eventually be responsible for operating the 
instrument presages that, whoever makes the choice and designs the tool should consult with 
those who will operate it on a day to day basis (Levitt, 1980:162). There is also a possibility 
that an existing instrument may be used for a completely new objective altogether; whereas in 
other instances it is required that both new and old instruments be used for new polices.  
On the other hand enforcement “… covers the ways in which instruments for policy may be 
applied and their effects monitored.” (Levitt, 1980:177). Consequently, several aspects or 
types of enforcements are available to deal with different types of power. They include legal 
action and penalties, which are generally enforced by common and criminal law; sanctions; 
incentives and discretion, where instead of applying the rules of legislation, the person 
operating the instruments opts for other enforcement measures. A case in point in this regard 
would be in instances where legislative processes are regarded as cumbersome and expensive. 
Discretion may also be caused by the fact that legal instruments and other enforcement powers 
may be interpreted differently at certain levels of authority. It is also in the nature of policy 
instruments to have the potential to build different degrees of power and force in their 
operation. That is, the power that a policy has as a result of the decisions made by its makers 
is virtually controlled by the instruments chosen to operate it.   
If the degree of control enshrined in the instrument is high, it will be difficult to design the 
relevant instrument in the early stages of its development. “The more flexible or optional the 
instruments expressions of policy are, perhaps the easier the design can be.”(Levitt, 1980: 
163). However, the degree of power or force built into the instrument which expresses a given 
policy has an impact on interorganizational relationships; that is on the actors who are supposed 
to collaborate within the network in order to implement policy; and the extent to which other 
actors in the network are able to respond to the controls of the instrument may be  predictable 
at times. Policy instruments express policy differently and it is not uncommon that such 
instruments are used in a combination (Levitt, 1980:167). 
The case study method made it difficult for analysts to exercise a measure of control to the 
proliferation of extraneous and independent variables generated by the research, or to attempt 
to generalise from the findings made on the basis of single case studies.  This phase, especially 
at its incipient stages was plagued by the multiplicity of variables understood to be impacting 
on implementation. Secondly, case studies made it difficult to generalise the findings in respect 
of other policy fields. For example, some may want to argue that Ruth Levitt’s observation in 
relation to the use of policy instruments may not be equally applicable in other policy areas 
apart from the area of pollution. 
By the middle of the 1970s, policy implementation researchers were already beginning to focus 
on the next stage of theory development, which is model building; and that is the subject of the 





2.6 THE SECOND GENERATION OF IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES-THE TOP-
DOWN VERSUS THE BOTTOM-UP PARADIGMS 
According to Winter, (2006:151), the second generation implementation studies began in the 
early 1980s; and sought to go beyond the explorative nature of previous research by 
constructing theoretical frameworks which could be used for empirical analysis. Unlike the 
majority of studies conducted in the previous phase, there were optimistic undertones 
undergirding some of the second generation studies (Winter, 2006:151).  
The Nepalese scholar Narendra Raj Paudel argues that the second generation implementation 
theories focused attention on the relationship existing between policies and practice (2009:39). 
He observes that the researchers of this phase of theory development highlighted a number of 
lessons which had been learnt for policy analysis. For example, it was discovered that policy 
by itself could not mandate what happens during its implementation within the local level; and 
that for any measure of success to be recorded in such a context, it would virtually depend on 
individual motivation (incentives) and belief; the strategic balance of pressure and support (the 
balance of sticks and carrots); and that policy directed change is in essence the challenge facing 
the smallest unit. Second generation scholarship on public policy implementation theory 
development also revealed that there is a sense in which implementation varies over time across 
units of government, and this process led to the construction of analytical, if theoretical 
frameworks which eventually gave rise to the top-down and bottom-up paradigms of policy 
implementation approaches (Paudel, 2009: 39; Pulz and Treib, 2007:89; Winter, 2006:152; 
Lester et al. 1987:202; Knoepfel, Laurre, Varone & Hill, 2007:194; Brynard et al. 2011:138; 
Conteh, 2011:123; deLeon, 1999:316).  
The Loyola University scholar, Professor Richard Matland captures the theoretical context 
which provided the basis for new developments in implementation research at this time. He 
perceptively observes,  
As implementation research evolved, two schools of thought developed as to the most 
effective method of studying and describing implementation: top-down and bottom-up. 
Top-down theorists see policy designers as the central actors and concentrate their 
attention on factors that can be manipulated at the central level. Bottom-up theorists 
emphasize target groups and service deliverers, arguing policy really is made at the 
local level. Most reviewers now agree that some convergence of these two perspectives, 
tying the macro level variables of the top down models to the microlevel variables 
“bottom-uppers” consider, is necessary for the field to develop. (Matland, 1995:146) 
In the top down approach, whose advocates included among others, scholars like Van Meter 
and Van Horn; Mazmanian and Sabatier; Nakamura and Smallwood, goals are specified by 
policymakers and implementation can be carried out by setting certain mechanisms in place. 
As Paudel (2009:39) perceptively notes, it is of utmost importance in this approach to policy 
implementation that the policymaker exercises control over the environment of implementation 
and implementers. To this extent a number of instruments are available to him to ensure such 
control. In the top-down approach, implementation has to do with the degree to which actions 
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of implementing officials or target groups coincide with the goals enshrined in the authoritative 
decision of the policymaker (Paudel, 2009:39; Matland, 1995:146). It is often argued by 
scholars that the most fully developed top-down model was created by Mazmanian and Sabatier 
(1989), which presents factors like the tractability of the problem, the ability of statute to 
structure implementation, non-statutory variables which affect implementation; and the two 
scholars argue that the probability of successful policy implementation hinges on these factors 
(Matland, 1995:146; Winter, 2006:152).  
The criticism levelled against this approach included among others the fact that in the first 
instance, the framework predicates itself on the statutory language as its point of departure, to 
the neglect of all else which preceded the “command” (Paudel, 2009:40). It ignores the fact 
that there are barriers to implementation germane to the earlier stages of the policymaking 
process; that is, long before the authoritative decision is made. “Analysis that takes policy as a 
given and does not consider its past history might miss vital connections.” (Matland, 1995:4)  
The approach also ignores the political realities responsible for policies with multiple goals 
(Paudel, 2009). Palumbo and Harder (1981:x) observe that when legislators, for example, make 
pronouncements about policy choices, they do not always provide clear goals that can 
efficiently direct the process of implementation of the relevant prescript. They argue that this 
is often caused by the fact that policy should seek to solicit support from diverse constituencies; 
and this in itself necessitates that policies are stated broadly in order to enlist support from a 
much wider front.   
These challenges facing the top-downers eventually led scholars to conclude that policy is not 
the preserve of legislators only. On the contrary, what normally happens in practice is that 
policy directives emanating from the top echelons of the hierarchy are often reinvented during 
the process of implementation3 by lower level administrators. 
… organizations do not follow a top-down model in the sense that all the lower echelon 
members do precisely what those at the top “order”. There is inevitably a large degree 
of discretion at all levels of an organization, and this is not always used to implement 
the interpretation those at the top have for policy goals. (Palumbo & Harder, 1981:x) 
Bottom-uppers on the other hand which included among others, scholars like Lipsky (1971, 
1980); Ingram; Elmore; Hjern and Hull emphasized the role played by local level street 
bureaucrats – to borrow from Michael Lipsky - in the implementation of policy (Pulz & Treib, 
2007:89), who in their implementation endeavours have the ability to change policy. In his 
explanation of political implementation which he regards as an aspect of his Ambiguity-
Conflict Model of policy implementation, Matland (1995:164) has noted that in the execution 
of a policy decision, there occurs a shift of forum for doing battle between opposing sides and 
this can lead to non-implementation. This is caused by the fact that at the decision making stage 
of the policy process, consensus can sometimes be reached by logrolling while the parties are 
                                                 
3 Hence Michael Lipsky’s coining of the concept of street level bureaucrats as policy actors who have the potential 
to ‘reinvent’ policy during the implementation process. That is, the process of implementation adds a new 
dimension to the enacted policy which may not have been part of the original pronouncement and intention. 
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responding to political pressure, even if a sizeable number of these actors have little interest in 
the implementation phase of the policy.  
The bottom-up theory framework generated its own fair share of criticism as well. Matland 
(1995:149) has noted that there are normative and methodological criticisms levelled with a 
measure of consistency by critics of the approach. The normative criticism arises from the fact 
that in a democratic dispensation the right to control policy should derive from the actors’ 
accountability to voters who elected them. Local level service deliverers’ authority to 
‘manipulate’ implementation in accordance with their own whims and interests does not derive 
from a legitimate base of power. For this reason, Matland argues that decentralisation, which 
is one of the central tenets of the bottom-up approach needs to occur within the context of a 
legitimately exercised central control. While street level bureaucrats should have discretion in 
their daily interactions with the citizens, it would be unacceptable to use this flexibility as a 
basis for designing policy since it “equates description with prescription.” (Matland, 
1995:150) The second methodologically oriented criticism of the bottom-up approach cited is 
that it tends to overemphasize local autonomy.  
Taking his cue from Richard Elmore (1978), Paudel (2009:42) argues that it is difficult in this 
approach to think of ways to change the behaviour of street level bureaucrats; and no thought 
is also expended to look at how discretion can be used to improve the effectiveness of policies 
at the street level. There also exists a possibility of creaming in this approach, not only as a 
result of street level bureaucrats, but because of the self-selection of the target groups caused 
by the fact that, more often than not, people who are poor and those who are not educated are 
less likely to benefit from services rendered when compared to the rich and wealthy. (Paudel, 
2009:42; Winter, 2006:153) The challenges observed and experienced with both top-down and 
bottom up approaches led to some kind of a theoretical cul-de-sac.  
From as early as 1985, articles providing a synthesis and critique of available implementation 
literature began to emerge. They included among others, scholarly articles on the subject 
produced by people like Richard Elmore (1985); Sabatier (1986); Van Horn (1987) and others.  
Criticising the top-down and bottom-up approaches, these scholars sought to combine the best 
features of both and virtually gave rise to three attempts (Lester et al. 1987:205).  It is the policy 
scholar Richard F. Elmore (1985) who developed the first American synthesis of the two 
approaches (Lester et al. 1987:205). Without providing a graphic model of his synthesis, 
Elmore suggests that, there is a need for policymakers to take cognisance of policy instruments 
and resources at their disposal together with the structure of incentives characterising their 
ultimate target groups. To this extent Elmore synthesized the two approaches by making use 
of the concepts of backward mapping and forward mapping (Lester et al. 1987:205). 
Concerned with theory building, Paul Sabatier’s synthesis of the two approaches sought to 
combine the bottom uppers units of analysis on the one hand, with the concern of the top 
downers regarding the constraining of behaviour by socio-economic conditions and legal 
instruments. The synthesis is then used in the analysis of policy change which takes place over 
a period of ten years or more (Lester et al. 1987:205). According to these scholars, the third 
contribution came to the fore in 1987, with an article co-authored by Malcolm L. Goggin; Ann 
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O’M Bowman; James P. Lester and Laurence O’Toole.  Taking particular cognisance of the 
American Federal context, these authors’ model advocates the notion that policy 
implementation by the state hinges on inducements provided and constraints imposed by states 
from elsewhere in the federation (i.e. above or below); whereas on the other hand, this model 
of intergovernmental policy implementation equally depends on the state’s favourable 
disposition towards acting, as well as its capacity to give effect to its preferences (Lester et al. 
1987:206). According to these scholars, the state’s choices may be the product of a process of 
bargaining between internal or even external parties which while not situated within 
government, nonetheless get involved in state politics. These scholars therefore maintain that 
for the state to implement federal programmes, it has to depend upon variables associated with 
both the bottom-up and top-down paradigms. The premise from which this synthesis operates 
is the prism that there is no single cause for evident differences in the implementation of a 
given policy (Lester et al. 1987:207). Having considered these attempts at synthesising the 
approaches either with the aim of theory building or of providing practical advice to 
implementers, the scholars note that a crossroads has been reached in the study of policy 
implementation; and to this extent different pathways are suggested for further work.  
It can be argued that one of the best and probably most fascinating synthesizing endeavours is 
the Ambiguity-Conflict model developed by the Loyola University, Chicago scholar, Professor 
Richard E. Matland. The Nepalese scholar concurs that Matland’s contribution “provides a 
more theoretically grounded approach to implementation.” (Paudel, 2009:43). However, while 
Paudel (2009:43) tends to present, in my view, an oversimplified review of Matland’s position, 
it is the argument of this thesis that when Matland is compared with other scholars within the 
synthesizing tradition, his model is slightly nuanced than a simple “combination of top-down 
and bottom-up perspectives”(Paudel, 2009:43). While Matland (1995:150) operates from a 
premise that the limited number of attempts made to combine the two perspectives has 
admittedly led to two groups, that is, a group of researchers who combine the two formats in a 
single model on the one hand, and those who are searching for conditions under which each of 
the approaches is appropriate; he nonetheless is of the view that some of these attempts fell far 
too short from producing viable theoretical models (Matland, 1995:151) Having levelled such 
a criticism he goes on to cite Selitz Wrightsman and Cook’s (1976) definition of a theory as a 
set of concepts which includes how such concepts are related to one another. 
Realising that top-downers choose relatively clear policies to study, while bottom-uppers study 
policies with inherent uncertainty and that few examples of case study oriented implementation 
research consider variations of implementation resulting from a different type of policy being 
implemented, Matland develops the Ambiguity-Conflict Model which requires careful 
evaluation of that particular policy’s characteristics (Matland, 1995:155). The degree of 
conflict and ambiguity inherent in the implemented policy virtually gives rise to four distinct 





Table 2(iii) The Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix: Policy Implementation Process (Taken from 
Matland, 1995:160) 
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Each box depicts the type of implementation (that is administrative; political; experimental and 
symbolic implementations); the resources needed for each of these approaches; as well as an 
example of a policy classified under each of the categories. Different dynamics operate in each 
of the implementation paradigms and for that reason they are suited to different types of 
policies.  
The second generation of scholarship in implementation research is also criticised for lack of 
consensus regarding a common definition of the concept “implementation”. Secondly, there 
are differences in the role of implementers more particularly with regard to their respective 
degree of autonomy. Thirdly, the synthesis fails to explain why implementation occurs, while 
at the same time it is also unable to predict behaviour of implementers in the future.  The 
approach is also plagued by too many case studies and not enough validations and replications 
(Paudel, 2009:44). 
The challenge faced by second generation implementation scholars was that of parsimony with 
regard to the list of implementation variables generated by such inquiries (Winter, 2006:157). 
As Conteh (2011:123) argues, even the combinations of top-down and bottom-up perspectives 
left the reader with a long list of variables and complex diagrams of causal chains.   
2.7 THE THIRD PARADIGM-CONVERGING THEORIES AND DESIGNS 
As early as the late 1980’s, there was already consensus emerging among scholars that the next 
phase of implementation research should focus on theory building (Lester et al. 1987:210). 
This dissertation advances an argument that in so far as developing ‘full blown’ implementation 
theories within the so called third generation paradigm of policy implementation, scholars have 
largely expended their efforts in the area of mapping contours for development of such studies. 
This suggests that not much has been forthcoming in terms of developing actual theories than 
Administrative Implementation 
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exploring how to configure the new agenda in this direction. Consequently, the current section 
of this chapter is not intended to be an exhaustive presentation of the evolution of third 
generation scholarship on public policy implementation. On the contrary, it will seek to 
highlight some exemplary attempts by a few scholars to conceptualise this agenda and identify 
some trends in the direction of third generation implementation scholarship; and that is the 
subject of the following section of this chapter. 
2.7.1 THE CALL FOR QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGNS IN POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES: FROM GOGGIN TO WINTER. 
As early as the late 1980’s, the University of Denver scholar, Professor Martin L. Goggin and 
his colleagues have expended some considerable effort in drawing the attention of other 
academics in the field to what should be the focus of third generation scholarship in public 
policy implementation. Writing in 1986, Goggin calls for a third generation implementation 
theory which will test theories by using comparative case studies and statistical research 
designs; a challenge which is later taken up by such scholars as Winter with characteristic 
nuances. Subsequent to that, Goggin together with James P. Lester, Ann O’M Bowman and 
Laurence J. O’Toole Jr. followed with a paper which can be regarded not only as a sequel to 
Goggin’s 1986 work, but also an important prelude to their combined effort which culminated 
into a book in 1990.  In the journal article published in 1987, these scholars argue that before 
any attempt can be made to develop a viable theory in this phase of implementation research, 
critical conceptual and methodological issues must be attended to. They include such 
phenomena as clearly identifying activities which can be regarded as belonging to 
implementation proper; the multiplicity of variables understood to be impacting on 
implementation; the combination of top-down and bottom up elements into a single model 
(Lester et al. 1987:211). In the area of measurements, policy implementation theorists must 
attend to issues relating to the measurement of variables; testing of hypothesis, as well as issues 
of data reliability (Lester et al. 1987:212). According to Winter (2006:157), Goggin et al.’s 
1990 work must be understood as a follow up on Goggin’s earlier solo endeavour of 1986; and 
in this publication, observes Winter, the said follow up consisted of a communications theory 
perspective on intergovernmental implementation; and further countenanced many of the 
variables generated by the previous bottom-up and top-down approaches to policy 
implementation. The special focus of this study was variations among states in their 
implementation in three different social and regulatory policies. The scholars further 
encouraged research which involves multiple measures and multiple methods which include 
quantitative research methods of inquiry.  
The Danish scholar, Soren Winter proposes a six point agenda for further research on the 
subject. In complete contrast to the desire to develop “the overall and one for all 
implementation theory” (Winter 2006:158), third generation implementation research should 
countenance theoretical pluralism or diversity of methodologies, and further focus on 
generating partial theories of implementation (Winter, 2006:158). This approach, Winter 
argues, will bring about new insights.  Generalising the model of implementation would in his 
view inhibit the precise specification of variables and thus hinder development in the 
understanding of implementation; “… it seems more fruitful to use research resources on 
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developing partial theories and hypotheses about different and more limited implementation 
problems and on putting those to serious empirical tests.” (Winter, 2006:158).  Winter suggests 
this approach because he feels that some of the methodological and theoretical 
recommendations suggested by Goggin et al. (1990) are too demanding and unrealistic (Winter, 
2006:157). There also exists a possibility that some of the different implementation 
perspectives generated by scholars would be integrated into broader analytical frameworks or 
models; and the main advantage to be derived from such frameworks is that they will 
emphasize the testing of theory driven hypotheses and provide framework for different studies 
to talk to each other, thus allowing comparison to take place.  
The second pair of aspects for the proposed agenda for third generation implementation 
research according to Winter (2006:158) has to do with the need to clarify concepts and a focus 
on outputs as dependant variables for research.  Concurring with his colleague Peter May 
(1999), Winter (2006:158) is of the opinion that most existing conceptual frameworks are not 
well developed in the sense that they are still characterised by concepts which are not 
sufficiently defined; and have no specification for causal links between them. However, the 
most pressing need for advancing implementation research according to Winter, is to 
reconsider the question as to what actually constitutes the object of study (i.e. the important 
independent variable) in implementation research.  Winter observes that in most existing 
scholarship on the subject, the word ‘implementation’ is often used to refer to both the 
implementation process and the output (or even at times the outcome) of the implementation 
process.  In contrast to Lester and Goggin et al. (1999), according to Winter, implementation 
research’s main objective or focus of study should be the output process in terms of delivery 
behaviour; and this focus is in keeping with common parlance in public policy research in terms 
of content of policy, the causes of policy and the consequences of its implementation (i.e. 
outputs). 
Winter observes a characteristic challenge in existing scholarship on implementation research 
in the sense that in such studies, goal-achievement, which is defined either as an output or 
outcome, is used as a dependant variable. For the Danish scholar, this poses serious problems 
for developing a viable theory of implementation and this is perhaps another instance where 
his mapping of the new agenda for third generation research becomes intriguing and lends 
credence to its suggested quantitative design. For Winter (2006:159), the inaccuracy of using 
goal-achievement as a dependant variable for this type of research lies in the fact that the 
phenomenon is a fraction mathematically speaking, where both output, in terms of the 
performance of the implementing actors, or outcome in terms of impacts or effects on the target 
population, are regarded as numerators while the policy goal becomes the denominator of the 
said fraction.  In other words, one can configure Winter’s implied equation in this instance as 
follows: 
 G A = OP or OC 
       PG 
Where G A = Goal-Achievement; OP = Output; OC = Outcome; and PG = Policy Goal 
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The difficult challenge this equation poses for using goal attainment as a dependant variable is 
that when goal-achievement is considered a fraction as the equation illustrates, there are 
different factors which account for variations in both the numerator and denominator of that 
particular fraction; thus rendering implementation theory generation problematic.  As the 
scholar puts it,  
While the policy formation process is likely to account for variation in goals, the 
implementation process is likely to account for variation in performance, and 
additional factors are likely to account for variations in outcomes. This renders the 
construction and accumulation of implementation theory very complex. (Winter, 
2006:159) 
The second challenge caused by the usage of goal-achievement as a dependant variable in 
implementation research is that policy goals themselves can be complex and thus difficult to 
operationalize. By the same token, goals are sometimes stated vaguely and ambiguously and a 
difference can also be identified between official and latent goals of a policy; thus exacerbating 
the complexity even further. It is for these reasons therefore that Winter proposes that outputs 
be used as a focus of study or dependant variable for implementation research to explain 
variations in the implementer’s performance. This according to Winter will require much effort 
to be expended in conceptualising and categorising the performance of implementers, whether 
they are in the form of agencies or street level bureaucrats. 
Winter further suggests that third generation implementation research should also focus on the 
study of outcomes; and that the latter should not be ignored in research. For Winter (2006:161), 
a complete understanding of the policy process is not possible when we are unaware of how 
the target population responds to the intervention. While Winter acknowledges that some may 
want to take issue with this observation as something which belongs to policy evaluation 
studies, he argues nonetheless that the latter is more concerned with methods than with the 
generation of theories; and has resulted in few theories being generated from this front. To this 
extent, few political scientists and public policy scholars have expended much effort in testing 
hypotheses in relation to outcome variations and the causal relationships between 
implementation behaviour and outcome. Winter therefore argues that his definition of a 
dependant variable, or the focus of study in implementation research (i.e. behavioural 
performance variable), will not only make it easier to explain variations in implementation 
output, but it will also be likely to make the study of the relationship between implementation 
outputs and outcomes much easier. Interestingly, as Winter notes, there is a change of 
dependent variable in this scheme of things in the sense that, in the study of relationships 
between implementation output and outcome, the former ceases to be a dependent variable and 
becomes the independent tested hypothesis. 
The last pair of factors which the scholar identifies for the new agenda of third generation 
implementation research pertains to the usage of comparative and statistical research; and in 




2.7.2 ORGANISATIONAL MANAGEMENT VERSUS COOPERATION-KURT 
CLINE 
According to Cline (2000:551), few researchers have attempted to examine the impact of 
implementation problem definition on the analytic frameworks they use. This includes the way 
in which one defines the implementation problem, shapes the analysis of key issues in the 
process, as well as the recommendations that result from such an analysis. Cline argues that 
from most of the theoretical work produced in this era, it is possible to reduce the arguments 
to two basic analytical approaches, organisational management or co-operation. He continues 
to compare models of the implementation process that use different conceptions of the 
problems for his argument. The models are those of Goggin et al. (1990), the communications 
model (CM) of intergovernmental policy implementation, and the implementation regime 
framework (IRF) largely posited by Stoker (1989). The CM focuses on the problem of 
implementation seen through the perspective of monitoring and improving the aspects that 
impede good organisational management, such as bureaucratic incompetence, lack of 
resources, unclear or poor communication, and lack of compliance with directives, standards 
and guidelines developed to implement policy. IRF focuses on the problems in achieving 
cooperation in the midst of conflict and the politics of conflicting interests among 
implementation agents and participants. Goggin continues by arguing that the inadequacy of 
defining the problem of implementation as one primarily related to organisational management 
represents a restricted and centralist view of the process. Consequently, adaptations on the part 
of other actors subvert the implementation process, and added to this, the roles of 
communication and conflict are also viewed too narrowly. This approach reduced the handling 
of conflict among the relevant actors as part of the legitimised process, and the handling of 
conflict from an instrumental viewpoint, by isolating the process from its larger social and 
political context (Cline, 2000:567). Its primary focus is to achieve co-operation in a context of 
conflicting interests. Conflict is generally viewed as a legitimate phenomenon among 
conflicting social values, and a continuation of conflict during the policy formulation and 
developmental stage. IRF links the implementation phase to the formulation phase, and to all 
the other stages in the policy process. IRF analyses strategic and networked interactions of 
participants within the larger institutional context, as an extension of the larger social dilemma. 
The resultant perspective is that if future implementation studies are going to be more 
descriptive and predictive, an understanding of this broader framework of conflicting and 
opposing role players is required, as well as the role of institutionalised communication 
problems. 
2.7.3 A NETWORK MANAGEMENT ORIENTED MULTI-ACTOR 
IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK: CHARLES CONTEH 
Another most recent contribution to third generation implementation theory development 
comes from the pen of Charles Conteh (2011) of Canada. The theory combines insights from 
theories of policy implementation, organization and governance. Conteh begins by criticising 
attempts to synthesize the two dominant approaches in policy implementation in the form of 
the top-down and bottom-up paradigms as attempts which eventually left the reader with a long 
list of variables and complex causal diagrams. The advent of the New Public Management 
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paradigm with its characteristic features of decentralisation of power, devolution of 
responsibility, structuring and restructuring of relationship in service delivery initiated a 
transition towards complex and multi-actor policy processes (Conteh, 2011:124), changed the 
focus of research from seeking to build meta-theories towards explaining how multi-actors 
from different institutions make a concerted effort together at implementing policies. This 
clearly is the influence of network management in policy implementation.4 For this reason, the 
approach broadens policy implementation “into a multi-focus perspective that looks at a 
multiplicity of actors, loci and level.” (Conteh, 2011:124) 
The organization theory perspective in the framework operates from a premise that 
organizations are principal players in the policy process and to that extent, organization 
theory’s preoccupation with investigating how organizations interact with their external 
environment is brought to bear in the theory; thus adding an open systems dimension to the 
framework.  
Governance on the other hand impacts on the shaping of the suggested framework in the sense 
that the implementation of policy is understood to take place in the context of institutionalized 
policy sub-systems located in various organizations; and this is how the perspective plays a 
part in the analysis of implementation. The interaction of these three theoretical fields therefore 
suggests for Conteh that the third generation policy implementation theory should regard policy 
implementation as a complex combination of hierarchy and collaboration in the sense that 
structured hierarchies have to adjust their internal processes to the imperatives of horizontal 
management for effective policy implementation (Conteh, 2011:128) 
2.7.4 CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO: THE CONTRIBUTION OF HARALD 
SAETREN 
In an attempt “to set the record straight.” (Saetren, 2005:560), the Norwergian scholar, has 
also produced an agenda for policy implementation research which among others, seeks to 
challenge some of the alleged myths and evident gaps in the development of implementation 
theory. He begins by stating his data resources which unconventionally include even PhD 
studies on implementation undertaken as far back as the 1930s and further clarifies his 
methodology which explains how he reached the conclusions he is making; areas which he 
claims are largely neglected by scholarship on the subject. His approach to implementation 
research therefore highlights specific questions which must be addressed by contemporary third 
generation policy implementation studies. They include:- 
1. Challenging the alleged demise of implementation research often reported without 
convincing evidence.  
                                                 
4 In my correspondence with the late South African scholar, Professor Petrus Brynard in 2008, inquiring about the 
ultimate origins of his 5 C Protocol variables approach to policy implementation analysis, he gave an indication 
that while the approach was his own invention, it nonetheless came about as a result of interacting with scholars 
at Erasmus Rottendam University in the Netherlands.  It is safe to infer that the network approach to management 
advocated by this school of thought demonstrated by Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan (1997),  had an influence in 
shaping the contribution of Brynard (2000) which he later espoused in a paper delivered at the 27th conference of 
the African Association For Public Administration And Management in Zambia (2005) 
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2. Exploration of the disciplinary foundations of implementation theory development 
3. The structure of scholarly communication on the subject 
4. Paying a closer look at what is alleged to be the core of publications or literature dealing 
with implementation theory. 
5. Identifying the ultimate origins of implementation research without perpetuating its 
alignment with Pressman and Wildavysky as is the general practice. 
6. Locating the place where implementation studies actually began. 
7. Identifying the policy issues often discussed by implementation studies; and 
8. Attending to the ethnocentric (if imperialist) bias in implementation studies which 
aligns such endeavours with North America and Western democracies. 
2.8 TOWARDS A FOURTH PARADIGM CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION-MNCULWANE AND WISSINK 
Having highlighted the evolution that has taken place in the development of the understanding 
of the critical factors that determine public policy implementation, Mnculwane and Wissink 
(2014:100-104) have argued that there is a need to consider the fact that during the generations 
of scholarly input on the matter, complexity is clearly the most vexing aspect of successful 
policy implementation. To this extent the two scholars have developed a model that can be 
used to analyse policy implementation case studies by focusing on processes, factors and 
institutions (i.e. the PFI Model) 
The model of analysis is primarily caused by the characteristic evolution which has taken place 
in implementation studies over the last century. As indicated earlier on, studies in policy 
implementation have brought about three paradigms of scholarship on the subject. In spite of 
the fact that as early as the 1980s consensus was already emerging among public policy 
scholars that the subsequent phase of research should out of necessity seek to focus on theory 
building, a sizeable number of scholars have expended their efforts in mapping out the contours 
for the development of what can be legitimately regarded as the third paradigm of 
implementation studies. As a result, we are still nowhere near the development of a generally 
accepted comprehensive theory of public policy implementation.  
The model is further prompted by the questions raised in respect of the relevance and the 
feasibility of developing grand theories of public policy implementation which will be 
universally applicable to each implementation locus. This is caused by the fact that the different 
loci within which public policies are implemented are constantly impacted upon by various 
contextual realities which might challenge the assumptions and generalisations of such grand 
theories.  It is the unique contextual orientation of each locus of policy implementation which 
indicates that when careful attention is not being paid to peculiar circumstantial phenomena 
and realities within which a policy is implemented, there exists a possibility that right solutions 
are likely to be provided for the wrong social problems. To this extent therefore, the model of 
analysis brings into focus the old tension between the relevance of the universal and the 
particular in studying social reality.  In essence, the model takes over from where third 
generation implementation scholars have ended. Scholars of the third paradigm have 
essentially generated some theoretical ideas and formulas which are intended to determine how 
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implementation works and how it can be improved. The specific insights developed within this 
paradigm have never been synthesized and simplified into a coherent case study framework 
which reduces the evident complexity and enables one to understand the challenges germane 
to policy implementation. The suggested model therefore pulls all the incipient theoretical 
strings yielded by such scholarship together, and present what may be regarded as a multi-
theoretical approach to the analysis of public policy implementation.  
To what extent is the model multi-theoretical? In the first instance the model combines the 
divergent bottom up and top down approaches to the study of implementation and to that extent 
takes its cue from the already established synthesising tradition characteristic of the third 
paradigm. However, the second multi-theoretical dimension of the instrument lies in the 
influence it receives from theoretical underpinnings of diverse disciplines which converge into 
a single simplified tool of analysis in the model. The PFI Model is primarily informed by a 
conglomeration of theories which include Philosophy (that is Process Theory), Social 
Psychology (that is Theory of Situational Factors or Situationism); as well as Political Science 
and Management (that is Institutionalism and Network Theory).  
Figure 2(b): Proposed PFI Model for Policy Implementation Case Studies 5 
 
The understanding represented in this proposed simplified PFI model, is that analysts and 
scholars could use it as a framework for describing the nature and mechanisms of a particular 
policy implementation plan and programme, through the linking of the processes that gave rise 
to the policy, and the factors that affect the implementation process, and the institutional 
structures and role players that are charged with its implementation. This framework may be 
able to provide a basis for a comprehensive policy case analyses and a basis for a more 
longitudinal study and description of the reasons why policies succeed or fail. It also provides 
                                                 
5 The PFI model (Processes, Factors and Institutions) proposed here should not be confused with the “Policy Implementation 
Framework (PIF)”, initially developed by Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian in the early 1980s. Mazmanian, D. A., 
& Sabatier, P. A. (1983). Implementation and Public Policy. Dallas: Scott, Foresman & Co 
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a more comprehensive insight into the nature of policy dynamics, as opposed to an erstwhile 
mechanical perspective of the nature of policy as espoused by the early scholars. 
 
Table 2(iv): Summary of Elements of the PFI Model as a basis for Policy Implementation 
Case Studies (Taken from Mnculwane and Wissink, 2014:103-107) 
Processes affecting the 
success of policy 
implementation 




Nature of policy formulation Macro environmental 
factors, political, social, 
economic, cultural, legal etc. 
Representative Political and 
democratic structures 
(parliamentary, provincial or 
local political structures)  
Management and 
administration of policy 
plans, programmes and 
projects. 
Developmental stage or 
status of a nation, 




Monitoring and evaluation of 
policy progress 
Policy resources, e.g. human 
and economic resources, 
policy analysis capacity. 
Bureaucracy and 
implementing agencies 
Reality of policy shifts and 
adjustments 
Types of policy instruments 
designed or available 
Clients, actors, street 
bureaucrats. 
Impact of policy outcomes Commitment to modern 
management sciences, e.g. 
strategic management, 
project or programme 
management, monitoring and 
evaluation. 
Networks and Coalitions 
 
2.9 CONCLUSION. 
The development of policy implementation theory as a distinct approach has incrementally 
gone through three specific paradigms where the primary intention has been to build on 
previous generations’ findings, while seeking to circumvent limitations evinced by preceding 
theoretical positions. The first generation of scholars adopted a mechanistic approach to the 
development of policy implementation devoid of any consideration of initiating an upward 
movement from the grassroots; and thus policy became elitist and relied predominately on 
centralised power expressed by such regulatory instruments as legislation. The second 
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paradigm is characterised by the emergence of the top-down and bottom-up approaches to the 
implementation of public policy and eventually brings about attempts at synergising the two 
distinct methods. The top-down paradigm was indicted on a number of fronts, thus leading 
scholars to conclude that the policy process is not the exclusive preserve of legislators, but the 
bottom- up movement is also critical for effective public policy implementation. The over-
reliance on devices of command and control and the concomitant centralisation of power was 
found wanting, and attempts were made to supplement it with an alternative which, among 
others sought to move away from an exclusively hierarchically ordered model of 
implementation, to the one which also takes seriously the decentralisation of power and initiate 
some movement from below. The third paradigm has been largely a convergence of theories 
and designs while underscoring the need for developing a complete theory commanding the 
allegiance of most analysts and practitioners in the field, nonetheless ended up mapping the 
contours of the development of such theories. In most cases the net result of this undertaking 
was largely exploring how the new agenda should be configured; and did not culminate in the 
development of actual theories. Having noted that the quest for grand theories of 
implementation still rages on, and that the development of implementation theory has become 
too complex a phenomenon, Mnculwane and Wissink have made attempts to create a model 
which while underscoring the value of case studies in developing implementation theory, 
highlights the role of specific processes, factors and institutions in shaping implementation. 
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     CHAPTER 3  
        THE INCENTIVES THEORY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter of this dissertation focused on unravelling the different paradigms of 
public policy implementation scholarship, highlighting various contributions made by scholars 
in the quest for a viable theory. This chapter presents the theory of incentives as used in various 
disciplines and policy areas. A comprehensive and chronological examination of the evolution 
of the theory of incentives over time eludes the scope of this study.  At best the present section 
of the thesis highlights the contours of the theory as it is used in selected fields of study. The 
chapter will also highlight some of the major criticisms levelled against the practice of using 
incentives generally. Ultimately, conclusions will be made based on the foregoing. 
3.2 THE IDEA OF INCENTIVES IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT: LAFFONT AND 
MARTIMONT 
 Laffont and Martimort (2001), provide a useful contribution about the theory of incentives in 
economic thought. The usefulness of their contribution more particularly for the purpose of 
this inquiry is that they provide a snapshot and overview of the general themes under which 
the theory of incentives has been developed and applied in economics at the nascent stages of 
the development of the idea. Laffont and Matrimort’s exposition of the theory is not necessarily 
a chronological analysis of the evolution in the development of the concept; on the contrary it 
provides a thematic presentation of the theory, highlighting specific contributions of different 
scholars in the development of incentives thinking and its pervasive nature in various fields of 
economic thought. It is evident that their contribution is to a large degree motivated by the 
relative dearth of analytical works in classical economics interrogating the subject of incentives 
noticeable more particularly at the earlier stages of economic thinking and analysis.  To this 
extent, Laffont and Matrimort suggest that it could well be part of the reason why the incentives 
theory has not received much attention from the discipline, and the fact that economics has 
largely focused its energies on seeking to understand value in large economies.  This has meant 
that there is no sizeable space and effort that classical economics has dedicated to the 
consideration and extensive interrogation of individual behaviour (largely associated with the 
deployment of incentives), in the market.  This situation is considered anomalous by the two 
scholars because it virtually meant that the firm remained a black box of sorts in the sense that 
classical economic theory remained “…  silent on how the owners of the firms succeeded in 
aligning objectives of its various members like workers, supervisors, managers with profit 
maximization” (Laffont & Martimort, 2001:11).   
However, according to the two scholars, when economists eventually decided to look carefully 
at the firm, it became clear to them that despite the characteristic neglect of the concept in 
economic theory, incentives were central to the sustenance of such enterprises.  Incidentally, 
economists began to realize that incentives pervaded a number of areas of economic thought 
such as agricultural contracts, managerial economics, taxation, voting, regulation of natural 
monopolies, insurance and others.  
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According to Laffont and Martimort (2001:17), the original context within which the notion of 
incentives owes its ultimate provenance is the “division of labour exchange.”6 To this extent, 
the two scholars posit an argument suggesting the possibility of tracing the origins of incentive 
thought with the family setting, where each member of the family is assigned specific roles and 
objective functions. Unlike Joseph Schumpeter (1954), Laffont and Martimort identify the 
notion of incentives already operating in Adam Smith’s analysis of agricultural contracts, 
explaining the relationship which existed between landlords and their workmen. This is evident 
in Smith’s discussion of the intricacies involved in the determination of wages, where the 
bargaining power between master and servant is not evenly distributed. That is, the interests of 
the two parties entering into a contractual relationship of this nature are not the same. While 
the master on the one hand seeks to scoop the biggest benefit from the economic relationship, 
he wants to give out as little as possible to the workman whose interests are then put at risk.  
Laffont and Martimort (2001:18) describe this master-servant relationship as the equivalent of 
the modern day principal-agent paradigm in economic thought. Incidentally, the two scholars 
also identify in Smith’s economics, the beginnings of a reflection on the basic constraints 
characteristic of the relationship. That is the fact that in such a relationship, the maxim would 
be, “A man must always live by his work and his wages must at least be sufficient to maintain 
him”; virtually suggests that there are limits to what the master can ask and expect from the 
workman.  
By the same token, the French scholars identify yet another strand of moral philosophy in 
Smithonian incentive thinking. In the context of agricultural contracts discussed by the Scottish 
luminary, Adam Smith, Laffont and Martimort observe some uneasiness about the deployment 
of high-power incentives for economic agents who are short-run maximisers of utility. Smith’s 
concern about this phenomenon arises from the fact that while agents or workmen are paid 
liberally by the piece7, they could easily overwork themselves and in the process, ruin their 
health (Laffont & Martimort, 2001:19). On the other hand, according to the two scholars, Smith 
also worried about the appropriateness of incentives paid to slaves for their respective toil.   
However, in the assessment of Laffont and Matimort (2001:19), Adam Smith’s most accurate 
and well known discussion of the notion of incentives in agriculture appears in his criticism of 
the practice of using incentives in the industry in ancient Europe, in Book III Chapter II. For 
Adam Smith, the two scholars argue, the fact that the land owner or proprietor provides 
metayers (farmers) with such inputs as seed, cattle, and implements for farming as a 
prerequisite for the ultimate equal division of the produce between the farmer and the landlord, 
motivates metayers to increase production so that their share too may be just as great. To this 
extent therefore, Smith according to Lafffont and Martimort, is in contrast to the modern theory 
of incentives which claims that agents will avoid exerting themselves to the best of their ability 
in order to maximise social value. The trade-off between incentives and the allocation of gains 
                                                 
6 The origins of the concept are with Adam Smith’s Wealth of the Nations. The notion suggests that through social 
cooperation of differentiated labour, nations acquire their wealth. Smith’s anthropocentric approach is in contrast 
to the understanding that various forms of capital like land are the source of all wealth.  
7 To be paid by the piece refers to a piece rate system which is a type of performance pay system wherein a worker 
is paid for each item produced, irrespective of the time taken for that particular unit of output to be realised. 
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from the trade concerned ensures that agents in this type of economic relationship exert their 
best effort, thus circumventing the agent’s moral hazard in the transaction. For Smith, 
according to the two French scholars, the biggest challenge with incentives in agricultural 
contracts was caused by the fact that farmers have no investments to make in the land itself, as 
well as in “the unobservable misuse of instruments of husbandry provided by the proprietor.” 
(Laffont & Martimort, 2001:20). This for the two scholars presents a classical moral hazard 
phenomenon in the economic relationship. 
Laffont and Martimort observe that while Adam Smith had already began to indicate and 
interrogate some of the challenges associated with the piece rate incentives in agricultural 
contracts, the interlude leading to what could be termed the first attempts at using incentives in 
managerial economics is provided by the famous English philosopher, mathematician, inventor 
and mechanical engineer by the name of Charles Babbage (1791-1871).8 According to Laffont 
and Martimort (2001:21), Babbage brought about two critical contributions in the development 
of incentive theory which were intended to address specific exigencies in all trades. On the one 
hand, Babbage introduced the need to provide accurate measurements of performance which 
would enable the setting up of appropriate piece-rate contracts. Babbage suggested that it 
would benefit industrious workmen and master manufactures in all trades to design machines 
which would register or quantify the amount of work performed since, “the introduction of 
such contrivances” would inevitably provide a needed stimulus or incentive for honest 
industry. This, according to Babbage would circumvent a sizeable amount of disagreements 
which often ensued between the parties to a contract. On the other hand, Babbage also proposed 
specific principles which should be followed when remunerating labour.  
3.3 INCENTIVES AND ORGANIZATION THEORY 
Hill and Jones (2001:13), prefix their discussion of the agency theory by briefly mapping out 
the contours which have marked the application of the principal-agent model for three decades. 
The two scholars observe that during the 1970s, literature dealing with the agency theory 
concerned itself with the relationship between managers as agents, and stockowners as 
principals. However, in the 1980s, the two academics distinguish yet another development in 
the application of the model to specific economic relationships. The work of such scholars as 
Stephen Ross, the Havard scholar Michael C. Jensen and the University of Rochester don 
William Meckling are cited by Hill and Jones (2001:131) as characteristic of the phase. During 
this era, scholars like Eisehard and Kossink began exploring possibilities of extending the 
application of the model to such disciplines as organizational behaviour, organizational theory 
as well as strategic management. Consequently, the two scholars’ attempt seeks to usher in a 
new paradigm in the application of the model by introducing other stakeholders which “include 
employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, communities and the general public.”(Hill & 
Jones, 2001:131). In essence, stakeholders according to Hill and Jones (2001:133), of course 
taking their cue from Freeman and Pearce refer “to groups and constituencies who have a 
legitimate claim on the firm.”  
                                                 
8 Babbage originated the idea of a programmable mechanical computer which ultimately led to the advent of more 
complex computer designs at a later stage. Hence he is regarded as the father of the computer. 
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But how do the two scholars describe the application of the model in the aforesaid disciplines? 
Clearly taking their cue from Ross (1973:134) and Jensen and Meckling (1976:5), Hill and 
Jones (2001:132) describe an agency relationship “as the one in which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent.”  However, what forms the 
cornerstone of the model is the assumption that there is a sense in which the interests of both 
the principal and the agent will always diverge. Therefore, in accordance with the nature of the 
agency theory, it is incumbent upon the principal to limit the divergence of the agent’s interests 
in the contractual relationship. The tools available to the principal for this purpose are 
incentives used to shape the agent’s behaviour and orientate it towards a specific direction 
which will maximize payoff for the principal. The second tool accessible to the principal to 
align the agent’s interests with his goals is to incur monitoring costs which are intended to 
restrict the agent from engaging in opportunistic action when implementing his/her part of the 
contract.  
However, Hill and Jones introduce an important nuance in their explanation of the model. That 
is, it is sometimes expected in the economic relationship that apart from the monitoring costs 
incurred by the principal, the agent on her part expends some resources in what is known as 
bonding costs, which will ensure that she avoids taking actions with an intrinsic propensity to 
harm or impact negatively on the interests of the principal (Hill & Jones, 2001:132). Having 
put in place such checks and balances to mitigate the effects of the moral hazard in the 
principal-agent model, the two scholars still concede that the divergence is not eliminated 
completely in the relationship. 
It is Laffont and Martimort who argue that the first attempt made at defining a fully developed 
theory of incentives in management economics should be given to Chester Irvin Barnard (1886-
1961), arguably the executive par excellence of the early twentieth century. Barnard 
(1953:139), is an organizational theorist9 and understands the organization as a cooperative 
system which relies on the willingness of individuals to contribute their individual effort for its 
effectiveness. The individual’s motives of self-preservation and self-satisfaction are focuses 
which dominate his/her actions and behaviour; and for this reason, it is the extent to which the 
organization is consistent with the satisfaction of the contributing individual’s motives that it 
will continue to exist as a going concern of sorts. For him, “The contributions of personal 
efforts which constitute the energies of organizations are yielded by individuals because of 
incentives.” (Barnard, 1953:139). It is the incentives which induce the individual to contribute 
meaningfully to a cooperative system. The inadequacy of incentives deployed would among 
other things, mean failure of cooperation in the system; and it is for this reason that, “… in all 
                                                 
9 Organization theory studies the way in which organizations are structured and designed. To this extent the 
discipline takes a macro-perspective on the nature of the organization. Organizational behaviour on the other hand 
focuses its attention on the micro-elements of organizational life and deals with the behaviour of those within the 
organization and its impacts on performance.  However, according to Robbins and Barnwell (2002:9), there is a 
characteristic overlap occurring between these two micro and macro approaches to the study of organization which 
often leads students to seek to understand both perspectives, albeit with different emphases. 
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sorts of organisations the affording of incentives becomes the most definitely emphasized task 
in their existence.” (Barnard, 1953:139)  
For Barnard (1953:140), it is the positive advantages weighed against disadvantages involved 
which induces an individual to contribute to the cooperative system. He argues that the status 
quo which often exists in organisations is that, while on the one hand, the advantages which 
accrue to individuals whose contribution needs to be solicited are few and meagre, the burdens 
involved are also negligible; and for this reason there exists a strong net advantage in such 
organisations. Consequently, where there are numerous or heavy burdens to be borne by 
contributing individuals, the offsetting positive benefits have to be either numerous or powerful 
to elicit the required behaviour. To this extent therefore, for organizations seeking to secure 
relevant and effective contributions from individuals, designing and deploying appropriate 
incentives may involve finding positive incentives or reducing, or even eliminating negative 
burdens or incentives.  
According to Barnard (1953:141), in order for an organization (i.e. cooperative system) to be 
able to obtain the kind of effort from contributing individuals which will enable it to exist, it 
can either use what Barnard calls objective inducements (i.e. the method of incentives), or work 
on changing the minds of such individuals (i.e. the method of persuasion), so that the objective 
incentives provided are regarded as adequate. However, for him it is also considered, 
“improbable that any organization can exist as a practical matter which does not employ both 
methods in combination.” (Barnard, 1953:141). But it can also be expected that while other 
organisations tend to emphasize the method of incentives (i.e. industrial organisations), others 
are favourably disposed towards the use of the method of persuasion (e.g. patriotic 
organisations). But what exactly is meant by both the methods of incentives and persuasion 
within the context of Barnardian managerial economics?  
For Barnard (1953:142), there are two types of incentives used to elicit cooperation in a given 
organisation. On the one hand, he identifies what he calls specific incentives which can be 
specifically offered. This class of incentives or inducements includes inter alia such material 
incentives as money, physical conditions which are provided to persons to solicit their 
acceptance of employment and other pertinent things. The second type of specific incentives 
consists of personal non-materialistic inducements which are often used to secure cooperative 
efforts from individuals beyond subsistence (Barnard, 1953:145). These include such 
incentives as opportunities for distinction, prestige and personal power.  
Even in strictly commercial organizations, where it is least supposed to be true, money 
without distinction, prestige, position, is so utterly ineffective that it is rare that greater 
income can be made to serve even temporarily as an inducement if accompanied by 
suppression of prestige. At least for short periods inferior material rewards are often 
accepted if assurance of distinction is present; and usually the presumption is that 
material rewards ought to follow or arise from or even are made necessary by the 
attainment of distinction and prestige. (Barnard, 1953:145).  
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Thirdly, there are also incentives relating to the creation of physical working conditions which 
are used to induce cooperation. The fourth type of incentives are what Barnard (1953:146) calls 
ideal benefactors, which refers to the capacity of an organization to respond to and to satisfy 
personal ideals of contributing individuals. Such incentives include inducements like pride of 
workmanship, sense of adequacy, loyalty and others. 
By the same token Barnard (1953:146-149) further identifies four indirect inducements which 
cannot be specifically provided and they include the following:- 
 Associational attractiveness, 
 Customary working conditions and conformity to habitual practices and attitudes, 
 The opportunity provided for feeling enlarged participation in the course of events; and 
 The condition of communion and comradeship. 
However, for Barnard there are instances where an organisation is not able to afford incentives 
that are adequate enough to solicit personal contributions from respective individuals. Such an 
organisation “will perish unless it can by persuasion so change the desires of enough men that 
the incentives it can offer will be adequate.” (Barnard, 1953:149). For Barnard, persuasion is 
a three-pronged strategy which entails:- 
 The rationalisation of incentives which either takes the form of a general rationalisation 
or a specific rationalisation, 
 The inculcation of motives – which entails the education of the young and propaganda 
for adults. 
Barnard completes his exposition of incentives by providing an outline of the theory of the 
phenomenon. In order to achieve this particular objective, Barnard (1953:154), outlines the 
theory with special reference to three distinct types of organisations namely, an industrial 
organisation, a political organisation, and a religious organisation. It would seem that the theory 
of incentives developed by Barnard in respect of the said types of organisations is primarily 
informed by the nature of the output expected as a result of cooperation in the system. The 
industrial organisation’s raison d’etre is the production of goods or the provision of services. 
According to Barnard, high incentives are possible in an industrial organisation under 
favourable environmental conditions coupled with relative ineffectiveness and relative 
inefficiency. By the same token, where the industry is operating under unfavourable conditions, 
effectiveness and efficiency, it will be necessary to pay low inducements. To this effect Barnard 
(1953:155) notes, “In most cases the limitations of conditions, of effectiveness and of efficiency 
permit only limited material inducements.”  
But Barnard also argues that in an industrial setting no amount of or level of material incentives 
will be able to elicit individual energies from participants and ensure effectiveness and 
efficiency in the organisation. It is for this reason therefore that non-material inducements 
should be considered in this context. However, according to Barnard (1953:156), non-material 
inducements have the tendency to conflict with each other; and for that reason are not 
compatible. To illustrate this point, Barnard cites the example where the opportunity for 
personal prestige is used as an incentive to elicit cooperation from an individual. To this extent 
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he perceptively notes, “Thus the opportunity for personal prestige as an incentive for one 
person necessarily involves a relative depression of others; so that if this incentive is 
emphasized as to one person, it must be in conjunction with other persons to whom personal 
prestige is relatively an important inducement.” (Barnard, 1953:156) The challenge involved 
in striking the right balance in the use of incentives therefore will often create a need for 
recourse to persuasion; yet even such recourse entails an amount of material outgo. To further 
illustrate the point, Barnard cites the example where coercion is to be used as persuasion and 
argues that the cost of maintaining force in this regard may prove to far outweigh the benefit. 
The same escalation of overheads will occur even if the method used to persuade is 
rationalisation using propaganda or a specific argument.  
On the other hand, the fact that political organisations do not produce material goods as an 
output presages that both ideal benefactions and community satisfactions become useful tools 
to induce participants to collaboration in such organisations. However, Barnard (1953:157) 
further observes that inferior incentives like opportunity for personal prestige and material 
rewards would still be required for the sustenance of extensive political organisations. The 
same is true in the case of religious organisations where ideal benefactions and communion of 
kindred spirits are dominant incentives to elicit cooperation among participants, while some 
inferior incentives undoubtedly have a role to play as well. 
The principal-agent paradigm has also been used by scholars to interrogate the subject of 
cooperation among member states. Stephen Ross describes the Principal-Agent Model as one 
of the oldest and common codified modes of interaction in human societies. According to this 
scholar, we conclude that, “… an agency relationship has arisen between two (or more) parties 
when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, 
designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems.” (Ross, 1973:134). It is 
important that Ross provides pertinent universal examples of such economic relationships in 
contracts made, not only between the employer and employee, but also between the state and 
the electorate (Ross, 1973:134). Ross further argues that while on the one hand, much of 
economic literature dealing with issues relating to moral hazards does not necessarily discuss 
principal-agency issues specifically, it nonetheless interrogates questions associated with 
problems arising from the phenomenon of agency; whereas on the other hand, in the context 
of a general equilibrium, the study of information asymmetries is in itself another example of 
an agency theory. As Ross (1973:134) notes, in the principal-agent model of conceptualising 
and codifying interaction in societies, both the agent and the principal have agreed on a specific 
fee which is used as payment to the agent’s services or goods. It is also important for this 
inquiry that Ross’s definition of the principal-agent model is not only construed as a 
relationship taking place between two parties only. On the contrary, the definition 
countenances the existence of more than two parties in the codified social interaction. 
In a paper contributed to the Journal of European Public Policy, Hussein Kassim and Anand 
Menon (2003:121), for example describe the principal-agent model within the context of 
seeking to find solutions to, and studying the institutional complexities of the European Union; 
and by implication within the background of the economics of the organization. In the case of 
the latter, the scholars reckon that the model in question has provided a leading and useful 
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framework for investigating the difficulties which arise from contractual relationships. The 
paper describes agency relationships as something that is, “… created when one party, the 
principal, enters into a contractual agreement with a second party, the agent, and delegates to 
the latter responsibility for carrying out a function or set of tasks on the principal’s behalf.” 
(Hussein & Menon, 2003:122). The definition highlights the centrality of contracts in the 
principal-agent model of social, if economic relationships; whereas on the other hand it refers 
to the delegation of responsibility to the agent for carrying out duties of the principal. To this 
extent, one can conclude that according to the two scholars, their particular nuancing of the 
definition of the model does not only lend itself amenable to the cliché advocating the 
delegation of responsibility while retaining accountability on the part of the principal. This is 
clearly demonstrated by the extent to which they reiterate the reasons why the delegation of 
responsibility characteristic of the principal-agent model is considered beneficial for principals 
in the relationship in so far as it allows them not only to delegate duties or functions, but also 
for the authority that accompanies such a delegation more particularly in the political arena. 
According to Kassim and Menon (2003:123) therefore, delegation affords the principal with 
the opportunity to: 
 Circumvent challenges germane to collective action by ensuring that the costs of the 
transaction offset the cost of monitoring compliance in the execution of the transaction; 
while simultaneously ensuring that other parties to the contract respect the terms of the 
relationship. 
 Deal with challenges arising from incomplete contracts 
 Enhance the quality of policy, specifically in areas which require special knowledge. 
The latter is therefore provided by an agent who possesses it. 
 Deal with regulatory competition and market failure in instances where states put down 
the type of incentives favourably disposed to their respective firms. 
 Displace taking decisions which may be considered unpopular. 
 Circumvent the challenge of policy making instability by delegating the responsibility 
for policy agenda setting to the agent; and thus avoid the disruption that might be 
characteristic of majoritarian systems of decision making in the policy cycle. 
A pertinent question is worth raising at this stage. If the observation made above to the effect 
that the principal-agent model lends credence to the sometimes overused phrase in management 
theory that delegation of responsibility does not necessarily mean the handing over of 
accountability to the agent, is anything to go by, how is it reflected in the aforesaid benefits? 
In the first instance, the principal is ultimately accountable for the cost incurred when 
monitoring the compliance of actors during the execution of a given policy. It is for this reason 
therefore that the principal in a contractual relationship seeks to mitigate such costs so that they 
do not escalate far beyond the benefits which accrue to the execution of the agreement; thus 
nullifying the necessity of such a contract in the first place.  Secondly, the principal in the 
relationship is also ultimately accountable for any policy failure. For this reason, if policy 
agenda setting is delegated to the agent, the inefficiencies which may be caused by inevitable 
changes in the majority oriented decision making systems, which can negatively impact on the 
52 
  
relevant policy cycles, will mitigate the attribution of failure to the agent because chances for 
such are minimized.   
While the two scholars concede to the classical use and prevalence of the model in relationships 
between shareholders and company executives, who on a day to day basis manage businesses 
for shareholders, they equally affirm that such relationships are not peculiar to the said 
environment only since, “… the principal can be any individual or organization that delegates 
responsibility to another in order to economize on transaction costs, pursue goals that would 
otherwise be too costly, or secure expertise.” (Kassim & Menon, 2003:122) In the context of 
public administration therefore, the citing of the objective of the model as that of economizing 
on transactions and the pursuance of specific goals which could otherwise be too costly for 
government to attain virtually links the benefits of the model with the primary raison d’etre of 
the new public management paradigm; whose primary concern is, among others, a reduced size 
of government and a ‘guarantee’ for an effective and capable state; which is a concern 
undergirding the evolution of the civil service reforms (CSR) witnessed over time in both 
developed and developing countries. Taking his cue from the 1997 World Bank Report titled, 
“The state and a changing world”, Kigundu (2004:44) puts it rather succinctly when he 
observes that “… while at the beginning CSR was focused on reducing the size and cost of the 
state, more recent thinking calls for a more capable state.” 
Kassim and Menon’s paper operates from the prism of public policy management. This 
presages that the two scholars see the use of the model within the context of public 
administration as an attempt to respond to the common pressures for change that governments 
have experienced. Minogue (2004:148) provides a succinct outline of three specific and 
common generic stimuli for describing change in governments. In the first instance, the 
realisation that government expenditure and poor performance have caused a fundamental 
questioning and dissatisfaction with the efficiency and effectiveness of large bureaucracies has 
led to awareness that sustaining such administrations would require a lot of money.  The second 
stimulus for this reform and change is the fact that there is a tendency among clients or citizens 
to understand themselves as active consumers of the services which government offers, and 
this has meant that they would always insist on quality of services from the state.  It is in this 
context therefore that the model comes in handy in the sense that, by adopting private sector 
strategies in the use of contracts for example, quality services are ensured for the citizenry 
(Minogue, 2004:151). The third stimulus according to Minogue is ideological in nature in the 
sense that the new public management paradigm provides an opportunity for the elite policy 
makers, not only to reduce the size of the state, but also “to see the new reforms as a means of 
entrenching and reinforcing their power at the centres, while distancing themselves from the 
uneasy problems of implementation at decentralised levels; they may also perceive 
opportunities for political or personal gain.”   
By the same token, the two scholars reiterate and highlight the actual sitz im leben which 
accounts for the ultimate origins of the principal-agent model. The latter is a model motivated 
by the “asymmetric distribution of information’ between the parties to the contract by 
providing opportunities for advice selection and moral hazard which allows shirking (i.e. 
engaging in opportunistic behaviour), that is costly to the principal and difficult to infer or 
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detect (Kassim & Meno, 2003:122). According to these scholars therefore, it is precisely for 
this reason that economists have turned to the use of incentive structures in order to put a 
damper and discourage opportunistic behaviour evinced by the agent under such 
circumstances.  
The use of incentives in the public sector setting is further corroborated by scholars such as 
Avinash Dixit (2000).  Dixit defines incentives as economic relationships where one person or 
party regarded as the principal in the relationship seeks to affect the actions of the agent by 
using incentives.  Dixit classifies such relationships into three categories. The first category of 
relationships in this regard are what he calls the Moral Hazard (MH); and it refers to an 
economic relationship where the action of the agent affects the good results of the principal; 
yet such actions are not observable directly. It is only some of the outcome; that is some of the 
result of the non-observable action that is noticeable. However, the challenge is that while some 
outcome of the action is observable, it does not allow observers to infer the action from the 
outcome, since the result itself is dependent on both the action in question and some other 
variable. The challenge which arises from this type of economic relationship is caused by the 
fact that the action is not verifiable and this creates challenges for designing the commensurate 
schedule of payment. As Dixit (2000:3-4) points out, the relationship and the concomitant 
moral hazard arising from it can be structured as follows. When the agent takes action (a), it is 
not verifiable yet it results in a fairly random outcome (x). The principal in the economic 
relationship faces a difficult challenge when wanting to devise a relevant if commensurate 
payment schedule for the verifiable action y(x); and to this extent s/he will find it difficult to 
maximise the expected utility from this relationship and the goods or services the agent 
provides. The challenge is caused by the fact that since the action of the agent cannot be 
verified, the agent is then faced with a moral dilemma in terms of choosing the first best non-
verifiable action commensurate with the first best payment (y) offered as an incentive in the 
transaction. 
Consequently, the nature of this type of economic relationship giving rise to certain moral 
hazards faced by the agent requires a specific kind of incentive scheme. One such example of 
a solution that can come in handy in order to provide incentives in such a scenario are what 
Dixit (2000:4) refers to as linear solutions to the problem.  The incentive scheme is designed 
in such a way that it provides a basic salary (k) to the agent.  Secondly, it adds a kind of marginal 
bonus (m) to each unit of verifiable random outcome produced (x). To this extent the incentive 
equation would be:- 
Incentive payment schedule = basic salary + marginal reward for each unit of outcome 
produced 
This can be alternatively configured as  
y(x) = k + mx 
The second category of economic relationships is where incentives for information (and not 
necessarily action), are to be provided by the principal to the agent. This is induced by the fact 
that a situation of information asymmetry exists in the sense that prior to the conclusion of the 
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economic relationship; the agent already possesses some information to which the principal is 
not privileged.  The theory underpinning the design of incentives or payment mechanisms is 
the revelation principle which requires the agent to reveal the information she or he possesses, 
which then results in the design of the payment schedule that is understood to be congruent 
with the information revealed (Dixit 2000:6). However, the ‘revelation’ itself is contingent to 
the realisation by the agent that a truthful unveiling of information is optimal for him or her to 
maximise his/her expected utility in the contract. The assumption in this scheme of things is 
that all feasible deployments of a payment mechanism allocated in a situation where there is a 
lack of asymmetry in the information held by the parties to the relationship, are such that they 
are the same as those “of a direct and incentive-compatible mechanism’ used to make the agent 
adhere to the revelation principle to divulge the privileged information s/he possesses prior to 
the conclusion of the economic relationship (Dixit 2000:6). Dixit also observes that in such a 
situation, the design of payment schemes is among other things, approached by crafting a 
suitable range of menu of contracts which are designed in such a way that each choice of a 
contract made by the agent will inevitably reveal the type of information the said agent 
possesses.  
The third category of economic relationships described by Dixit (2000:3;8) is what he labels 
the costly verification scheme of incentive payments. In this instance, the agent in an economic 
relationship observes an outcome better than the principal is able to. To this extent the principal 
is required to craft or derive a particular payment scheme (an incentive), as well as a costly 
verification scheme (Dixit, 2000:3). The latter is caused by the fact that in the process of the 
presentation of the outcome to the principal by the agent, the latter deliberately misrepresents 
the outcome in order to maximize his/her benefit or expected utility. On receipt of the 
‘exaggerated’ report, the principal is faced with two options. On the one hand, s/he may simply 
accept it at face value, or s/he may choose to subject it to a costly verification exercise before 
paying. More often than not, if the agent provides a report which represents a worse scenario 
for him/her, s/he is not audited; however if his report suggests the contrary, a costly audit is 
conducted.10 It is the outcome of the costly audit which will determine whether incentives are 
paid – in cases where the report is truthful – or the agent is fined if the facts have been 
misrepresented. Dixit (2000:8) notes that there are similarities between the payment for 
information and costly verification categories in the sense that both rely on an element of 
revelation principle. However, the difference is that in the case of the incentives for effort 
paradigm, the information is held long before the economic relationship ensues between the 
parties concerned; whereas in the case of the costly verification category, the agent acquires or 
becomes aware of the privileged information post-contract. 
Having outlined the different categories of economic relationships owing their ultimate origins 
and nature to the different configurations of information asymmetries and flows between 
parties, it is also important to note that Dixit (2000:3) is of the opinion that they can arise 
simultaneously in a given situation. One can argue therefore that if such a scenario emerges, it 
has the propensity to further complicate the task of designing suitable incentive schemes that 
                                                 
10 It can be argued that this situation also presents a kind of moral hazard for the principal as well; so that the 
moral hazard phenomenon is not unique to agents only. 
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are in consonance with the labour provided. As to how the possible combination of the above 
can come in handy in instances where the economic relationships occur simultaneously, is 
perhaps the work that requires further research.  
3.4 INCENTIVES IN PSYCHOLOGY 
It is not only in the spheres of economics and management where the theory of incentives 
makes sense.  The psychologist E. Klinger, in a book published in 1977 approaches the notion 
of incentives from the perspective of scientific psychology and advances an argument that 
people are organised around incentives.  Klinger (1977:4) observes that such an organization 
occurs at two levels.  On the one hand, people tend to plan their actions in such a way that they 
situate themselves on a trajectory that will enable them to obtain incentives; whereas on the 
other hand, the pursuance and enjoyment of incentives by individuals has the possibility to 
determine the nature and quality of their inner experience.  To this extent, Klinger concludes 
that the way in which people relate to their incentives is critical.  The economist Dongryul Lee 
concurs with the psychologist:   
An incentive is any factor that motivates a particular course of action. All  
people respond to economic incentives. In other words, people make a decision in  
accordance with their incentives.  Therefore, to understand the behaviour of 
people or the phenomenon shown in the real world, we first need to consider the  
incentives behind those. Once the incentives are found and understood well, we  
are able to obtain much insight to understand and predict the behaviour of people  
and further design those toward the direction we want to head to.  (Lee, 2009: 1) 
 
It is this realization made by Lee that incentives will enable us to predict the behaviour within 
a particular social context, and further assist towards shaping such behaviour to the direction 
we want it to take, which lends credence to the concept as a useful tool in public policy making 
and implementation.   
3.5 THE DEPLOYMENT OF INCENTIVES IN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
There is evidence indicating the adoption of incentives in conservation policies of the natural 
environment. Literature suggests that environmentalists have for quite some time deliberately 
made use of specific incentives to solicit community participation and involvement in 
programmes dealing with conservation issues. The importance of incentives in environmental 
management is perhaps better echoed and summarised in the criticism levelled by the Globe 
Foundation of Canada in its pronouncement against the traditional practice characteristic of 
what the article calls ‘traditional enviromentalism’: 
Traditional environmentalism has failed to appreciate the importance of incentives  
in guiding human action, whereas the New environmentalism focuses on individual  
decision making that provides incentives for people to become good environmental  




Perhaps one of the best examples epitomising attempts to use incentives in environmental 
policy development is offered by two scholars Adam Jaffe and Robert Stavins in their paper 
published in 1995 in the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Volume 29, 
titled, “Dynamic Incentives of Environmental Regulation: The Effects of Alternative Policy 
Instruments on Technology Diffusion”.  The purpose of Jaffe and Stavins paper is to establish 
a framework that can be considered when comparing the effects of alternative policy tools on 
the deployment of new technologies.  The paper seeks to provide documented empirical 
evidence to the effectiveness of market-based approaches to achieve objectives for 
environmental protection.  It argues that in order to change the behaviour of target groups in 
the environmental policy arena, it will be worth the while of policy makers to adopt incentive 
oriented market-based approaches to policy development and implementation, instead of 
tenaciously clinging to the established command and control paradigm of traditional policy 
making.  
While Jaffe and Stavins (1995:S-44), acknowledge the preponderance of such literature on the 
subject, they nonetheless lament the paucity of attempts made by scholars to empirically 
analyse and quantify the cost effectiveness of alternative tools and instruments; as well as the 
dearth of empirical investigations into the alleged relative dynamic efficiency of the attributes 
of such alternative policy instruments.  It is for this reason therefore that the two scholars set 
themselves out in the paper to fill the existing ‘void’ in this regard.    
As early as 1995, Jaffe and Stavins had already observed a debate raging between economists 
on the one hand, and policy scientists on the other regarding the most effective mechanisms or 
tools for ensuring that environmental protection is achieved. Economists tended to favour the 
deployment of market based approaches to environmental protection while policymakers on 
their part were favourably disposed towards the traditional command and control strategies 
(Jaffe & Stavins 1995:S-43). For the two scholars the lack of empirical studies demonstrating 
the effectiveness of market based approaches over command and control is caused by the fact 
that such strategies are not used extensively. Governments look for opportunities where they – 
by means of policy – can influence invention, innovation and diffusion of new technologies by 
firms and individuals, which will impact positively on environmental quality.  
For Jaffe and Stavins, policy instruments that can be used to foster and induce technological 
invention, innovation and diffusion11 positively are classified into three categories namely, 
market based approaches, performance standards and technology standards. Policy 
interventions based on these categories have the propensity to force or induce technological 
change. However, Jaffe and Stavins (1995:s-45) observe that the weakness inherent in policy 
interventions which are specifically designed to enforce technological change lie in the fact 
that, while the regulator assumes that such interventions will bring about improvement to the 
existing technologies, they are nonetheless unable to quantify the envisaged improvement. 
According to these scholars, market based policy approaches bring about the most effective 
                                                 
11 According to the two scholars invention refers to the development of a new technical idea; whereas innovation 
is referring to the incorporation of such an idea into a product or process as well as its first implementation in the 




long term incentives in so far as invention, innovation and diffusion are concerned. The reason 
being that market based policy approaches to environmental pollution control bring about 
continued benefits in the form of reduced tax, increase in subsidies or permits that can be sold. 
Performance standards do not offer benefits in the long run. Once a performance standard has 
been achieved, the incentives are not there to encourage further attempts. By the same token, 
once the technology standards are attained, there are no incentives to continue.  
Turning to the effects of direct regulation, our analysis does not suggest  
building codes made any significant difference to observed building practices  
in the decade 1979-1988. It is possible that stricter codes (that were often  
binding relative to typical experience might have an effect, but this itself 
 ought to remind proponents of conventional regulatory approaches that while  
energy taxes will inevitably be effective on the margin, typical command-and 
-control approaches can actually have little or no effect if they are below  
existing standards of practice.  (Jaffe & Stavins, 1995:S-61).  
 
According to the report published by the National Centre for Environmental Economics, 
international experience evinces a greater acceptance of incentive based mechanisms in the 
management of the environment (NCEE, 2004:1). The report discusses a broad range of 
economic instruments used in many countries to protect the environment; and explains how 
each instrument used is designed; how it performs particularly in the context of developing 
countries. While the report draws from other survey literature, it however avoids a simple 
regurgitation of other scholars’ analysis on the subject. According to this report, an economic 
incentive is, “… any instrument that provides continuous inducements, financial or otherwise, 
to encourage responsible parties to reduce their release of pollutants or make products less 
polluting.” (NCEE, 2004:2). Incentives designed to protect the environment provide monetary 
rewards or near monetary rewards for less pollution released and impose sanctions for polluting 
more. 
Overall, the report observes some general advantages associated with the use of economic 
incentives in comparison with the traditional command and control approach. Such incentives 
generally provide motivation to reduce pollution below the required or permitted levels. 
Secondly, they encourage polluters to be smart about pollution control costs; and also stimulate 
technological innovation. Finally, some economic incentives are uniquely suited to world 
problems on pollution because they make it easier to effect behaviour change in situations 
where smaller polluters are widely dispersed; which makes it difficult for command and control 
measures to be effective. The report concludes that, behaviours that are difficult to deal with 
adequately by using command and control measures are effectively managed by economic 
incentives; and for this reason encouraging polluters do more or improve on existing regulatory 
requirements. The following table virtually summarises the array of economic incentives used 





Table 3(i). Incentives used internationally 
ECONOMIC 
INCENTIVE 
MODUS OPERANDI ADVANTAGES DISSADVANTAGES 
1. Fees, charges and 
taxes 
The source or polluter 
pays a fee/charge/tax for 
each unit of pollution 
produced or emitted. 
The tool is attractive 
because the polluter is 
able to quantify savings 
to be made by producing 
less pollution. 
Fees generate revenues 
for agencies which 
impose them 
Fees cannot guarantee the 
amount of reduction of 
pollution to be effected. 
 
In most cases, rates used 
for fees are so low in such 
a way that their impact on 
reducing pollution could 
be  minimal 
Failure of some  
incentives to directly 
target pollution (e.g. 
nonexistence of taxes 
levied for automobile 
emissions where gasoline 
as well as car taxes are 
used indirectly to address 




It takes the form of a 
monetary deposit paid at 
the time when the 
product is sold; and the 
deposit is returned upon 
the product reaching the 
end of its useful life. 
They sometimes 
originate from the private 
sector and do not always 
need to be mandated by 
government. 
Fees paid help to 
subsidise return of 
recyclable products 
Most appropriate for 
discrete solid 
commodities 
High transaction costs 
involved limit their usage. 
3. Pollution Trading 
Systems 
Two types of systems 
used in rights to pollute, 
namely cap and trade 
systems and credit 
systems. 
Cap and trade systems 




Companies profit from 
reductions in emissions. 
Less innovative firms are 
able to purchase tradable 
emission allowances. 
Provides certainty about 
environmental 
improvement. 
Possibility of high costs 
of operating them. 







MODUS OPERANDI ADVANTAGES DISSADVANTAGES 
Credit systems have no 
established ceiling for 
emissions; but the 
polluter earns tradable 
credits for being able to 
control pollution beyond 
the limit specified in the 
permit. 
4. Subsidy Systems Grants, low interest 
loans, favourable tax 
treatment as well as 
preferential procurement 
policies for products 
construed to be posing 
lower risks for the 
environment are 
important incentives 
used in this regard. 
Generally used to curb 
pollution by the private 
sector and to support the 
initiatives by the same to 
reduce pollution. 
Have the potential to give 
rise to harmful 
environmental impacts 
like subsidized water. 
Government and by 
implication, the tax payer 
virtually pays the cost 
which is in essence, the 
liability of the polluter. 
5.Information Disclosure Information on 
environmental 
performance is collected 
and made publicly 
available. 
Companies are able to 
learn about the 
magnitude of their 
respective emissions in 
the process of collecting 
relevant information. 
 
6. Voluntary Mechanism Negotiated agreements 






Benefits akin to those 
associated with 
information disclosure 
make the tool  popular.  
Eligibility for a variety of 






3.6 INCENTIVES AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 
The multiplicity of fields within which the notion of incentives is applied is further 
corroborated by their application in the knowledge economy. Incentives play an integral role, 
not only in the generation of knowledge per se; but also in the diffusion of the same to relevant 
industries where it is eventually used. Knowledge asymmetries existing between the industries 
on the one hand, and individual researchers and institutions on the other create the context for 
the relevance of incentives in the generation and deployment of such knowledge.  According 
to Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2002:14), the conduits for transferring useful knowledge to the 
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consumer-industry are manifold and include among others, patents, informal information 
exchange, publications and reports, public meetings and conferences, recently hired graduates, 
licences, joint or cooperative ventures, contract research, consulting and temporary personnel 
exchanges. In the Carnegie Mellon survey used by Cohen et al., the indication is given that out 
of a labyrinth of pathways that can be adopted by public researchers and institutions as specific 
modes of knowledge transfer to industry, publications and reports appear to be dominant 
channels used; yet the preference for specific channels for the communication of such 
knowledge varies as indicated by the ratings in the research.   
Taking their cue from Salter and Martin (2001), Bekkers and Freitas (2009:3), observe that, 
“… existing evidence suggests that academic research has a positive impact on the 
development of industrial innovation.” In this regard, the two scholars cite evidence provided 
by other academics to the effect that about 10% of “new products and processes introduced by 
firms would not have been developed (or only with great delay) without the contribution of 
academic research.” In order to facilitate the flow of knowledge from individual researchers 
and research institutions like universities, policies are used to intensify the required interaction 
between industry and the researcher. In a paper providing a background to and an evaluation 
of the work commissioned by the European Union Commission as part of the Expert Group on 
knowledge transfer in 2008/2009 for example, the two scholars Bekkers and Freitas (2009:3) 
analyse the motivation and the actual incentives behind the adoption of six main channels for 
knowledge transfer which takes place between the university and industry.  
The two scholars begin their analysis by consenting to the notion that exogenous incentives 
generally are used to encourage specific behaviour, a particular course of action or a relative 
choice.  While the two scholars admit that there is possibly an extensive list of channels 
available to the university in particular which can be adopted to transfer knowledge to its users 
in the industry, they nonetheless propose that the said multiplicity of channels can be 
effectively reduced to manageable categories of six groups. The following table adapted from 
Bekkers and Freitas (2009:6) illustrates the type of incentives germane to each group of 
channels available to the researcher for transferring knowledge to the industry. Incentives in 












Table 3(ii) Channels for knowledge transfer  
TYPE OF CHANNEL MOTIVATING INCENTIVE 
1. Academic and professional 
publication 
1.1 Possibility of being recognized by peers in the discipline 
1.2 Personal motivation provided for example by the personal curiosity 
of the researcher; desire to solve industry related problems; and the 
desire to apply the knowledge required.. 
1.3 The requirement to fulfil job tasks related to the academic  post 
1.4 Possibility for promotion 
1.5 The possibility or even need to participate in a conference 
2. Informal Contacts 2.1 Informal contacts can be motivated by the need for social recognition 
on the part of the researcher. 
2.2 Academics also need to network with peers and colleagues in both 
the industry and the academia. 
2.3 Informal contacts with industry can also be motivated by the need to 
access resources for research; and 
2.4 The need to identify promising areas of research. 
2.5 The possibility that informal contacts can be used as a stepping stone 
to other channels of knowledge flows between industry and the 
individual researcher. 
3. Labour Mobility 3.1 Personal characteristics of the researcher such as the need to:- 
3.1.1 Regularly change job activities 
3.1.2 Acquire a diverse work experience. 
3.1.3 The desire to achieve complementarity between the work of 
research and the application of generated knowledge, can lead to 
mobility from university to industry as a form or chance of knowledge 
transfer. 
3.1.4 Differences in wages and the desire to apply acquired knowledge. 
3.1.5 The firm’s need for valuable economic information; and 
3.1.6 The need to identify new promising arrears of research. 
4. Collaborative and contract 
research 
4.1 Availability of funds for own research or group. 
4.2 Availability of facilities and resources in firms 
4.3 Potential for recognition by peers and industry 
4.4 Need to maintain contracts. 
4.5 The fulfilment of job functions 
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TYPE OF CHANNEL MOTIVATING INCENTIVE 
4.6 Possibility of job promotions 
5. Spin-offs 5.1 Job opportunities. 
5.2 Funds available for own or group research. 
5.3 Desire for applicability. 
5.4 Entrepreneurship.  
6. Patents and Licencing 6.1 Motivated by pleasure of being an inventor. 
6.2 Recognition by both peers and industry. 
6.3 Desire for private income. 
6.4 Potential for generating funds for own or group research. 
6.5 Career opportunities presented by patenting. 
 
According to Bekkers and Freitas (2009:12), some of the incentives motivating the choice of a 
given channel of knowledge transfer from university to the industry are tailored and targeted 
for institutions rather than individual researchers. 
Table 3(iii). Channels targeted for institutions 
CHANNEL MOTIVATING INCENTIVE 
1.Academic and professional 
publications 
1.1 The incentive to provide high quality publication enables the 
university to attract good students and good new staff. 
1.2 Possibility of leveraging the institution to access more research 
funds and staff in the face of  competitive mechanisms used for 
allocation 
1.3 Need to improve the institution’s ranking in the relevant 
scoreboard.  
1.4 Possibility of attracting contracts and collaborations 
2. Informal contacts 2.1 Desire to improve staff’s level of performance by engendering 
and encouraging creativity and widening their horizons as scientists. 
2.2 Possibility of accessing funding. 
3. Labour Mobility 3.1 Improves staff performance levels by widening horizons and 
engendering creativity. 
3.2 Motivated by the applicability of research output in the industry. 
3.3 Need to prevent brain drain as staff flows to industry. 
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CHANNEL MOTIVATING INCENTIVE 
3.4 Need to attract contract or collaborative research. 
4. Collaborative and Contract 
Research 
4.1 Desire to improve the institution’s ranking and scoreboard in the 
face of competitive research funding models applied to research 
organisations. 
4.2 Need to attract research funds. 
4.3 Need to access resources and facilities for research kept by firms. 
4.4 Desire for networking. 
Need to identify new arrears of research. 
5. Spin-offs 5.1 Need to improve rankings and scoreboard as a result of the 
importance placed by policy makers on spin-offs and the concomitant 
commercialisation of knowledge. 
5.2 Financial benefits which accrue to spin-offs. 
6. Patents and Licensing 6.1 Need to improve organisational ranking and scoreboard ratings. 
6.2 Financial benefits which accrue to licence fees charged for 
knowledge. 
 
3.7 SOME OF THE ESTABLSIHED INCENTIVES USED IN HERITAGE RESOURCE 
PRESERVATION. 
The current section of this chapter is not intended to be an exhaustive presentation of incentives 
which can come in handy in ensuring that there is adequate participation in the policy 
implementation conduit within communities. On the contrary, it seeks to highlight some of the 
most well established, effective and innovative ways of soliciting the required participation. 
Taking our cue from some of the state of the arts type of reports which have been produced by 
various bodies on the use of incentives for this particular purpose (e.g. the 2004 National 
Incentives Task Force for the EPHC and the Parliamentary Assembly Report of the European 
Council of 2003 etc.), at least twelve such incentives will be examined in this regard.  
3.7.1 TAX INCENTIVES  
Public policy is regarded as a panacea for identified social ills which are construed to warrant 
a solution. In the international heritage landscape, a variety of tax incentives are used to induce 
positive responses from communities particularly with the protection and preservation of the 
built environment. In the City of Kingston, Ontario in Canada for example, the City Council 
established a Tax Refund and Grants For Heritage programme for properties designated under 
the Ontario Heritage Act (Kingston, 20-09-2012). The initiative was a result of collaboration 
between two units within the Council namely, the Planning Division and Financial Services. 
The collaboration was caused by the varied nature of designated property owners in Kingston. 
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The Kingston Municipal Act, 2001 provides for a 40% tax refund per property with a heritage 
assessment agreement within a cycle of three years.  
There is some evidence that in the United Kingdom at least two types of tax incentives are used 
with regard to heritage property.  On the one hand, the government has introduced what is 
called the Acceptance in Lieu Scheme which allows individuals to submit items or heritage 
objects of cultural or historical significance for public ownership in lieu of Inheritance Tax; 
Capital Transfer tax and Estate Duty (Russell, 2010:1). The scheme is regulated under the 
auspices of the Inheritance Tax Act, 1984 and provides that 25% of the tax that would have 
been payable, is remitted back to the owner of the heritage object submitted.  
By the same token, the United Kingdom also has a Conditional Exemption Incentive Scheme 
intended for the preservation of artefacts of cultural or historical importance in order to benefit 
the nation. The scheme involves the deferment of Inheritance Tax, Capital Gains Tax in 
instances where an item qualifies for exemption when passed to a new owner either on death 
of the same or as a gift. However, the exemption is conditional and for this reason the owner 
should continue to comply and satisfy a specific criteria. 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also provides another pertinent example 
of attempts made in the international arena to incentivise a constellation of actors in the heritage 
policy implementation arena. The report titled, “Tax Incentives for cultural heritage 
conservation”, intended for discussion by the Committee on Culture, Science and Education 
begins by highlighting the nature of the context within which heritage incentives are of 
paramount significance for preservation of resources. The report argues that public funding 
alone has become increasingly inadequate to effectively support and encourage owners of 
heritage property, more particularly in countries with  rich heritage or those who are making a 
transition from economies run by the state (Parliamentary Assembly, 2003:1). The report 
therefore identifies reduced tax on VAT, Income Tax, Wealth Tax, Inheritance Tax or Gift tax 
as appropriate avenues of incentivising owners of heritage property to protect and care for 
heritage resources under their care and ownership. A country by country review is then 
undertaken by the report which concludes that while some countries do offer tax rebates for 
heritage preservation some do not, while in others no data was available at the time of the 
preparation of the document. However, it needs to be pointed out that tax reductions are an 
effective way of providing encouragement to property owners to protect heritage resources, but 
it may not be as effective in places where the bulk of such property is not in private hands as 
is the case in Western Europe where according to the said report about 65% of historic buildings 
is owned either by individuals or non-state bodies (Parliamentary Assembly, 2003:2). 
3.7.2 GRANTS  
The report of the Taskforce of the EPHC cites three different types of grants generally used for 
incentivising heritage protection in the global heritage industry. They are entitlement grants; 
discretionary grants and performance grants (EPHC, 2004:16). Entitlement Grants are types of 
grants provided to the owner of a heritage resource who meets a special eligibility criteria. The 
Netherlands Department of Conservation for an example provides entitlement loans to property 
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owners intending to embark on works of restoration or maintenance ranging from 20%-70% of 
the total cost. The City of Kingston in the State of Ontario in Canada, for example has a 
Heritage Property Grant Program where an owner of eligible property receives a grant not 
exceeding 50% of the cost of the restoration project. This type of funding is provided once in 
two years on a first come first serve basis; and does not exceed $2000 (Kingston – 02-09-2012). 
Discretionary Grants on the other hand are types of grants where applicants have to compete 
for funding adjudicated by an assessment committee or board which determines who eventually 
receives the coveted funding. While most states in the United States of America make use of 
grant schemes for heritage preservation, the state of Colorado has a reputation for offering the 
most generous grant offered by a state. From 1993-2001, this state provided grants amounting 
to $63 million, averaging $7 million per year. In the year 2000 alone, the scheme provided $13 
million to property owners for the said purposes. 
In the case of Performance Grants, strict criteria are used to define projects which will be 
supported by this type of grant. Applications submitted to solicit funding are screened and 
performance closely monitored (EPHC, 2004:17). It is considered particularly appropriate and 
effective in instances where limited budgets are targeted for priority areas in the heritage 
conservation landscape. The EPHC Report provides two examples of such grants offered in 
both Australia and the United States of America. The City of Roanoke in the State of Virginia 
in Australia, provides grants for heritage property owners wanting to restore the façade of 
dilapidated heritage buildings and further provides employment for low to middle income 
earners in the state. On the other hand, the report also cites evidence provided by the City of 
Phoenix in the State of Arizona in the United States of America which runs a grants scheme 
providing 50% to the total cost of residential heritage property located within historic districts. 
According to this report, this scheme is funded to the tune of $ 1 million US per year; and 
assists with funding in projects costing from $ 2000 - $ 5000 (EPHC Report, 2004:17). 
3.7.3 LOANS 
Short or long term direct loans, secured against the property in question are made available to 
property owners by heritage organisations at lower interest rates. Once a direct loan has been 
repaid, there exists a possibility that it can be given to a new project thus ensuring sustainability 
of the initiative. However, the amount of administrative support required to run a successful 
loan scheme might render them fairly cumbersome. Revolving Fund Loans for example 
provide low interest loans to heritage property owners wanting to restore and rehabilitate 
important historical or architectural buildings throughout the state. The loan works on the basis 
of a twenty years amortization schedule and is payable in five years.  Interest for this loan is 
fixed at half the prime rate applicable at the time when the funding was solicited. However, 
there is a balloon payment due at the end of the five year period ((EPHC Report, 2004:22). 
Loan subsidies on the other hand are provided to the owner of the heritage resources (i.e. 
historical building) who want to do some conservation work by a commercial institution; and 
the interest is then subsidised by a heritage organisation.  A pertinent example of this type of 
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incentives cited by the EPHC is the Victorian Heritage Council in the United Kingdom which 
provides a grant to an owner amounting to approximately 3% of interest of the loan taken. 
3.7.4 PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES 
The Australian Model provides a pertinent example of how local government planning and 
development can create occasion for providing incentives to owners of heritage property ad 
developers. The Incentives for Heritage Protection Handbook published by the Commonwealth 
of Australia for the Heritage Chairs of Australia and New Zealand (HCOANZ) lists a total of 
seven instruments that can be used for this purpose which include zoning controls; planning 
incentives; transfer of development rights; parking; building site ration and land use 
concessions; flexibility in planning and/or building requirements; rate reduction; and waiver of 
fees for development applications (HCOANZ – 9 June 2013). According to the EPHC 
(2004:20), both local government and planning authorities have a critical role to play in the 
conservation of historic heritage. Local planning can promote conservation or even act as an 
important disincentive in ensuring that such heritage is properly preserved and protected by 
means of zoning controls, planning incentives and transfer of development rights. The 
Environmental Plan of the City of Sydney provides that the maximum floor space ration for 
places contained in the Heritage List should be the existing floor space of the building which 
is on site; with the provision that land that is vacant can be improved with the installation of 
new buildings (EPHC, 2004:20). On the other hand, in order to encourage the use and 
conservation of heritage sites in South Australia, the Development Act, 1993, permits Councils 
to relax requirements for planning and building. According to this report, “This could include 
relaxing parking requirements, allowing a use that would not ordinarily be permitted, or 
allowing variation to the usual safety and/or disability requirements.(EPHC, 2004:21). 
3.7.5 HERITAGE AGREEMENTS 
Legally binding voluntary contracts between owners of heritage property and the heritage 
authority are also used as instruments to engender heritage resource preservation. The 
Incentives for Heritage Protection Handbook (Undated:18), for example, observes that such 
agreements are legally binding to both current and future owners and can include other 
incentives like remission on rates, tax deductions, grants, planning concessions and plot ratio 
transfers. On the international heritage industry arena, the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation’s Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage12  provides a classical paradigm of a heritage agreement which 
binds member states to commit to the preservation of heritage within their territories. The terms 
of this convention are not only binding to the said states but in the case of South Africa, the 
convention has led to the adoption of the World Heritage Convention Act No 49 of  1999; 
which seeks among others to ensure that the terms of the convention are cascaded and 
incorporated to the South African Law. 
Apart from agreements committing the global community to the protection of heritage 
resources, there are pertinent examples of such agreements entered into by state bodies or 
                                                 
12 The Convention was adopted in the 17th Session of UNESCO on the 16th of November 1972 in Paris. 
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agencies and owners of heritage property. The Environmental Protection and Heritage 
Council’s National Incentives Taskforce Report defines such agreements as legally binding 
contracts aimed at ensuring long-term preservation and protection of a heritage place. 
According to this report, such agreements are signed in perpetuity and are for that reason 
binding to future owners of the property; while “providing the owner with access to incentives 
such as rate remissions, land tax reductions, grants or planning concessions” (EPHC 
2004:21). The said report cites three examples of such agreements. In 2004, the Heritage 
Council of Western Australia has a heritage agreement scheme in operation which at the time 
consisted of forty six agreements already executed; and a similar number being negotiated. 
Another interesting case in this regard is provided by the Heritage Act of South Australia which 
having provided for such agreements, already had six agreements in place and the time of the 
publication of the said report. However, according to this report, most of these agreements have 
been successful save one; which as a result of non-compliance with terms of the agreement, 
the property in question fell into disrepair; and no legal action was taken because of the cost 
involved as well as negative publicity. This in a sense illustrates the difficulties encountered 
when sticks are to be applied to enforce compliance with heritage laws and regulations. By the 
same token, in the United States of America preservation easements authorised under the 
auspices of historic preservation laws are used as a form of conservation agreements for 
resource protection and preservation (EPHC, 2004:22). 
3.7.6 REVOLVING FUNDS AND CONSERVATION TRUSTS 
According to the EPHC’s Taskforce Report, revolving funds are used with remarkable success 
for conservation of historic heritage properties in both the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America (EPHC, 2004:22). Such funds provide a pool of capital which is used for 
preservation of historic properties. Money from this fund is used to acquire, safeguard and 
resell heritage property with a conservation agreement attached to it. It can also be used for 
lending individuals and organisations to buy restore and secure such properties. The money 
generated from sales and repayment of grants is brought back to the fund’s coffers and reused 
for similar purposes.  
3.7.7 ENCOURAGING USE OF HERITAGE PROPERTIES 
When old buildings in particular are not being used, they tend to deteriorate. A survey 
conducted in Australia indicated that out of all the historic buildings which were unused, 39% 
of them were in a poor condition (EPHC, 2004:24). One of the ways of protecting and 
preserving such heritage resources is to encourage adaptive reuse, where a historic building 
previously used for a particular purpose is refurbished and changed for another use. However, 
the refurbishment and alteration is done in such a way that its heritage qualities are not 
compromised in the process; and the new use can include residential, commercial and 
community uses. The EPHC Taskforce Report (2004:24) perceptively notes that adaptive reuse 
may not always be the kind of panacea heritage practitioners resort to all the time to deal with 
problems of dilapidation emanating from non-use. In the first instance, some historic buildings 
are not amenable to adaptation and it is also not uncommon that the personal objectives of the 
owner of the property are not conducive to the historic fabric of the building. On the other 
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hand, there are occasions where communities will object to major adaptations on historic 
buildings, more particularly those located within residential areas. 
3.7.8 THE PROVISION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
Positive responses and participation in the protection of heritage resources can be solicited 
from respective owners by providing them with relevant technical knowledge and expertise 
required for their preservation. Such services are either provided by government or a non-
governmental institution free of charge or at a reduced rate. A pertinent example of this model 
is the developments which have taken place in the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Belgium. 
In the Netherlands, a non-governmental organisation called Monumentwatch established in 
1973 provides important maintenance advice to owners of old buildings. Owners of such 
property are made to subscribe to the said service and receive an initial inspection report which 
prioritises what needs to be attended to in the case of that property. Subsequent to this initial 
endeavour, follow up annual inspections will ensue in order to inform further attempts at 
renovations and maintenance. According to the said report, about forty inspection teams inspect 
13 000 listed buildings per annum; and this represents about a quarter of all listed buildings in 
the Netherlands. Taking their cue from this model, both the United Kingdom and the Flemish 
Region of Belgium had started their non-profit body known as Maintain our Heritage with the 
intention of trying the scheme. 
3.7.9 THE USE OF LABOUR VOLUNTEERS 
In places like Australia and Canada, volunteers are used with great success in the preservation 
of historic buildings. Such community volunteers offer their services voluntarily for such things 
as provision of tour guides, fund raising and the actual restoration of historic heritage buildings. 
Generally the tasks that volunteers get involved in include such labour intensive activities as 
painting, landscaping, repair of signs etc. By the year 2004, in Victoria alone about 20 sites 
had already received such assistance (EPHC, 2004:28).  
3.7.10 RECOGNITION AND PROMOTION AS A TOOL FOR PRESERVATION 
This particular tool operates from a premise that both information and awareness are  useful 
catalysts that can be used to garner community interest and political support for heritage 
conservation. Information and promotion encourages understanding and appreciation of 
heritage, which has the potential to motivate communities and other actors in the policy 
implementation arena to want to participate. Recognition and promotion can take many forms. 
Heritage Festivals arranged annually are one such example aimed at the promotion of heritage 
and to engender awareness of the need to care for heritage resources. A classical example of 
such an initiative is the Canberra Heritage Festival in Australia which is a two week long 
programme comprising walks, talks, exhibitions, tours and workshops (EPHC, 2004:28). 
3.7.11 CLIENTS AND COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIPS 
The attainment of sound and cooperative client relationships is not only regarded as critical for 
a viable conservation strategy (EPHC, 2004:29), but it is an important tool for public policy 
implementation in general. On the one hand it seeks to ensure that the constellations of actors 
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involved in the policy implementation conduit are managed properly and their participation 
effectively solicited. South African policy scholars, Brynard et al. (2011150-151), for example 
highlight the role played by such coalitions for the execution of public policies in his 5C 
Protocol Model. On the other hand, the strategy represents a shift of paradigm in public policy 
implementation endeavours in the sense that it seeks to move away from the traditional 
enforcement model of heritage management and administration which focuses predominately 
on policing, which may turn out to be  costly for heritage managers due to the high costs 
involved in litigation processes involved. 
Ensuring sound client and community relationships in heritage management therefore seeks to 
achieve specific objectives which include attempting to assist heritage property owners to 
achieve their goals in respect of their heritage assets. Secondly it also seeks to the same 
proprietors to comply with the requirements stipulated for managing and protecting listed 
resources and also goes a long way towards clearing misconceptions about the same. According 
to the EPHC report (2004:30), in the usage of this strategy, there also exists an opportunity for 
the deployment of other incentives like grants and loans; thus lending credence to the 
complementary nature of the strategies. 
3.7.12 GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE AS A STRATEGY TO 
ENSURE PARTICIPATION 
Government to government assistance in heritage matters can also help to stimulate and foster 
active participation of implementation stakeholders at the lower levels of the heritage 
protection and management echelons. The EPHC report perceptively notes that part of the 
strength and effectiveness of this inducement strategy lies in the fact that incentives are 
virtually deployed at the lower levels close to the clients. According to this report, the tool is 
used quite extensively by a number of countries as an inducement for participation in the 
preservation of historic buildings as heritage property of a given country (EPHC, 2004:30) 
3.8 THE CRITIQUE OF INCENTIVES 
The theory of incentives is not without its critics.  According to the International Society for 
Performance Improvement (ISPI) and the Incentive Research Foundation (IRF) (2002:1), the 
fact that research on incentives has been conducted from perspectives of such diverse 
disciplines as accounting, education, economics, communications, human factors, psychology 
and sociology has given rise to conflicting claims and controversies regarding their usefulness. 
The criticism levelled against incentives ranges from moderate critics to  radical detractors.  
A pertinent example of a moderate criticism of incentives theory is provided by the above 
named Incentive Research Foundation itself. The methodology adopted by this research 
followed a combination of strategies. On the one hand the statistical method called meta-
analysis was used to assess trends and information yielded by more than 45 studies conducted 
on the subject; whereas telephonic interviews and web based questionnaires were also used to 
solicit relevant information from a sample of 145 companies in the United States of America 
which use incentive schemes (IRF, 2002:i). In support of its central thesis, the report concludes 
that there exists “solid evidence that paying people for exceeding work targets” makes them 
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to value their respective tasks even more; builds self-confidence and esteem for their 
employers; make them to be more persistent in the tasks they perform; and set themselves for 
higher levels of accomplishment which in turn results in overall interest generated for the work 
they do (IRF, 2002:8). However, the report concedes that some incentive schemes do not 
produce the anticipated better results, but posit an argument which locates the causes of such 
failure on questions of poor assessment and study of problems for which tangible incentives 
are designed; and errors committed during the implementation of the tangible incentives 
programmes and interventions. In order to bolster its position, the report provides some 
statistics regarding the evidence yielded by the meta-analysis and surveys conducted during 
research. A 15% performance increase was indicated where people were asked to perform 
activities they had never carried out before. This, according to the report indicates that 
incentives are least helpful under such circumstances given that, where people were asked to 
and encouraged to persist in the performance of tasks more familiar to them, a substantial 27% 
increase in their performance was registered; and also in instances where people were 
encouraged to give their best mental effort to specified tasks, a 26% performance increase 
resulted. But other critics of the theory are not as moderate as this appraisal does; and that is 
the focus of the subsequent section of this chapter. 
3.8.1 A NEO-MARXIST CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES 
It can be argued that much of the criticism that is levelled against the theory of incentives 
emanating from this front is to an extent motivated by what political philosophers regard as the 
liberal justification of inequalities represented depicts a range among others in the work of such 
thinkers as the political philosopher and ethicist, John Rawls in particular. Seeger (2011:50) 
criticises the assumption underlying the incentives theory that the more money the better; and 
sets himself to uncover what he perceives as the intuitive claim of this dictum undergirding the 
incentives argument. He looks at the commitments to the argument and concludes that without 
any “further empirical backing the incentives argument cannot be upheld.” How does he arrive 
at such a conclusion? As already alluded to, Seeger (2011:41) seeks to criticise the incentives 
theory from the empirical perspective. In order to achieve this objective, he first discusses the 
incentive argument within the context of the framework already provided by Rawls’ theory of 
justice. For Seeger, Rawls argument is articulated within the purview of the theory of 
distributive justice; and further identifies two distinctive, yet interrelated premises comprising 
Rawl’s theory. For Seeger (2011:41), Rawl’s theory has a normative (NP) premise which 
affirms that, “Inequalities that are to the greatest benefit of the worst off are justifiable”; yet 
on the other hand, there exists for Seeger an empirical premise (EP) in Rawls argument which 
states that, “In a well ordered society there can be substantial inequalities to the benefit of the 
worst off.” Seeger points out that in Rawls’ difference principle; the benefit of the worst off is 
measured in terms of primary goods; namely income and wealth, positions of authority and 
responsibility as well as self-respect. A just distribution therefore would allocate the best 
bundle of goods to those who are worst off in society. But Seeger (2011:42) argues that the 
distribution of other goods impact on the distribution of self-respect as a social good. He then 
criticises the advocates of the incentives argument on the basis of the fact that they do not pay 
enough attention to the respective weights of primary goods; and that social goods are hardly 
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discussed in this scheme of things. This state of affairs according to Seeger gives rise to a 
situation where the difference principle is exclusively understood and articulated in terms of 
material goods only. To this extent, he concludes that material inequalities are detrimental to 
the social goods of the worst off, and this according to Seeger, is the dynamic that the difference 
principle as advocated by Rawls’ philosophy, fails to capture.  
It is for this reason therefore that he challenges the proponents of the incentives argument to 
defend the theory by demonstrating how the losses of social goods sustained by the worst off 
“are outweighed by their presumed gains in material goods” (Seeger, 2011:43); resulting from 
the assumed trickledown effect presumed to be given effect by the difference principle. For 
Seeger, the flaw inherent in the incentives argument is glaring in the sense that material gain 
does not necessarily improve an individual’s chances of realising her/his conception of the 
good; nor can it outweigh the losses in social goods suffered by the worst off in society.  Seeger 
(2011:44) therefore argues against the common observation undergirding the incentives 
argument and the difference principle in particular which states that, “The more money I have, 
the better my chances will be that I can reach my aims.”  
In his attempt to render this proposition inaccurate and less convincing as a support for the 
incentives theory and the difference principle of Rawlsian philosophy, he distinguishes 
between what he regards as absolute wealth and the relative position. By absolute wealth he 
refers to how much does a person own in absolute terms; that is, not taking cognisance of how 
much do other fellow members of society own; whereas by relative position, the scholar is 
referring to how much does one own in relation to other members of the community (Seeger, 
2011:44). It is in this context that Seeger fires yet another salvo in his criticism of the theory. 
He argues that, sometimes owning less than your fellow members of society reduces one’s 
chances of realising her/his conception of good in life because she/he is not on a par with 
everyone else who has an advantage as a result of their better relative positioning resulting 
from their well off status. Seeger uses Thomas Pogge’s argument to advance his cause by 
claiming that some of the good things aspired to by the worst off in society, are by their very 
nature positional goods and competitive. To this effect Seeger observes, “In any case, it should 
be uncontentious that, as far as competitive goods play a role in their conception of the good, 
the worse off will have a worse chance of realizing their conception of the good in the liberal 
distribution that in the egalitarian distribution.” (Seeger, 2011:45) 
According to this scholar, the absolute position of an individual in society is significant above 
a certain threshold level (Seeger, 2011:46). That is, for his owning more in absolute terms does 
not increase much his chances or possibilities of realizing his goals.  In a sense, while material 
gains can improve the lot of poor people who struggle to access basic needs, societies in 
industrialised communities have reached a certain level of material well-being; and as a result 
their basic needs are satisfied accordingly. For this reason, any significant gain in material 
goods has no direct and recognisable impact on the lives of these citizens. 
By the same token, Seeger (2011:48) further indicts the rationality of the incentives theory, 
“the more the better”, by stating that individuals in communities have the tendency to adjust 
their goals and social preferences according to their perceived possibilities. For example, he 
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argues that if material gain has the possibility to lead to an expensive conception of good, the 
desire to increase material wealth is virtually eliminated. 
Another example of a critique of the incentives theory with a Neo-Marxist orientation is that 
provided by the two scholars from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Samuel Bowles 
and Sandra Polania Reyes (2009). The two scholars argue that explicit economic incentives 
have the potential to be counter-productive by inducing people to adopt a market mentality, 
thus compromising values to act in socially beneficial ways which already existed among them 
even prior to the introduction of such inducements (Bowles & Reyes, 2009:2). They argue that 
explicit economic incentives have the tendency to eclipse important social preferences like 
altruism, fairness, and civic duty, which are important influences for shaping individual human 
behaviour.  
The two academics are optimistic that there is now both theoretical and empirical evidence 
suggesting that there is a need to reconsider the assumptions made earlier regarding the use of 
explicit incentives in economic thought.  The first evidence is provided by the advance which 
has been made in the behavioural experiment laboratory and filed work which demonstrates 
the importance of social preferences in shaping up human economic behaviour. Secondly, the 
recognition and empirical study of incomplete contracts has caused the appearance of new 
terms like trust, fairness etc. in standard economic applications such as the principal-agent 
relationships. These terms as used in this context are in essence, social norms underwriting 
mutually beneficial economic exchange. Thirdly, advances which have been made in neurology 
which include such things as brain imaging and other techniques, have led the two scholars to 
suggest that we may sooner be in a position to effectively isolate what they refer to as 
“counterproductive effects of explicit incentives” (Bowles & Reyes, 2009:3). Fourthly, the 
increasing focus evinced by economists in the study of cases where preferences are not an 
exogenous phenomena; but on the contrary are brought about by the individual’s exposure to 
different types of incentives and other experiences.  Finally, advances which have been made 
in the theory of public policy have also indicated that incentives have the tendency to affect 
both beliefs and preferences in a way that can easily bring about unintended consequences. 
There are two interlocking primary concepts which inform the two scholars’ critique of the 
theory of incentives. Apart from the Neo-Marxist orientation already alluded to above, the two 
scholars’ criticism of the theory is on the one hand an extension of the Lucas Critique13 
principle to social preferences; while on the other hand it is also firmly rooted in the Yerkes-
Dodson Law of Arousal14. The intention of the two scholars is to challenge the plausibility of 
the assumption that the effects of explicit exogenous incentives must be separated from the 
phenomena of social preferences. They observe, 
                                                 
13 This is a concept which came with Robert Lucas in 1976 which suggests that a person cannot draw accurate 
conclusions in macroeconomics based on past data. A policy which worked under certain circumstances may not 
necessarily apply under a new set of conditions.  
14 The Yerkes-Dodson Law of Arousal owes its provenance from the Yale University psychologists Robert M. 
Yerkes, and John Dillingham Dodson in 1908. The law states that an individual or organism’s performance can 
be aroused; but if the arousal is increased too much, the performance solicited by the same drops or decreases. 
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… we extend the logic of the Lucas Critique to questions of framing, motivations, and 
social norms, in short to preferences.  To do this we modify the standard public  
economics and mechanism design assumption that taxes, subsidies, and other explicit 
incentives affect behaviour only indirectly, that is by altering the economic costs and 
benefits  of the targeted activities. In this conventional approach explicit incentives thus 
do not appear directly in the citizen’s utility function and as a result, the effects of each 
being independent of the levels of the other. We modify the citizen’s utility function so 
that this separability property need not hold and as a result the two kinds of motivations 
may be either compliments – social preferences being heightened by incentives 
appealing to self-interest—or substitutes, when explicit incentives are said to crowd out 
social preferences. (Bowles & Reyes, 2009:3) 
 
The two scholars argue that individual human behaviour is context sensitive in the sense that 
it is shaped by the situation in which their actions are executed. For this reason it is untenable 
that the notion of inseparability espoused by economists with regard to exogenous incentives 
and social preferences can be extrapolated from behaviour experiments and natural science 
empirical studies conditioned by different contextual circumstances.  Generalising in this 
context raises a few validity concerns (Bowles & Reyes, 2009:4). By the same token the 
Yerkes-Dodson law will inevitably give rise to a situation where strong monetary incentives 
may over-motivate an agent and thus give rise to counter-intuitive and counterproductive 
effects not necessarily intended by the person deploying inducements.   
Furthermore, for Bowles and Reyes (2009:6) there are interaction effects operating between, 
and linking explicit exogenous incentives to values. They argue that incentives have the 
tendency to influence behaviour both positively and negatively. This occurs because citizens 
themselves have values which may prompt certain behaviour when incentivised towards a 
particular direction. For this reason, the two scholars conclude that the attempt to separate 
explicit incentives from social preferences like altruism, fairness and civic duty does not hold 
because, “… incentives and social preferences are synergistic and are termed complements. 
Where the reverse is true the two arguments are substitutes (or are said to exhibit “negative 
synergy” or “ crowding out.” (Bowles & Reyes, 2009:6) 
Having concluded that the notion of separability between exogenous economic incentives and 
social preferences does not hold, the two scholars outline specific mechanisms which in their 
view are responsible for the crowding out and undermining of social preferences. They argue 
that it is in the nature of incentives to act as signals to the agent, of the purpose (s) for which 
they have been deployed; the beliefs of the incentive designer about the target; and the nature 
of the task to be performed. (Bowles & Reyes (2009:10). By providing such information 
therefore, incentives affect the behaviour of the target (agent) additional to the cost and the 
benefit of the action to be implemented. The second mechanism responsible for the crowding 
out effect of incentives according to Bowles and Reyes (2009:12) is caused by the fact that 
incentives have the propensity to suggest appropriate behaviour. People often look out for cues 
of appropriate behaviour and incentives provide them; and this leads to crowding out of useful 
social preferences which motivate individuals to action in society. This observation leads the 
two academics to a third mechanism which in their view is responsible for the phenomenon of 
crowding out. That is, incentives may have the effect of compromising intrinsic motives and 
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self-determination (Bowles & Reyes 2009:14). Citing the evidence provided by an array of 
authors in psychology, Bowles and Reyes argue that there exists a rich experimental and 
theoretical literature, complemented by on-going debate in psychology, which has explored the 
crowding out of intrinsic motives. By the same token, the scholars also cite the evidence yielded 
by experiments conducted by economists as well as non-experimental studies in economics 
which suggest that self interest and other self-regarding preferences can act as substitutes and 
not additives or complements. Consequently, they conclude that incentives may have the 
tendency to compromise intrinsic motives and self-determination. Lastly, Bowles and Reyes 
(2009:15) argue that incentives tend to alter the environment in which new preferences can be 
learned by effecting long term change in motivations as a result of having altered the way in 
which people acquire motivation. 
Cohen is yet another scholar who challenges the idea of incentives from the premise of political 
philosophy by among other things, challenging the Rawlsian dictum regarding the legitimacy 
of social inequalities. He begins his critique of incentives by carefully outlining some important 
arguments advanced over time about the legitimacy of social inequalities. Incidentally, it is 
within the context of these arguments for social inequalities where he locates the late Harvard 
scholar and liberal philosopher, John Rawls. He concedes that arguments for social inequalities 
in capitalist societies have accumulated over time (Cohen, 1991:264). The political right, 
according to Cohen justifies economic inequality by arguing that on the basis of entitlement, 
dessert and utility, rich people are justified to their wealth. The utilitarian position is shared by 
both the right and centre of the political spectrum (Cohen, 1991:264) 
Cohen then points out that left wing liberals represented in the philosophy of John Rawls reject 
the principles of entitlement, dessert and utility as a justification for inequality; however 
according to Cohen, Rawls (left wing liberals), right wing conservatives and those at the centre 
of the spectrum, agree that inequalities are justified if they make badly off people well off as 
far as is possible. “For Rawls, some people are, mainly as a matter of genetic and other luck, 
capable of producing more than others are, and it is right for them to be richer than others if 
the less fortunate are caused to be better off as a result.” (Cohen, 1991:265). It is within this 
Rawslian difference principle that Cohen articulates his criticism of the incentives argument. 
According to Cohen (1991:266), the more generous form of the difference principle is that 
which allows inequalities which neither help nor harm the worst off. To be sure, Cohen accepts 
the difference principle in its generous interpretation; yet questions the application of the 
principle to defend incentivising the talented.   
 For my part, I accept the difference principle, in its generous interpretation….   
but I question its application in defence of special money incentives to talented people. 
Rawslians think that inequalities associated with such incentives satisfy the principle. 
But I believe that the idea that inequality is justified if, through the familiar incentive 
mechanism, it benefits the badly off is more problematic than Rawslians suppose; that, 
at least when incentive consideration is isolated from all reference to desert or 
entitlement, it generates an argument for inequality that requires a model of society in 




By the same token, Cohen (1991:271) takes issue with the argument sating that when 
productive people are made to take home a modest pay, they will produce less than what they 
would otherwise do; and if they do, poor and badly off individuals in that society are worse 
than they would be if talented people were well incentivised. 
Cohen does not set himself out to criticise and question all incentives. On the contrary, he 
directs his criticism “on the character of certain utterances” associated with the argument, and 
virtually focuses on those incentives which produce inequality; and are understood by their 
protagonists as justified because they make badly off people better off. For this reason, Cohen 
raises no objection against such incentives as those designed to get rid of the poverty trap, or 
those that are intended to encourage individuals to undertake jobs that are considered 
unpleasant. The rationale he provides for such an attitude is that it is not in the nature of such 
incentives to provide inequalities. To this extent he observes, “My target is incentives 
conferring high rewards on people of talent who would otherwise not perform as those rewards 
induce them.” (Cohen, 1991:272)  
According to him, the incentive argument sounds reasonable when it is presented in an 
impersonal form; but he argues that the same argument undergoes a kind of devaluation when 
it occurs or is advanced in an interpersonal setting where, “… a talented rich person 
pronounces it to a badly off person.” (Cohen, 1991:272-273). For this reason, he argues that 
the use of incentives as a normative argument presupposes that its pervasive effect should be 
subjected to the speaker-audience-relative; that is, who is addressing who in the argument. In 
a sense, Cohen is encouraging his interlocutors to begin to think about the incentive argument 
within the context in which they are articulated. To this effect he observes, “A normative 
argument will often wear a particular aspect because of who is offering it and/or to whom it is 
being addressed. When reasons are given for performing an action or endorsing a policy or 
adopting an attitude, the appropriate response by the person(s) asked so to act or approve or 
feel, and the reaction of variously placed observers of the interchange, may depend on who is 
speaking and who is listening.” (Cohen, 1991:273) For Cohen (1991:276), what discredits the 
utterance of the incentive argument in a personal setting is that the presenter of the argument 
is the same person whose choice will make the argument’s premise true. That is, the fact that 
the recipient of the incentive will only be rewarded if s/he produces more, is a situation or 
condition created deliberately by the designer of the incentive; and for that reason Cohen 
(1991:277;287) believes that it is morally unacceptable.  
By the same token, Cohen further indicts the incentives argument by appealing to a sense of 
community shared by societies. He observes that the incentives argument needs to be subjected 
to a comprehensive justification in order to establish a good reason for its existence. To 
illustrate what he means by a comprehensive justification, he cites a tax reduction policy 
enacted by the Margaret Thatcher administration which reduced income tax by 20%, from 60% 
to 40% in March 1988 (Cohen, 1991:263). In the cited example, there is on the one hand what 
he refers to as a Major Normative Premise of the argument; (i.e. economic inequalities are 
justified when they make the worst off people materially better off); as well as the minor factual 
premise, (i.e. when the top rate of tax is 40%, (a) the talented rich produce more than they do 
when it is 60%; and (b) the worst off are, as a result, materially better off (Cohen, 1991:271). 
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But what does this mean and how does it relate to his concept of comprehensive justification 
which legitimizes the theory? Cohen feels that the action of cutting income tax down by 20% 
as an incentive to induce the rich to produce more may be justifiable; but it does not 
automatically offer a comprehensive justification if the behaviour of the recipients of the tax 
reduction cannot be justified. Equally, the provider of the tax cut, that is the treasury exchequer, 
is not providing her incentive policy with comprehensive justification if he regards the question 
whether the behaviour of the rich as induced by the incentive, as irrelevant to the equation. 
“Thus, in so far as we are expected to treat the incentive argument as though no question arises 
about the justification of the behaviour of the talented rich that its minor premise describes, 
what we are offered may be a justification, but it is not a comprehensive justification of 
incentive policy.” (Cohen, 1991:279). A policy argument provides the required comprehensive 
justification if it passes what Cohen (1991:282) refers to as the interpersonal test, which 
subjects the robustness of the said policy to the litmus of the aforesaid speaker-audience-
relative. Therefore, if it happens that either as a result of the person presenting the argument 
for incentives and/or as a result of the person to whom the argument is presented, the attempt 
fails to secure the justification of the policy, that means it is failing to provide the required 
comprehensive justification. According to him therefore, “the incentive argument does not 
serve as a justification of inequality on the lips of the rich, because they cannot answer a 
demand for justification that naturally arises when they present the argument, namely, why 
would you work less hard if income tax were put up to 60%? The rich will find that question 
difficult no matter who puts it to them…”(Cohen, 1991:280) 
Having established the comprehensive justification critique of the incentives argument, Cohen 
then links it with the concept of community to advance his argument against inducements and 
inequalities. For him, the type of community that matters for his purposes is what he describes 
as a justificatory community. According to Cohen (1991:282) a justificatory community refers 
to a set of individuals or people in the midst of whom prevails a norm of comprehensive 
justification. That is, a community wherein the empirical norm of justifying the behaviour of 
the recipient of an incentive in a way that provides legitimacy or justification for the mooted 
policy is upheld even though it may not always be satisfied.  It is from this premise that Cohen 
wants to infer that if the arguments provided as a rationale for the incentives policy fail the 
interpersonal test applied by the justificatory community, that policy cannot justify its raison 
d’etre. This line of reasoning therefore leads Cohen to conclude that if by presenting an 
argument for incentives, the rich by so doing represent relations obtaining between themselves 
and the poor that are admittedly at variance with community, then it logically follows that the 
incentive argument can only justify inequality in a society where interpersonal relations 
demonstrate a lack of communal character; and this according to Cohen is not commensurate 
with the values of democratic societies where all members of the community should not only 
participate in policy making, but should also be able to define their institutions. To this effect 
he notes, “In my own (here undefended) view, it diminishes the democratic character of a 
society if it is not a community in the present sense since we do not make policy together if we 
make it in the light of what some of us do that cannot be justified.” (Cohen, 1991:283). 
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3.8.2 CHALLENGING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PREMISE FOR THE INCENTIVE 
ARGUMENT 
“When reward systems fail, don’t blame the program-look at the premise behind.” (Kohn, 
1993:54)15. This quotation forms the essence of the argument against incentives levelled by 
Alfie Kohn. Basing his arguments on what has been indicated by other studies, Kohn argues 
that the negative correlations between incentives pay and measures of organisational 
performance such as profitability seem to suggest that higher pay, especially at the level of the 
executive, does not produce better performance in the workplace. He further argues that 
although in some instances there could be a direct link between the quantity of goods produced 
and the turnaround time expended thereto, it is nonetheless difficult to link the quality of such 
performance to the incentives provided (Kohn, 1993:56). In support of his central thesis that it 
is the psychological theory behind incentives that is responsible for the failure of such pay for 
performance programmes, he cites a six point framework which in his view examines the real 
costs of a given incentive programme.  
To begin with Kohn argues on the basis of causality by pointing out that even if it were to be 
granted that people are concerned about their salaries, such an assumption would not 
necessarily prove that money is a motivating factor for performance. Secondly, he observes 
that incentives have an intrinsic tendency to punish as a result their manipulative nature. That 
is, being controlled by rewards is desired by a manager, yet the fact that it is made contingent 
to specific behaviours, has the potential of making managers manipulate subordinates in the 
pursuit of incentives. According to Kohn (1993:57), not receiving a reward one was hoping 
for, is itself equivalent to being punished. To this extent he observes that “The new school, 
which exhorts us to catch people doing something right and reward them for it, is not very 
different from the old school, which advised us to catch people doing something wrong and 
threaten to punish them if they ever do it again.” (Kohn1993:58). The third criticism that he 
levels against the theory is that incentives rupture relationships (Kohn, 1993:58). That is, when 
incentives are viewed from the perspective of Total Quality Management (TQM), they reduce 
possibilities for cooperation and teamwork; and it is impossible to ensure quality without 
teamwork. This rupturing of relationship among members of a team is caused by the fact that 
when people begin to compete for rewards, they see each other as obstacles to success; and for 
this reason find it difficult to ensure that there is the required cooperation and teamwork in the 
workplace, which will enable the provision of quality goods or services. Kohn feels that in a 
context where incentives are provided for performance, they have the tendency to impact 
negatively on the relationship between supervisors and subordinates. On the one hand, a 
supervisor who punishes is like a police in the rear view mirror of a car driver; while on the 
other hand, rewards can also cultivate a culture of concealing one’s problems to the manager 
by simply not asking for assistance, which is one of the pre-requisites for optimal performance 
in an organisational setting.  
Kohn (1993:58) further argues that incentives have the tendency to make managers ignore 
solving problems in the workplace. It is the duty of the manager to try and understand what 
                                                 
15 Alfie Kohn article is a non-journal article contributed to the Harvard Business Review of Sep/Oct 1993. 
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causes problems of performance in the workplace, so that appropriate solutions are found. 
Different situations giving rise to different challenges in the workplace require different 
responses from management. Under these circumstances, incentives have the tendency to offer 
reductionist solutions to organisational performance; and virtually substitute for good 
management practice. It is also for this reason that Kohn (1993:59), taking his cue from 
Rother’s study, states that in organizations where incentives are used, less leadership is 
demonstrated by managers; thus impeding their ability to manage.  The fifth critique that Kohn 
levels against incentives is that in the context where they are used, people simply do what they 
are told to do only if the reward is significant. In such an environment, he argues, people are 
discouraged from risk taking and being creative in exploring possibilities, because incentives 
encourage them to focus on the reward they will receive when doing the task given. Such a 
behaviour pattern is the result of a predominant focus on numbers (quantity) and turnaround 
times for delivery which will affect the nature of incentives given.  
Kohn therefore concurs with John Condry that incentives militate against exploration. He also 
argues that in situations where incentives are used in the workplace, they further create a 
tendency among people to choose much easier tasks, the performance of which will increase 
their chances of obtaining relevant targets and rewards related to them. This compromises risk 
taking even more. To this extent he observes, “Do rewards motivate people? Absolutely. They 
motivate people to get rewards.” (Kohn, 1993:59). Lastly, Kohn also argues against the 
incentives theory on the grounds that rewards tend to undermine interest. His argument is that 
if one’s goal is excellence, no single motivation will in that instance match intrinsic motivation. 
“People who do exceptional work may be glad to be paid and even more glad to be well paid, 
but they do not work to collect a pay check. They work because they love what they do.” (Kohn, 
1993:59). He further notes that there are other more simpler reasons used by other scholars 
exploring the negative effects rewards have which include among others, the possibility that 
the recipient will understand the incentive as a bribe persuading him to do what he does not 
want to do naturally. Having outlined the type of criticism often levelled against the use of 
incentives generally, it is now time to focus specifically on the criticism that can be levelled at 
the incentives normally used for heritage purposes as highlighted above; and that is the focus 
of the subsequent section of this chapter. 
3.8.3 CRITIQUE OF HERITAGE CONSERVATION INCENTIVES USED 
The criticisms levelled against the deployment of incentives as policy tools to assist 
implementation can still be applied in the context of heritage policy development and 
implementation. Incidentally their usage to induce specific actions and behaviours within the 
context of South Africa which is the focus of this study is important.
3.8.4 LACK OF REQUISITE POLICY ANALYSIS KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS. 
It is the argument of this thesis that as a result of many factors which include among others 
lack of relevant policy knowledge and experience, there exists a possibility that a foolhardy 
approach is likely to be adopted in the development and deployment of appropriate incentives 
in various policy fields, more particularly within the context of a developing country like South 
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Africa, where there is a dearth of policy skills and knowledge among managers in the public 
sector. The skills required to ascertain the type of incentives better suited to the type of 
stakeholders contemplated in the implementation of heritage policy as well as to the type of 
action induced, has the potential to militate against good and noble intentions in this area of 
public administration. 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
The incentives theory is used in a variety of disciplines where it receives a positive appraisal 
from its proponents. The chapter has explored a sample of contributions from various scholars 
approaching incentive practice from various perspectives. However, the theory is not without 
its fair share of critics ranging from the moderate to the most radical. The subsequent chapter 
will trace the evolution of heritage policy in South Africa from the earliest times to the present; 







THE DEVELOPMENT OF HERITAGE POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1911 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is an analysis of the heritage policy enacted in South Africa from 1910 to the 
present. There is apparently a particular bias from which this analysis-cum presentation is 
conducted. The primary purpose of this chapter is to understand the evolution of heritage policy 
particularly with regard to the deployment of incentives as policy instruments intended to aid 
implementation. However, the fact that the whole notion of incentives falls within the scope of 
policy instruments presupposes that a consideration of incentives in a non-reductionist fashion 
would seek to understand and describe them within the purview of the deployment of relevant 
policy tools for effective policy implementation. Policy instruments have the tendency to 
unmask the nature of the relationship existing between those who govern and the governed; 
and to this extent they present analysts with a condensed form of knowledge about the 
phenomenon of social control and how it is being exercised (Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007:3). 
Consequently, there is admittedly an instrumentality bias in the analysis of heritage policy 
undertaken in this chapter. Legislation in particular is the focus of this analysis. The rationale 
for such an approach is induced by the fact that legislation together with regulations and 
instructions are regarded as “purpose and- process-specific derivatives of public policy” (van 
Niekerk, vander Walt and Jonker, 2001:80); and for that reason it is understood as a declaration 
of intent by government. To this extent the first section is a brief outline of the parameters of 
the policy process in South Africa from the colonial times to the present. Subsequent to this 
section the chapter focuses attention on the evolution of heritage policy from about 1910 to the 
present, highlighting specific trends in the process of such a development. This extended 
section of the chapter is followed by a short critique of post 1994 heritage policy and 
conclusions are made based on the foregoing. 
4.2 OUTLINING THE CONTOURS OF THE POLICY PROCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Taking into consideration the different regimes which have ruled the country since the 
establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the South African policy process, broadly 
speaking, has gone through three phases.  The general tendency is to subdivide the three phases 
into the Union Era 1910-1948; the apartheid phase (1948-1994); and the post-apartheid 
democratic dispensation (1994 to the present).  Ndukuyakhe Ndlovu, a researcher in the Rock 
Art Research Institute of the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa clearly follows 
the three phases approach in his analysis of the effectiveness of heritage legislation in the 
country’s heritage industry.  “I have divided this section into three political periods, namely, 
the Union (1910–48), Apartheid (1948–90) and Democratic (1994–present). The significance 
of such divisions lies in understanding the political environment South Africa has witnessed in 





4.2.1 THE COLONIAL INFLUENCE IN THE POLICY PROCESS FROM 1910. 
While retaining the same principle of the political environment as a determining factor of a 
given policy process, the South African policy scholar, Fanie Cloete has introduced useful 
nuances which slightly modify the said broad outline. Cloete (2011:73) notes that with the 
formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the Westminster system of government was 
already firmly entrenched in the colony; which meant that the country was governed in 
accordance with the principles extrapolated from the British political system. Many senior civil 
servants in the bureaucracy were imported from England; and they established a public 
administration where Afrikaners occupied lower class positions; while the majority of 
disenfranchised Blacks were relegated to the periphery of the South African decision making 
machinery of the state; and by implication marginalized from the policy processes which 
determined the course of the country. For this reason, the policy process itself was favourably 
biased towards the interests of the white settlers who dominated the power for decision making 
as well as interest groups who represented white socio-economic interests. The fact that in the 
colonial era (1910-1948) the policy process existed under the aegis and monopoly of white 
colonial influence in South Africa resulted in the top down incremental change to the nature of 
the policies enacted within the period. 
4.2.2 POLICY MAKING UNDER THE AEGIS OF GRAND APARTHEID 1948-1982 
With the National Party coming into power in 1948, critical changes with a direct impact on 
the policy process in South Africa took place.  English White male elites who dominated the 
administration were supplanted by Afrikaner political elites at the helm of government who 
were bent on entrenching apartheid policies in the country.  Cloete summarises the policy 
context at this time aptly when he observes that, “From the perspective of the policy process, 
the only significant change from the pre-1948 period was the change from the dominant 
English elites to Afrikaner elites.  For the rest, the traditional policy processes proceeded 
largely unchanged, although Afrikaner interest groups became more influential in the late 
1960’s in steering government policy”. (Cloete, 2011:74) However, during this phase, policies 
were adopted on ideological basis and not on their practical feasibility.  
4.2.3 THE EROSION OF THE APARTHEID STATE FROM 1983-1989 
The period from 1983 to 1990 represents what Cloete (2011:74) calls an eroded apartheid state 
which was characterised by the establishment of the tri-cameral parliament and negotiations 
with moderate Black, Coloured and Asian who were co-opted into the policy machine of the 
state. The exclusion of the majority of black people meant that government lacked legitimacy 
and could not speak for the disenfranchised on policy matters.  The policy changes made at this 
time were still top-down and incremental; and were not acceptable to the majority of oppressed 
South Africans. The opposition and resistance to apartheid policies which also included the 
development of Bantustans, virtually led to a situation where the apartheid government 
implemented its policies by brutal force.  Security planners of the regime were now elevated 
to prominence. (Cloete, 2011:75). The failed state at the end of the Botha era led to dramatic 
policy changes in South Africa. 
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4.2.4 POLICY PARADIGM SHIFTS FROM 1990-1994 
According to Cloete, important policy paradigm shifts which led to a post-apartheid South 
Africa occurred from 1990 onwards.  “F. W. de Clerk was an unlikely candidate to initiate a 
paradigm change in South African politics.  On coming to power he had the reputation of being 
one of the most conservative members of the government.  He quickly shed this image by 
dramatically reversing some of the National Party’s most revered policy tenets during 1990 
and 1991.” (Cloete, 2011:75) 
It can be argued by some that Cloete’s analysis of the situation at this period has the propensity 
to underplay the role played by liberation movements and the international community in the 
opposition to apartheid as major contributory factors which led to the change of heart. Such a 
realisation has important consequences for the analysis of the policy process at this particular 
period. There is a sense in which the changes effected by de Klerk are not simply to be 
construed and described as arbitrary if voluntary condescending actions by the state. This has 
the potential to give credence to an exclusive institutional (statism) understanding of state 
policy without taking into consideration the mounting pressure exerted by the mass democratic 
movement both inside and outside the country which also contributed to the eventual change 
of heart within the ruling minority in South Africa. The abolition of apartheid eventually 
brought about a change in the top-down approach to policy which had characterised the South 
African policy process in previous dispensations.  Cloete aptly summarises the pre-1990 policy 
process in South Africa when he observes that, “Until 1990, successive governments followed 
a largely traditional, Western, industrial world colonial policy approach, consisting of 
incremental policy changes controlled by Western political and bureaucratic elites and aimed 
at preserving as much of the status quo as possible.”(Cloete, 2011:75) 
4.2.5 THE POST APARTHEID STATE AND A DEMOCRATIC DISPENSATION 
At the advent of democracy in 1994, government policies began to focus more on the plight of 
the poor and underdeveloped communities thus reflecting a remarkable shift from the norms 
and standards of past dispensations.  The Afrikaner white male elite at the helm of the 
bureaucracy was supplanted by a new black, indigenous elite (Cloete, 2011:76) As a result of 
this change, the public service experienced major structural transformation which increased the 
number of black senior managers in the administration. Having briefly presented an analysis 
of the South African policy scenario from the inception of the Union to the present democratic 
dispensation, it is now time to pay attention to the evolution of heritage policies over the said 
phases; and that is the focus of the subsequent section of this chapter.  
4.2.6 THE EVOLUTION OF HERITAGE POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA PRIOR TO 
1994 
By their very nature, public policies are declarations of intent by the state aimed at solving 
social problems identified in the agenda of government as requiring solutions. For this reason, 
a given policy is a response by government to a situation deemed politically unacceptable and 
thus requiring an intervention by the state (Knoepfel et al. 2007:21). It can be concluded 
therefore that implicit in any given policy is a theory of social change, a causality model which 
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virtually expresses how government seeks to deal with an unacceptable social reality in order 
to bring about the required change. The said causality model can be illustrated as follows:- 
Figure 4(a). Theory of social change implicit in a policy intervention
 
This therefore presages that a policy consists of specific goals in the form of expectations in 
relation to the intervention, as well as the means to be used to attain to such policy aims.  Both 
policy goals and policy techniques exist at various levels of abstraction. Policy techniques are 
instruments or tools used to express policy ( Levitt, 1980: 160 ), and to achieve its goals; and 
it is for this reason that the study of policy tools is in essence, the study of how a particular 
policy position is given expression and how it is intended to be implemented. To this extent 
therefore, policies consist of complex arrangements of goals and techniques (Howlett, 
2011:20).   
The choice of appropriate policy instruments virtually belongs to the policy design stage of the 
policy process; and while it is true that policy instruments straddle through all the different 
stages of the policy course, policy design activities are primarily concerned with the choice of 
policy tools relevant to the implementation phase of the process. Substantive policy instruments 
seek to alter the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services by the public; 
whereas procedural policy implementation tools focus on attempting to change the behaviour 
of targeted actors in the policy implementation conduit to align it with the attainment of the 
goals of government expressed by the policy concerned. (Howlett, 2011:23) 
Contemporary scholarship on the subject of policy instruments has provided quite a labyrinth 
of pathways in terms of establishing accurate taxonomies of tools selected for public policy 
implementation. However, there seems to be some consensus that policy instruments can be 
categorised in four distinctive types. Organizational implementation instruments rely on 
government institutions and personnel to affect policy output delivery and policy process 
change (Howlett 2011: 63); whereas authoritative implementation tools on the other hand 
primarily rely on government’s ability to steer actors in the implementation arena to courses 
that it prefers by using real or perceived threat of state enforced sanctions (Howlett, 2011:83). 
Financial implementation instruments involve specific techniques relating to the transference 
of treasure resources from or to actors in order to incentivise specific actions and proscribe 
others (Howlett, 2011:101). However, other policy implementation tools countenanced at the 
design phase are information based instruments used to communicate knowledge and 
information to specific targeted groups in the policy sub-system (Howlett, 2011:115).  
Consequently, the analysis of heritage policy in South Africa evinces a characteristic bias 
towards the use of authoritative policy instruments more particularly in the form of direct 
government regulation. The latter is a typical command and control instrument better suited to 
top down approaches to public policy implementation. By their very nature, regulations are 









its goals. The fact that the basic aim of such instruments is to circumvent behaviour construed 
to be incongruent with policy goals presages that authoritative tools are often used in a negative 
sense with a strong game theory orientation. It is precisely as a result of their coercive nature 
that authoritative tools like regulation are more compatible with legal forms of governance. For 
this reason, the rules enshrined in regulation as a prominent example of authoritative policy 
tools, take various forms which include standards, permits, prohibitions and executive orders. 
Taking his cue from Michael Reagan’s definition of regulation, Howlett, (2011:84) concludes 
that “… regulation is a prescription by government which must be complied with by the 
intended targets; failure to do so usually involves a penalty, sometimes financial but also often 
involving incarceration and imprisonment.” 
Probably as a result of challenges faced by governments to easily command and control their 
targets, as well as the latter’s propensity to resist regulatory endeavours (Howlett, 2011:83), 
the South African heritage policy arena has witnessed a preponderance of modified forms of 
regulation consisting of slightly more vague rules often characterised by remote threats of 
penalties.  Since 1911, the South African heritage industry has been regulated by no fewer than 
four regimes of laws and the longest surviving of these statues, namely the National 
Monuments Act, 1969 has undergone several amendments and revisions.  
Consequently, this section of the chapter will adopt a double pronged approach in its rigorous 
interrogation and analysis of heritage policy in South Africa prior to the advent of democracy 
in 1994. The first section will be the identification and analysis of the content of relevant pieces 
of regulation as expressions of policy, and in keeping with common parlance in the discipline, 
will involve among others the identification of the origins of the policy and the description of 
its content. Subsequent to this expository if descriptive endeavour, the analysis will proceed to 
highlight and summarise specific trends evident in the evolution of the said policy as it unfolded 
in various pieces of heritage legislation over time.  
4.2.6.1 HERITAGE POLICY AND THE ADVENT OF THE BUSHMEN RELICS 
PROTECTION ACT, 1911. 
The Bushmen Relics Protection Act No 22 of 1911 is the first post-union legislation aimed at 
providing protection to Bushmen relics in the form of drawings or paintings made on stones or 
petroglyph by the South African Bushmen or any other autochthonous peoples.  The protected 
resources included contents of graves, caves, rock shelters, middens or shell mounds believed 
to have been executed by the said indigenous people.  Two interrelated social challenges 
accounted as impulses for the ultimate provenance of this piece of legislation as an expression 
of government policy. On the one hand, South Africa was at the time constantly plagued by 
expeditions from European countries sent to collect pre-historic paintings and engravings 
which led to the destruction of such resources (Deacon, 1992:2; Hall & Lillie, 1992:3). Scholars 
have attested to the milieu within which this characteristic obsession with collection owes its 
provenance. Tracing the history of the museum of science Macdonald (1998:6) locates the 
origins of this preoccupation with the Renaissance in the fifteenth century; where as a result of 
the widening horizons of knowledge due to extensive dissemination of the ancient texts, travel 
and voyages of discovery increased as well as more systematic forms of communication and 
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exchange, the habit of collecting artefacts virtually became a form of managing the explosion 
of knowledge. That is, if it was no longer possible to contain the knowledge of the world in 
texts (i.e. canonical texts like the Bible and other ancient writings), collecting artefacts and 
displaying them in a museum was then considered the best option available to both princes and 
scholars to manage the explosion. Ndlovu (2011:34), taking his cue from Macdonald and other 
scholars concludes that when Africa’s colonial masters made their way to the continent, they 
did not only bring with them their political agenda, but coupled with the latter was the 
characteristic pre-occupation with the collection of objects for the museums.  
On the other hand, another stimulus which accounts for the origins of the said legislation is the 
lack of appreciation of such heritage resources from South Africans which also led to their 
neglect and destruction. Some may want to argue against this proposition and observe that the 
assumption that heritage resources were neglected and there was a lack of their appreciation by 
South Africans is erroneous to an extent in the sense that colonial masters who set themselves 
as heritage practitioners and managers of the time did not bother to find out or even consult 
with indigenous peoples on how they were preserving and protecting their heritage sites which 
they often considered sacred. Ndlovu (2011:43) for example argues that one of the reasons why 
legislation has failed to proactively protect heritage resources in South Africa, is the failure of 
legislators to incorporate African principles and values in that corpus of legislation. He 
perceptively notes that there needs to be an appreciation of “African values which emphasizes 
spiritual significance of heritage rather than only the physical significance” (Ndlovu 2011:48), 
if heritage legislation is going to be effective in securing adequate protection of the national 
estate. From a policy perspective, Ndlovu’s indictment is of utmost importance if one takes 
particular cognisance of the fact that policy is a value laden enterprise. It therefore makes a lot 
of sense to begin to question the type of values which inform a given policy alternative or 
position. 
It is within the context of this characteristic plunder and ‘neglect’ of heritage resources that the 
formation of the South African National Society (SANS) took place in 1905, and eventually 
led to the enactment of the 1911 heritage legislation. The society consisted of individuals with 
interest in the preservation of places and objects of historical significance and natural beauty. 
Such resources included old houses, trees and avenues; as well as wild flowers which were at 
the time threatened with extinction. The first President of the society was Justice Sir Henry de 
Villiers, Privy Councillor and Parliamentarian; the Vice President was the Speaker of the Cape 
House, Sir William Bissett Berry; Fransis Masey was the society’s Honorary Secretary; while 
Charles Struben became Treasurer.  Other members of the committee included the botanist, Dr 
Harry Bolus; Mr Sclater, Monsignor Kolbe, Colonel Stanford and the Rev Leibbrandt. The 
primary aim of this society was to engender a sense of nationhood among South Africans by 
means of preserving their culture and enjoyment of the national heritage prior to the formation 
of the union. (Artefacts Lexicon) It was the agitations of this pressure group which had 
branches in Grahamstown (Eastern Cape), Pietermaritzburg and Durban (KwaZulu-Natal), 
which led to the enactment of the said first heritage legislation in South Africa (Hall & Lillie 
1992:3). Records in the archives provide some evidence that the branches of the society were 
active in advocating the preservation of resources in their respective localities long after the 
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enactment of relevant heritage legislations in the Union. The Pietermaritzburg branch for 
example lodged a few applications both with the Minister of the Interior16 and the local City 
Council, advocating for the preservation of such things as, the renaming of World’s View to 
Voortrekkers’ View (SANS-PMB, 1937:1)17; suggestion to erect a wall tablet commemorating 
the erection of the first Dutch Reformed Church parsonage in Pieterrmaritzburg (SANS-PMB, 
1925:1); the application for a donation towards the erection of an oak screen at St George’s 
Anglican Church in NapierVille, in commemoration of the soldiers who garrisoned Natal from 
1838-1914 (SANS-PMB, 1931:1) 
The act as an authoritative instrument prohibits any removal of Bushmen relics from the Union 
of South Africa without the consent of the Minister of the Interior (Section 2(1).  Section 3 of 
the act prescribes a disincentive in the form of a fine not in excess of fifty pounds to discourage 
the unwanted action from being executed.  In the event that the offender fails to pay the 
expected fine, s/he will be liable to a prison term with or without hard labour for a period not 
exceeding three months. 
4.2.6.2 HERITAGE POLICY AND THE NATURAL AND HISTORICAL 
MONUMENTS ACT NO 6 OF 1923 
It was the lobbying conducted by the same South African National Society which twelve years 
later saw the Senate and House of Assembly of the Union of South Africa promulgating the 
Natural and Historical Monuments Act No 6 of 1923 assented to by the Governor-General on 
the 26th of March. In essence, this piece of legislation was an extension of the protection regime 
offered by the 1911 Act, in that it included within its scope, both natural and historical 
monuments as well as other objects considered to be of aesthetic, historical or even scientific 
value or interest. Section 8 of the legislation defines monument as referring to arears of land 
with distinctive scenery, areas with distinctive, beautiful or interesting flora and fauna content; 
objects both natural and those resulting from human agency considered to be of aesthetic, 
historical or scientific importance; waterfalls, caves, bushmen paintings, avenues of trees, old 
trees as well as old buildings.  
Taking its cue from the Historical Monuments Board of England (Hall & Lillie, 1992:3), 
Section 1 of the Act, through the agency of the Governor-General, established the Commission 
for the Preservation of Natural and Historical Monuments of the Union (CPNHMU) which 
consisted of not less than seven members.  From a policy implementation analysis perspective, 
the introduction of this institution marks an important incremental nuance and development in 
the design of regulation as an overriding heritage policy instrument in South Africa. The 
enactment of this law and its concomitant institution of the CPNHMU as part of its strategy 
represent the first attempt to move away from the exclusive authoritative use of law as an 
instrument for heritage policy implementation. The Bushmen Relics Act was an all-out top 
                                                 
16 Source CSO, Volume No. 1985, Ref 1910/5219 of the Pietermaritzburg Archives, provides evidence of 
correspondence regarding the solicitation for a grant to fund the preservation of Bushmen paintings in Natal. 
17 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository (hereafter PAR), Chief Native Commissioners’ Papers (hereafter CNC), 
Volume 133, File No. 1329/13 – A491/13/16, Native Commissioner (hereafter NC), Umzinto to CNC, 8 




down authoritative expression of heritage policy which did not allow the inclusion of other 
sub-instruments in its architecture. On the contrary, the Natural and Historical Monuments Act, 
1923 establishes a new government agency which will focus its attention on specific arears of 
heritage policy implementation. Compared to their substantive organizational counterparts 
aimed at directly affecting the production, distribution and consumption of public goods and 
services, procedural organizational policy instruments on the other hand are primarily intended 
to alter the behaviour of target communities and the relevant processes involved in the 
implementation of policy in order to better achieve government goals. Given this legislative 
context, the incorporation of procedural organizational instruments such as the Commission 
into the fabric of heritage law represents the first attempt by the South African policy makers 
to introduce other policy instruments within the authoritative regulatory framework established 
thus far in the design of heritage policy. To this extent the duties of the commission included 
the following policy implementation focus areas:- 
 To use its discretion in causing a register of monuments of the Union to be made. 
 To take the necessary step to ascertain legal ownership of a monument. 
 To preserve and prevent the impairment of monuments by mutual agreement with the 
legal owner. 
 To act as a trustee of any given monument if such a request is made by the legal owner. 
With the advent of the commission as a procedural organizational policy instrument 
incorporated into the architecture of an authoritative tool (i.e. law), the heritage management 
landscape witnessed a few innovations. In the first instance, financial or treasure based policy 
instruments in the form of both incentives and disincentives were introduced and formed part 
of the authoritative instrument. According to Section 7 of the Act, the Commission did not only 
make specific bye-laws, but also prescribed fixed fees to be paid to gain access to, and 
safeguard against disfigurement, damage or destruction of the monument. By their very nature, 
user fees increase the cost of doing something; and thus act as a disincentive to dissuade targets 
from embarking on certain actions which might have the potential to hamper the attainment of 
policy goals. As a substantive financial policy instrument, the imposition of user fees for access 
to monuments has the tendency to determine how such a service is produced, distributed and 
consumed by the public. By the same token, Section 3 of the Act prescribes other financial 
policy instruments interwoven into the fabric of the authoritative regulation. That is, the 
Commission is entitled to receive donations, fees and annual subscriptions in order to do its 
work. In instances where a vital monument is in the hands of a private owner, or public bodies, 
Section 49(c) permits the commission to explore the possibilities of monetary incentives to 
secure an agreement with the owner. The Commission puts in place by-laws aimed at those 
who contravene the Act; and the penalty will not exceed a hundred pounds; and a six months 
prison sentence for default in payment thereof (Section 7(2).  The decision as to which 





4.2.6.3 HERITAGE POLICY AND THE COMBINATION OF EXISTING 
PROTECTION REGIMES IN 1934 
While the Bushmen Relics Protection Act No 22 of 1911 and the Natural and Historical 
Monuments Act, 1923 functioned side by side to circumvent the limitations of the protection 
regimes offered by each piece of legislation, there is evidently an incremental aspect in the 
nature of the Natural and Historical Monuments, Relics and Antiques Act No 4 of 1934.  It 
repeals the previous two pieces of legislation; and collapses their respective protection 
measures into a single composite act. To this extent Section 8 of the Act offers protection to a 
fairly wide range of heritage resources than each of the previous pieces of legislation. Heritage 
resources protected by this regulation include natural and historical monuments (e.g. land with 
distinctive scenery and caves with aesthetic, historical or archaeological significance etc.); 
relics (e.g. fossils; bushmen drawings etc.); and antiques which included any movable object 
(not regarded as a monument or relic) of aesthetic, historical, archaeological or scientific value 
or interest, the whole of which or more valuable portion thereof has for over a hundred years 
been in any part of South Africa included in the Union; or which was made therein more than 
a hundred years before the publication of the notice. The second incremental dimension in the 
act is evident in its retention of the procedural organizational instrument in the form of the 
Commission established by the 1923 legislation (i.e. the CPNHMU). Section 1 of the new 
regulation gave it a new name, that is The Commission for the Preservation of Natural and 
Historical Monuments, Relics and Antiques (CPNHMRA); congruent with the scope of the 
new Act.  
The continuation of the tradition of incorporating other governance tools within the regulatory 
framework of the overriding authoritative  instrument such as is evident in the retention and 
restructuring of the Commission is clearly well established as a norm by this time. Functioning 
within a regulatory framework, the Commission as a procedural policy instrument has virtually 
become the central actor in the heritage policy implementation arena. The restructuring of the 
entity and reconfiguring of its expanded mandate under the new legislation, creates space for 
other policy instruments to be incorporated within the legalistic, if regulatory framework. As 
alluded to above, procedural policy instruments are primarily intended to alter the nature of 
policy implementation processes by impacting on the behaviour of actors involved. In order to 
fulfil its critical role as an important actor in the heritage policy implementation conduit, 
specific financial instruments acting as incentives to solicit and maximise participation are 
deployed by the regulation. Unlike in the case of the 1923 legislation where funds made 
available to the Commission for executing its functions were limited to donations, fees and 
annual subscriptions (Section 3 of the Act), the 1934 regulation prescribes the allocation of 
grants by government to the entity to perform its duties. Furthermore, while the 1923 Act 
prescribes no substantive or procedural treasure based incentives for participation in the 
Commission, belonging to the latter in the case of the Preservation of Natural and Historical 
Monuments, Relics and Antiques Act is subtly incentivised in the sense that, part of the 
incentives regime prescribed by the Act entails the solicitation of individuals to participate in 
the Commission. This is attained by allowing each member to draw from the funds of the 
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commission in order to defray financial costs which might have been incurred by the member 
concerned while on the Commission’s business. 
In instances where certain artefacts in need of protection are in private hands or owned by other 
public institutions, the Commission is entitled to use available funds to purchase such objects. 
On the other hand, the creation or restructuring of the entity as a procedural organizational 
policy instrument did not only create space for the incorporation of treasure-based policy tools. 
As a policy technique whose scope has been widened by the regulatory instrument under whose 
auspices it is expected to function, the Commission became a kind of institutionalised 
investigative tool which at the requirement by the Minister, would embark on investigating 
matters relating to the proclamation of objects as prescribed by Section 8 of the law. To this 
extent therefore, there existed a possibility in the scope of usage of this specific tool that it 
virtually took the form of a Commission of Enquiry of sorts, more especially in instances where 
the envisaged proclamation was dogged by controversy. In such instances, the use of a 
Commission as an instrument will among other things be a method employed by government 
to delay and postpone decisions on specific matters deemed as embarrassing to the state 
(Howlett, 2011:77).   
Apart from the incorporation of investigative capabilities in relation to the usage of the 
Commission as an organizational tool intended to alter the parameters of given policy 
subsystems, there is a sense in which the advent of the 1934 heritage regulation also created 
space for incorporating the use of information based policy tools in its scope. By their very 
nature information based implementation tools are adopted at the design phase of the policy 
process with the intention to communicate knowledge or information which will alter 
somewhat, the behaviour of targeted actors so that it is aligned with the implementation goals 
of government. Howlett (2011:115) aptly describes such tools as “ … ‘sermons’ in the ‘carrots, 
sticks and sermons, formulation of policy instruments.” To be sure, information based tools 
can be used either to dispense or to collect information to targeted actors in the implementation 
arena. In an effort to persuade actors to change behaviour and align it with the preservation 
goals of government, the Commission will, “take steps for the erection of tablets in suitable 
places giving information in both the official languages of the Union about the historical events 
which occurred at places.”(Section 6(1)(e). 
The established tradition of meting out strong punitive measures which is characteristic of most 
authoritative policy instruments still continues with the new legislation. Section 11 of the Act 
for example imposed a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds to those who violate the law, 
the default of payment of which is punishable by imprisonment not exceeding a period of six 
months; whereas Section 13(2) prescribes a fine not exceeding twenty five pounds for those 
who contravene the measures taken to regulate access to protected heritage resources. It was 
the limited protection offered by this legislation in the sense that only proclaimed monuments, 





4.2.6.4 HERITAGE POLICY UNDER THE AEGIS OF APARTHEID 
Thirty five years later the fourth heritage legislation was enacted by the Nationalist 
Government in the form of the National Monuments Act No 28 of 1969. This was a piece of 
heritage legislation decreed under the aegis of apartheid; and while undergoing some 
amendments over time (i.e. nine amendments in a space of 22 years18), it virtually continued 
to operate until the enactment of the National Heritage Resources Act, 1999 thirty years later 
in the democratic dispensation. While the previous three pieces of heritage legislation were 
administered by the Department of the Interior, the new act was the responsibility of the 
Department of Education. The latter was one of the state departments which after 1948, were 
used by the state machinery to entrench the policy of apartheid.19 To this extent, the passing of 
this legislation could be seen as one such tool in the hand of the state unswervingly committed 
towards institutionalising segregation and marginalising black people in South Africa. To be 
sure, the Act itself purports to seek to protect heritage resources of the republic 
indiscriminately. However there is evidence that, in keeping with spirit of the times, its 
application was characterised by glaring biases-cum-discriminations. At the beginning of the 
decade of the nineties (that is 56 years after the Natural and Historical Antiques Act, 1934 and 
21 years of operation of the National Monuments Act, 1969), a survey conducted revealed that 
at least 97% of all declared monuments reflected the values of white immigrants in South 
Africa; whilst only 3% of such monuments represented the art, architecture and artefacts of the 
republic’s 84% black population (Frescura 1990:5)  
                                                 
18 National Monuments Amendment Act No 22 of 1970; National Monuments Amendment Act No 30 of 1971; 
Expropriation Act No 63 1975; National Monument Amendment Act No 35 of 1979; National Monuments 
Amendment Act No 13 of 1981; War Graves and National Monuments Amendment No 11 of 1986; Legal 
Succession to the South African Transport Services Act 80 of 1989.; and the National Monuments Amendment 
Act No 25 of 1991. 
19 The Bantu Education Act No 47 of 1953 was one such piece of legislation within an array of policy instruments 




Figure 4(b):  Distribution of monuments 
There are evidently inherent biases and incompetency in the said legislation. 
“Though heritage legislation prior to 1969 introduced the concept of ‘monuments’, 
the National Monuments Acts subtly altered the concept in that it provided for the 
declaration of ‘national monuments’. This change has considerable implications; it 
raises the question of what exactly is meant by ‘national’, particularly in a country as 
divided and culturally diverse as South Africa. The term emphasised the political 
nature of monument proclamation.” (Whitelaw, 2000:58) 
 
By the same token, Kotze and Jansen van Rensberg (2003:4) perceptively note in this regard 
that the provisions of this piece of legislation did not only ensure limited protection to the 
heritage resources of the Republic, but further paid  little attention to the interests of previously 
suppressed ethnic groupings in South Africa.  
The deployment of procedural organizational tools as instruments for implementing heritage 
policy is maintained and entrenched by the National Monuments Act, 1969. In order to achieve 
the policy goals articulated by the introduction of the act, Section Two of the same establishes 
the juristic person known as the National Monuments Council whose objects according to 
Section 2A of the Act were:- 
 To preserve and protect historical and cultural heritage, 
 To encourage and to promote preservation and protection of heritage; and 
 To coordinate activities concerned with monuments and cultural treasures 
With the advent of the National Monuments Council, Section 3A establishes two important 
committees known as the Bugergraftekomitee and the British War Graves Committee who 
were going to place a special, focus on both Dutch and English graves by identifying burial 



















grounds of individuals who died in wars other than the First and Second World Wars as well 
as the rebellions which took place in between; burial grounds and graves of garrison troops20 
who died up to August 3, 1914; Voortrekker graves and burial grounds as well as burial grounds 
and graves of exiles21. 
While the Act itself is an authoritative instrument and as such biased towards the use of the 
coercive power of the state to circumscribe and alter the behaviour of actors towards the 
attainment of policy goals; it still features specific treasure based and information policy 
implementation tools in its scope. A fairly conspicuous and sizeable direct incentive for the 
work of the council is the appropriation of funds by parliament intended to enable its 
functioning as Section 9(1) prescribes; whereas on the other hand exemptions of the Council 
from duties, taxes and fees, constitute yet another set of financial tools deployed by the 
legislation to incentivise the organisation’s work (Section 15 of the Act). In order to ensure that 
there is provision for the repair, maintenance and general care of targeted burial grounds and 
graves, Section 9A of the Act maintains the War Graves Trust Fund established by the repealed 
War Graves Act, 1967. By the same token, burial grounds and graves of individuals who died 
in the Anglo-Boer War in the Orange Free State or in camps established in the Cape province 
for receiving inhabitants of the Republic De Oranje-Vrijstaat, receive preferential treatment in 
the sense that a special annual allocation of R 1000 is provided for their repair, maintenance 
and care (Section 9A(6). Financial assistance aimed at incentivising such policy actors  as 
registered persons, authorities or organisations is to be allocated by the Council from its coffers 
to defray expenses involved in maintaining heritage resources under the care of the said policy 
actors (Section 5A(1). Section 5(1)(iii) mentions the possibility of state subsidies provided for 
purposes of purchasing, restoring or maintaining monuments. While this is clearly intended for 
the Council, it is fairly reasonable to infer that in instances where the heritage resources were 
in private hands, such subsidies could not be ruled out. Section 5(2) as well empowers the 
council not only to borrow money but also to incentivise the protection of monuments by 
lending money to owners of such resources. By the same token, Section 6 of the Act provides 
for allowances for members of the council and its committees to defray expenses incurred while 
on council’s business.  The Act also contains some information based instruments for effective 
implementation of heritage policy. Section 5(g)(i) for example enjoins the Council to erect 
tablets which give information about historical events linked to specific heritage places; 
whereas Section 5A(j) permits the publication and distribution through the news media or in 
any other manner, any knowledge and information directly or indirectly linked to a monument. 
Having briefly interrogated the pre-1994 heritage legislation in South Africa, it is now time to 
highlight specific trends evident in that corpus of policy before proceeding to the democratic 
dispensation’s endeavours in this regard; and that is the subject of the subsequent section of 
this chapter. 
                                                 
20 Garrison troops refer to permanent forces of former republics and colonies in South Africa and those of the 
United Kingdom which were stationed in South Africa before 1910 (Section 1 of  NHRA, 1999) 
21 Exiles referred to here are persons who during the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902) were removed and taken 
away from a place now forming part of the Republic of South Africa  as a prisoner of war, and died there (Section 
1 of NHRA, 1999). 
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4.3 SPECIFIC TRENDS IN THE POST UNION ERA OF HERITAGE POLICY IN 
SOUTH AFRICA (1911-1948) 
There is clear evidence in the foregoing that, apart from being dominated by the interests of 
the white colonialists, heritage policy during this era was also more biased towards the use of 
authoritative regulatory instruments in the implementation of heritage policy. The corpus of 
legislation emanating from this period is replete with strong disincentives, in the form of 
penalties meted out to offenders. There is evidently a strong incremental character even with 
the form of penalties prescribed by the successive regimes of heritage legislation. Section 3 of 
the Bushman-Relics Act No 22 of 1911 prescribes a fine not exceeding fifty pounds to 
offenders on conviction, the default of which renders the individual liable for a prison term not 
exceeding three months. Section 7(2) of the Natural and Historical Monuments Act No 6 of 
1923 increases the penalty for non-compliance to one hundred pounds and a prison sentence 
of six months for defaulting on such payment. The incremental character of the penalties 
prescribed by this Act is among others, clearly demonstrated by their respective integrated and 
multi-pronged nature. It is the elaborate nature of the prohibitions enshrined in Sections 9 and 
10 of the Act regarding such things as alienations, pledging or letting of resources (Section 
9(1); damaging of the protected resources (Section 9(2) and 9(4); the relocation and exportation 
of resources (Section 9(3) and 9(5), which caused the said multi-pronged and incremental 
approach of the legislation. To this extent Section 11(c) of the act increases the penalty for 
specific types of offenders, “… in the case of the unauthorised export of an antique the said 
fine may be increased to a sum not exceeding seventy five percent of the market value of such 
antique.”  On the other hand, the multi-pronged, if incremental nature of the penalties 
enshrined in this legislation are further corroborated by Section 13(1) of the Act which enjoins 
the Commission to make bye-laws which will among others, “… prescribe fines not exceeding 
twenty pounds” for the contravention and non-compliance with the stringent rules regulating 
access to public monuments, relics or antiques (Section 13(1)(a)); as well as flouting bye-laws 
aimed at “regulating the excavation and removal of relics.” (Section 13(1)(d). The apartheid 
era laws adopt the paradigm provided by colonial era legislation in this regard and levies a fine 
of one thousand rand or a prison term not exceeding six months for convicted offenders and 
further prescribes the possibility of a lawbreaker being liable to both a fine and a prison 
sentence simultaneously upon conviction (Section 16(d). 
Table 4(b):  Incremental progression in the deployment punitive measures in heritage legislation.  




Bushman-Relics Protection Act, 
1911 
Fine not exceeding fifty pounds Prison terms not exceeding three 
months 
Natural and Historical Monuments 
Act, 1923 
Fine not exceeding one hundred 
pounds 
Prison term not exceeding six 
months 
Natural and Historical 
Monuments, Relics and Antiques 
Act, 1934 
Fine not exceeding one hundred 
pounds 








Fine not exceeding 75% of the 
market value of exported antique. 
National Monuments Act, 1969 Fine not exceeding one thousand 
rand 
Possibility of incurring both fine 
and prison sentence. 
Prison sentence not exceeding six 
months 
 
On the other hand, much can be said about approaches undergirding heritage policy 
development during this epoch in South Africa as depicted by the legislation under scrutiny. 
The top down approach characteristic of strong institutional and game theory biases in the 
development of heritage policy provides a rich context for a particular predisposition in the 
respective approach to policy implementation intrinsic in the relevant corpus of heritage policy 
during this epoch. The critical role played by government in the determination and 
implementation of heritage policy, presages that it is favourably disposed towards the use of 
‘sticks’ (i.e. the command and control paradigm) in the execution of policy. It is government 
alone which can effectively command monopoly over coercion and by implication, better 
situated to enforce policy on its citizens because it occupies the central seat of power. It is for 
this reason that the instruments of policy enacted during this period, simply reflect a 
mechanistic if classical approach to policy implementation where execution will happen 
automatically once the policy has been enacted; and in instances where implementation runs 
into some difficulties with non-compliance, the state uses its machinery to enforce its carrying 
out by recourse to legal action and penalties as espoused by the said legislative corpus. 
To be sure, the over reliance on authoritative instruments and the characteristic preponderance 
of ‘sticks’ in the implementation of heritage policy in this era, is punctuated by the inclusion 
of other policy instruments which are nonetheless subjected under the regulatory tool. There is 
evidently a dearth of any treasure or information based policy tools in the content of the 
Busman-Relic Protection Act, 1911. By the same token, there are no direct incentives deployed 
to solicit participation in the implementation of the Natural and Historical Monuments 
Act,1923 save the mention of donations, fees and annual subscriptions which shall on occasion 
be made to the Commission.  “The funds of the commission may include such donations, fees 
and annual subscriptions as may from time to time be made to it or be payable to it.”(Section 
3 of the Act). The Natural and Historical Monuments, Relics and Antiques Act, 1934 is the 
first heritage prescript to mention grants which will be payable to the Commission and would 
constitute its finances together with other sources of finance introduced by the previous 
legislation. “The funds of the commission shall consist of such grants, donations, fees and 
annual subscriptions as may from time to time be made to it or be payable to it.) (Section 5 of 
the Act). On the other hand, Section 6(d) of the same, points to the possibility of using funds 
to purchase or acquire heritage resources from their respective owners with the intention of 
preserving such artefacts. Section 5(b)(iii) of The National Monuments Act, 1969 speaks of 
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the possibility of a state subsidy given in respect of the purchase, restoration or maintenance 
of a heritage resource worthy of preservation and protection; while Section 5(2) speaks of a 
possibility of lending money to owners of protected resources so as to ensure their protection. 
The act also prescribes the paying of allowances to members of the Council or committees 
(Section 5(6) while on official duty. By the same token Council was among others, to be 
financed by “moneys appropriated by parliament to enable the council to perform its 
functions.” (Section 9 of the Act.) However, the large part of such incentives are intended for 
the operations of the Monuments Council and not necessarily to solicit effective participation 
from the general public in the implementation of the policy. By the same token an impression 
is also given that outside the ambit of enacted heritage legislation, grants and donations were 
solicited by the South African National Society in respect of specific heritage resources 
preservation projects. The aforementioned exchange of correspondence between the 
Pietermaritzburg branch of this organization and different stakeholders whose generosity is 
solicited for donations and grants to erect a plate with names of soldiers who garrisoned Natal 
from 1838-1914 is a case in point. 
One can therefore conclude without the fear of being precarious in such a conclusion that where 
the overriding principle in fostering the implementation of policy is ‘sticks’ and not ‘carrot’, 
there exists a propensity that even when objective incentives are allowed in this scheme of 
things, they are not accompanied by an effort at persuasion which will among other things 
appeal to the agent’s22 sense of patriotism and civil duty. The combination of objective 
incentives and persuasion are crucial for maximum participation. On the other hand, this state 
of affairs presages that the lopsided emphasis and over reliance on the command and control 
principle characteristic of this era’s corpus of heritage policy, minimizes the scope for the 
deployment of meaningful inducements for communities to participate in the implementation 
of the intervention.  
Given this context, it is fair to conclude that the use of other tools in this regard is intended to 
act as an indirect form of regulation. That is, the use of treasure based policy tools within the 
ambit of an authoritative policy tool like the law can be regarded as regulatory in nature. 
According to Howlett (2011:90), treasure based policy instruments like incentive regulation 
are sometimes offered within the context of top down authoritative approaches to policy 
implementation. For that reason their deployment as incentives occurs with the possibility of 
some form of hierarchical oversight which acts as a security should voluntary means be 
considered insufficient to orientate target behaviour accordingly.  
4.4 THE LIBERATION ERA AND ATTEMPTS TO SHAPE THE HERITAGE POLICY 
PROCESS 
A comprehensive synthesising of literature devoted to heritage policy analysis during the 
Liberation Movement in South Africa, eludes the scope of this present study and would require 
a research of its own. A limited treatment of this subject in this dissertation which briefly 
                                                 
22 The agent in an economic relationship is that party whose behaviour is being influenced by the principal’s 
deployment and use of specific incentives. 
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highlights some of the themes interrogated by academics and intellectuals regarding heritage 
policy in South Africa during the days of apartheid will suffice.  
4.4.1 FRANCO FRESCURA AND THE LIMITATIONS OF THE NATIONAL 
MONUMENTS COUNCIL 
Frescura represents heritage academics and intellectuals, who in the peak of apartheid 
interrogated the question of monuments and culture. His work is primarily a critique of the 
work of the National Monuments Council from 1936-1989. Frescura’s analysis makes some 
important contributions regarding the legacy that the new dispensation of heritage management 
inherited from both British and Apartheid Colonial rule in South Africa. According to Frescura 
(1990) the National Monuments Council’s impact in the preservation of monuments in 
particular was minimal given the fact that the legislation which existed as early as 1923, could 
do little to safeguard the national estate. It was not until 1934 that those powers were extended 
to a wider range of heritage artefacts; to the extent that by 1988 only 3581 buildings, sites and 
objects were protected by the National Monuments Council (Frescura,1990: 1)  
With the hope of shaping heritage policy development in the new dispensation, Frescura 
intends using his analysis of the apartheid heritage management status quo, to inform the 
development of better policies in the new South Africa, which will provide meaningful 
conservation and protection to heritage resources in a post-apartheid era. In bolstering his 
argument for the need for transformation in heritage management, Frescura cites, among 
others, the following factors:- 
 The lopsided nature of the declarations of monuments in the colonial and 
apartheid years 
Having studied the impact made by the introduction of the first organisational policy 
implementation instrument by government in the form of the Historical Monuments 
Commission in 1923, and the National Monuments Council in 1934, Frescura reaches a 
conclusion that 75% of all the monuments declared until the eve of democracy were “almost 
overwhelmingly oriented towards the Cape” (Frescura, 1990:4) 
 The entrenchment of white values in the process of monumentalising 
His other argument for policy change in the new dispensation is premised on the overwhelming 
and exclusive representation of white people’s values in the monumental landscape of the 
country. This is demonstrated by the fact that of all the monuments existing at the eve of 
democracy, 97% of them reflected and represented exclusively white values (Frescura, 1990:5) 
This, he argues suggests that  “the policy of monumentalising our built environment has been 
used consciously or unconsciously to reinforce white political strategies and to support claims 





 The links between the National Monuments Council and the the ruling party 
ideology 
Frescura (1990:7) observes that ever since 1969 when the National Monuments Council was 
established by the National Monuments Act No 28 of 1969, 71 persons have been nominated 
to the Council. The representation of the country’s demographics in the said Council are 
evidently a course for concern for heritage policy. The demographics are as follows:- 
Fifty four (54) of the individuals appointed to the Council during the said period were Afrikaans 
speaking, three (3) were women; and only two (2) were individuals originating from outside 
the white community. With reference to the Councils ideological leanings,  Frescura observes 
that 12 members of this Council within the period in question were known members of the 
Broederbond, a secret society among the Afrikaner community which ever since 1919, sought 
to influence and regulate the country’s political, economic and cultural life. 
Frescura therefore represents contributors to the heritage policy process who did not only 
occupy themselves with the critique of the existing status quo in heritage management under 
apartheid, but who equally intended to provide  pointers to the new paradigm of heritage 
administration in the new dispensation. 
4.4.2 COMMEMORATIONS, MEMORY AND MONUMENTS - ALI KHANGELA 
HLONGWANE 
Although Hlongwane writes in the new dispensation, his contribution is useful in the sense that 
it provides reflection on the pre-1994 era and how the commemoration of critical events like 
June 16, 1976 were used, and how such commemorations paved the way for heritage policy in 
the new dispensation. Hlongwane’s contribution weighs in on the debate about 
commemorations, memory and monuments. He looks at the various ways by which the June 
16, 1976 student uprisings have been commemorated in order to preserve the living heritage 
associated with the event.  He argues that over the three decades the commemorations have 
been largely expressions of grief, loss as well as the desire to continue to pursue the liberation 
of South Africa. According to him, while these commemorations have been characterised by 
tradition, change and continuity as an aspect of memory, they have also been “a site of struggle 
for liberation and ideological contestation amongst those engaging in the struggle for 
liberation.” (Hlongwane, 2008:135). Within the context of the pre-1994 political situation, 
where the ruling elite was determined to erase and demonise the legacy of the uprisings, this 
struggle was double pronged. On the one hand it consisted of the mobilisation of people against 
apartheid colonialism, while on the other hand it was characterised by liberation movements 
contesting for ideological hegemony. To this extent the commemoration became “a unifying 
rallying point among the oppressed (Hlongwane, 2008: 165), where both grief and pain rallied 
people together and committed them to the project of liberation.  The commemoration therefore 





4.5 THE EVOLUTION OF POST 1994 HERITAGE POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
At the advent of democracy in South Africa, part of the legacy bequeathed by the pre-1994 
heritage policy regime was the adoption of authoritative instruments carefully calibrated to 
include a mixture of organizational, treasure and information based policy instruments, of both 
a substantive and a procedural nature. Over a period of time scholarship has been trying to 
account for the factors responsible for affecting the choice of policy instruments. Since the 
decade of the sixties for example, an interesting development has taken place regarding this 
subject matter; and a careful consideration of the analysis of this evolution indicates that 
different models have been used to explain how appropriate policy instruments were chosen 
over time. According to Michael Howlett (2011), earlier studies on the subject tended to 
suggest that the choice of tools in economic policies in particular was determined by the goals 
pursued by the policy in question and the contextual realities within which such choices were 
made. Later, other scholars suggested that it was the degree of government coercion required 
to implement an initiative which determined the choice of relevant tools. Howlett (2011:50-
55) however has argued that according to contemporary scholarship, it is the specific mode of 
governance which is construed to impact on the choice made for relevant policy tools.  
Summarising the contributions made by scholarship on the subject, Michael Hill acknowledges 
the complexities involved in choosing appropriate policy instruments to effect policy. “What 
the literature on instruments has made very clear is that the factors that influence instrument 
choice are complex. Policy type comes into play here as well as issues about resistance to 
policy, but we may also see ideology influencing choice. In each specific case much depends 
on what is available, what has been done before, or what is already in use in a closely related 
policy area.” (Hill, 2009:178)  
4.5.1 THE ADVENT OF DEMOCRACY AND THE WHITE PAPER ON ARTS, 
CULTURE AND HERITAGE, 1996 
Within the ambit of the Constitution which in its Bill of Rights, firmly establishes the rights of 
cultural communities to enjoy and maintain their respective cultures (Section 31), the 1996 
White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage sets the tone and introduces remarkable paradigm 
shifts in the development of heritage policy and the management of the national estate in the 
post 1994 era. The advent of a new dispensation in South Africa had already ushered in a 
process of fundamental transformation in all aspects of society. This transformation, in 
complete contradistinction to the previous epoch, had to be guided by such fundamental 
principles as democracy, justice, non-racialism and non-sexism (Republic of South Africa (b), 
1996:1). In setting out its primary purpose therefore, the White Paper, at the outset, 
unequivocally declares that it seeks to inaugurate government policy for establishing optimum 
funding arrangements and appropriate institutional frameworks for the creation, promotion and 
protection of South African arts, culture and heritage. It is within this context that the policy’s 
stated goal is cited as that of ensuring adequate public subsidies for arts, culture and heritage; 
which will among other things guarantee the promotion of the diverse heritage of the country 
(Republic of South Africa (b),1996:2). This presupposes that the White Paper adopts a strong 
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organisational and treasure based bias to the choice of implementation instruments; and that is 
the subject of the subsequent section of this chapter.  
4.5.1.1 THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND THE USE OF TREASURE 
BASED POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN THE WHITE PAPER ON ARTS, CULTURE 
AND HERITAGE, 1996. 
The establishment of appropriate institutions or agencies as a means to achieve policy goals in 
the protection and preservation of both tangible and intangible heritage resources is the 
fundamental aspect of the White Paper; and the need for such initiatives is caused by the desire 
for redress and democratisation of the industry (Republic of South Africa (b), 1996:12). In the 
colonial era as mentioned above, the Bushmen Relics Protection Act, 1911 came into being as 
a result of the influence of the South African National Society (SANS), established earlier in 
the beginning of the twentieth century. Interestingly, the White Paper openly acknowledges 
that its ultimate provenance is largely due to the work of the Arts and Culture Task Group 
(ACTAG), established by the Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology at the dawn 
of democracy in 1994, to advice on new policy directions for the industry. The establishment 
of ACTAG is yet another demonstration of how government uses its authority to selectively 
activate and mobilise certain actors and give them special recognition in the policy process so 
that their views influence the relevant policy and its implementation. This is clearly 
demonstrated in the pervasive role played by the ACTAG recommendations in the formulation 
of the White Paper. 
Apart from its recognition of ACTAG and giving it preferential access to decision makers and 
government officials, the White Paper further recommends the reform of specific authoritative 
and procedural organisational instruments bequeathed by the previous dispensations of heritage 
management. While on the one hand the White Paper (Republic of South Africa (b), 1996:13), 
recognises the existing Declared Cultural Institutions handed down by the past, it nonetheless 
advocates a systematic restructuring and rationalisation in order to ensure redress of past 
inequities. By the same token, while the White Paper acknowledges the National Monuments 
Council (NMC) established by the 1969 legislation, as well as the presence of homeland 
heritage legislation, it further advocates the reconstitution of the NMC as a division within a 
new broader institution called the National Heritage Council; as well as the consolidation of 
the Bantustan heritage legislation into a single law. This inevitably created scope for a new 
institution and a new legislative framework which will seek to optimise the coordination of 
heritage resource management across all fields of the national estate.  
The White Paper also advocates the establishment of the National Place Names Division which 
replaces the National Place Names Committee whose primary responsibility was to advise the 
Minister on the naming of places in South Africa (Republic of South Africa (b) 1996:13). By 
the same token, in its endeavour to transform the support for heritage informed by specific 
values and principles, the White Paper proposes that government again uses its organizational 
resources and establish a procedural policy tool in the form of the National Heritage Council. 
According to the White Paper, the establishment of this institution creates space for the 
deployment of treasure-based instruments to help government attain its policy goals: “The 
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National Heritage Council will receive a parliamentary grant through the Department and will 
provide funding by transfer payments to institutions and projects under its remit.” (Republic 
of South Africa (b)1996:14). Apart from the disbursement of such incentives for heritage policy 
implementation, the agency will also play an advisory role to government. 
On the other hand, one of the interesting shifts evident in the White Paper which brings about 
change in the manner in which participation is solicited from anticipated actors in the 
implementation conduit, is the use of persuasion of a special kind. A closer look at the 
introductory comments provided by the two political heads of the relevant Department 
responsible for the administration of the White Paper is quite revealing. As previously observed 
in the earlier sections of this dissertation, the type of persuasion characteristic of political 
organisations like government departments is such that by using propaganda, it appeals to the 
targeted actors’ sense of patriotism for the implementation of the policy. An impression is 
created for example that the implementation of the policy advances the course for 
transformation which is the characteristic feature of the changing South Africa in the decade 
of the nineties.  For this reason it can therefore be concluded that the White Paper seeks to 
employ the use of both treasure based objective incentives and persuasion to align the 
behaviour of would be actors in the implementation arena with the attainment of policy goals. 
Apart from prescribing the deployment of direct, if objective incentives in the form of grants 
and subsidies, the White Paper further proposes the application and use of ideal benefactions 
in soliciting participation in the implementation processes of heritage policy. When the 
Minister in question seeks to persuade would be actors to participate by means of relevant 
persuasive propaganda in the introductory message to the chapter, he makes an interesting 
observation that the new heritage policy ushered in by the White Paper, creates hope for 
members of the various arts, culture and heritage communities that their previously suppressed 
and marginalised views and aspirations, are now going to be a meaningful, if decisive part of 
the mainstream (Republic of South Africa (b) 1996:1) To this extent, the type of persuasion 
employed in this instance is not meant to rationalise the inadequacy of the incentives provided. 
On the contrary it seeks to appeal to the potential ‘implementation actors’ ideals by promising 
recognition of their views and interests. 
The Minister, in his introductory message to the document indirectly alludes to the moral 
hazard phenomenon in the provision of incentives for implementation advocated by the White 
Paper. While admittedly adopting what he regards as an ‘arm’s length’ relationship in the 
implementation of the policy, he is simultaneously cognisant of the fact that funding from 
public coffers carries specific obligations of accountability to both the principal and agent in 
the relationship. Implicit in the statement by the said public manager is the admission that the 
deployment of financial policy instruments like grants and subsidies suggested by the policy 
will certainly require that measures be taken to monitor value for money in the disbursement 
and usage of such resources.  This by implication places a heavy responsibility on the principal 
in the relationship to seek to circumvent the negative moral hazard impact by among other 
things incurring the cost of monitoring the usage of the deployed monetary incentives. To this 
extent therefore, it can be concluded that there seems to be a multi-pronged incentives regime 
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advocated by the White Paper which is intended to inform subsequent heritage policy 
development in the new dispensation. 
What sort of determination can one make regarding the deployment of incentives in the White 
Paper? Taking one’s cue from the foregoing analysis of the policy document, one can safely 
conclude that, while a conscious and commendable attempt is made to countenance the use of 
specific inducements to solicit maximum community participation in the implementation of 
heritage policy such as is evident in the content of the White Paper and its concomitant 
undergirding propaganda providing its sitz im leben, the policy is still lean on its deployment 
of such tools when compared to the wide array of incentives already in use in the industry 
internationally. 
4.5.2 THE NATIONAL HERITAGE COUNCIL ACT NO 10 OF 1999  
When tracing the historical background within which this piece of legislation owes its ultimate 
provenance, the Heritage, Archives and Libraries Legislation Review Report of the Department 
of Arts and Culture chronologically lists at least three specific impulses which culminated in 
the crafting of the Draft Heritage Bill in 1998. One such impetus according to this publication 
was provided by the report presented by the ANC’s Monuments, Museums, Archives and 
National Symbols Commission to the Culture and Development Conference which was held in 
Johannesburg in 1993.  The said report recognised among other things, the racist and narrow 
scope of existing heritage legislation as well as its inability to uphold values and principles 
germane to a democratic dispensation. It was in the light of this situation therefore that the 
report proposed the establishment of a new system for the administration of heritage institutions 
which included a Heritage Council, regional councils and the establishment of a National 
Heritage Trust Fund (Republic of South Africa 2008:123-124)  The second propulsion was the 
report of the Arts and Culture Task Group (ACTAG) in 1995 which among other things, 
envisaged the establishment of a National Heritage Council to be comprised of the National 
Archives Commission, the National Amasiko Commission, the National Museums 
Commission and the National Heritage Sites Commission (South Africa (Republic 2008:124). 
The third impulse was provided by The White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage in 1996 
(Republic of South Africa 2008:124). The latter, in its endeavours to transform the industry 
also contemplated the establishment of an institution which would seek to expedite the process.  
“Given the range of tasks required to transform support for heritage, and in accordance with 
the principles of access, redress and participation, it is proposed to establish the new National 
Heritage Council (NHC) as a statutory body.” (Republic of South Africa 1996:14). Three years 
later government enacted the National Heritage Council Act, 1999 which was intended, “To 
establish the juristic person known as the National Heritage Council” whose main objectives 
centred around the development and protection of the national estate; coordination of heritage 
management; protection, preservation and promotion of heritage content residing in orature23; 
integration of living heritage24 with functions of the council and other relevant authorities and 
                                                 
23 Section 2(vi) of the Act defines orature as oral tradition. 
24 Section 2(iii) defines living heritage as, “the intangible aspects of inherited culture” which may include such 
resources as cultural tradition, oral history, performance, ritual, popular memory, skills and techniques, indigenous 
knowledge systems; and a holistic approach to nature, society and social relationships. 
102 
  
institutions; promotion of indigenous knowledge systems; and intensification of support for the 
promotion of history and culture of all citizens (Sections 3 & 4 of the Act).  
In keeping with the recommendations of the White Paper, 1996, there is a conscious effort to 
solicit participation from members of the society in the implementation of heritage policy 
demonstrated by the Act. Cash based financial policy tools in the form of grants tailored for 
both individuals and institutions in the implementation conduit are deployed by the regulatory 
tool. In order to fulfil its mandate, one of the primary functions of the Council is to disburse 
grants to any person, organisation or institution so that it promotes and develops national 
heritage activities and resources (Section 10(1)(d). The wide range and all inclusive nature of 
actors targeted by the grants are not racially biased and arbitrary. This is caused by the fact that 
there are specific values and principles governing public administration in the new dispensation 
prescribed by the supreme law of the country. Section 195(d) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 enjoins the new public administration to provide services 
impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias. The said emphasis on democratic values and 
principles espoused by the Constitution are to a large extent responsible for the service hatch 
type of public administration which indiscriminately responds to the needs of the people, 
advocated by Section 195(e).  
Associated with its role in the deployment of direct financial policy instruments, the 
organizational tool (i.e. the NHC) functions as a procedural authoritative policy 
implementation instrument and is used to provide the Minister of Arts and Culture with on-
going advice on how funding is allocated to declared cultural institutions (Section 10(1)(b) of 
the Act); while on the other hand it will also engage in some lobbying activity in order to secure 
funding for heritage management (Section 10(1)(j). Light incentives are also provided to 
members of the Council whose expenses incurred while on its business are duly reimbursed. 
To that extent members of committees co-opted by Council who are not necessarily in the 
employ of the state are also reimbursed accordingly (Section 9 of the Act). While the act is 
characterised by the deployment of direct treasure-based incentives in the form of grants in 
particular, it can also be safely inferred that there are indirect inducements implicitly provided 
for in it which are not specifically offered. In a culturally diverse country like South Africa 
whose past is characterised by a fair amount of marginalisation and suppression of other 
cultures, the offer to belong to an organisation which decides on matters related to heritage 
funding is lucrative.   
On the other hand, a closer look at the implicit or explicit implementation theories evident in 
the Act as a form of direct regulation seems to indicate vestiges of a bias towards a lopsided 
top down approach to the execution of policy. For example, the choice of incentives therefore 
is likely to be largely influenced by the elitist thinking of the council without taking particular 
cognisance of the nature of the actors to whom grants are disbursed. If this is anything to go by 
therefore, one can safely infer that there exists a possibility that the choice of incentives used 
to solicit responses in the policy implementation arena is likely to be influenced by the nature 
of the dispensing authority without carefully studying the circumstances of the recipient and 
other socio economic dynamics within the beneficiary’s context.  
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By the same token, givers of incentives have the tendency to focus on those incentives they are 
likely to control (Stone, 1997:277); and this may have the effect of limiting the scope when 
choosing relevant inducements; and this could easily lead to a situation where incentives 
characterised by a low level of control from the giver are virtually marginalized and not 
considered by the dispensing institution. This is often demonstrated by the kind of criteria that 
funding bodies like the NHC and the National Lottery for example, often require from 
applicants in order to qualify for funding for heritage projects.  
4.5.3 THE NATIONAL HERITAGE RESOURCES ACT NO 25 OF 1999 
The National Heritage Resources Act, 1999, is arguably the cornerstone of the post 1994 corpus 
of heritage legislation. Tracing the steps of the bill through the legislative processes of the 
National Assembly reveals that both the National Heritage Council Act, 1999 and the National 
Heritage Resources Act, 1999 were submitted under Section 76 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 as a single National Heritage Bill on the 1st of September, 1998. 
On the 8th of February 1999, the Chief Whip of the ruling party moved a draft resolution as 
follows to this effect in parliament:- 
That notwithstanding the provisions of Rules 147 to 150, the Portfolio Committee on 
Arts, Culture, Language, Science and Technology to which the subject of the National 
Heritage Bill [B 139 – 98) was referred for enquiry and report in terms of Rule 
147(3)(b) on 15 October 1998, not be limited to presenting one amended Bill to the 
House but be given leave to split the Bill and together with its report present two 
separate Bills to the House without thereby expanding the subject of the Bill as 
originally referred to it. (Republic of South Africa Hansard 8-17 February 1999:23) 
 
While the National Heritage Council Bill, 1999 was assented to by the President after due 
legislative processes on the 14th of April 1999, the National Heritage Resources Bill, 1999 on 
the other hand was agreed to by Parliament on the 25th of March 1999; and signed into law by 
the President on the 28th of April 1999 (South Africa Hansard 23-26 March 1999:3450).  
The legislation is a direct regulatory policy instrument; and comparatively speaking has a  wide 
scope of application as evinced by its objects in the introduction. This authoritative policy tool 
is structured into three chapters. The first chapter seeks to establish a system for the 
management of the national estate and as a result sets out general principles which should 
inform the management of heritage resources in the Republic (Part 1); and Part two of the same 
establishes the South African Heritage Resources Agency as well as Provincial Heritage 
Authorities (Sections 11 and 23). The second chapter deals with matters concerning the 
protection and management of heritage resources and prescribes formal protections25 (Part 1); 
                                                 
25 Resources categorised under formal protections include both national and provincial heritage sites; protected 




general protections26 (Part 2) and the management structure of the national estate27 (Part 3) The 
last chapter of the act prescribes enforcement measures, appeals, offences and penalties to be 
levied on offenders (Part 1); while part two consists of miscellaneous phenomena ranging from 
the publication of notices in the Government Gazette (Section 52), to the enunciation of the 
short title of the Act (Section 61).  
In keeping with the characteristic tradition already established in the colonial era, the act as a 
direct regulatory instrument comprises of a combination of policy tools aimed at enabling 
effective implementation. In the first instance, there is a very strong reliance on government’s 
organizational capacity evident in the regulatory tool. Intent on establishing an integrated and 
interactive system of heritage resource identification and management and circumventing a 
possible tower-silo approach in the administration of the national estate, the act places heritage 
management firmly within the context of cooperative governance espoused by chapter three of 
the Constitution. To this extent, resources are to be managed in accordance with specific 
grading assessment criteria.  Inevitably, this particular grading system gives rise to other 
organizational instruments designed for effective implementation of heritage policy. According 
to Section 7(1)(a) of the Act, Grade I heritage resources comprises “Heritage resources with 
qualities so exceptional that they are of special national significance.”; are the responsibility 
of the South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA). Grade II, which comprises of 
resources significant within a province and Grade III resources which consists of that section 
of the national estate considered worthy of conservation are the responsibilities of Provincial 
Heritage Authorities (PHRA’s) and local authorities respectively. SAHRA, a juristic person 
whose affairs are managed by a Council established in terms of Section 14 of the Act,  has the 
overall responsibility of coordinating the actual identification of heritage resources comprising 
the national estate and the management thereof (Sections 12-13). Both Provincial Heritage 
Authorities to be established by Members of Executive Councils responsible for heritage 
matters in the nine provinces (Section 23) and Local Authorities are also accorded functions, 
powers and duties (Sections 24 – 26). 
The leveraging of government’s organizational resources in the deployment of implementation 
instruments is further demonstrated in the act by the allocation of specific rights, duties and 
exemptions to all branches of the state and supported bodies other than those dealing directly 
with heritage matters. State departments, The Deeds Office and The Surveyor General, for 
example, are required by section 9 of the Act to provide a variety of heritage related services 
and assistance to SAHRA as the coordinating entity in the management of the national estate. 
This constellation of actors therefore provides an array of both direct substantive and 
procedural organisational implementation tools in the attainment of heritage policy goals.  
There is also a sense in which the act provides for the use of partnerships and contracts as yet 
another form of organizational instruments used to implement policy. According to Howlett 
(2011:71), such instruments are used by government to offload the legal and financial burdens 
                                                 
26 General protections include heritage artefacts such as imported objects protected by laws of foreign countries; 
structures; archaeological, paleontological resources and meteorites (Section 35); burial grounds and graves; 




associated with service delivery. In this instance, goods or services which should be provided 
by government are contracted to such entities as QUANGOS and other private individuals and 
organisations. Section 42 of the act therefore provides for the negotiation of agreements 
between heritage authorities, conservation bodies, individuals and even communities in order 
to ensure conservation and protection of heritage resources. Section 42(2) creates the 
possibility of such agreements and partnerships to include specific terms such as “… the 
provision of financial or other assistance from the heritage authority concerned.” 
On the other hand, the implementation of public policy also relies on the deployment of specific 
treasure based instruments aimed at soliciting behaviour that is congruent with set policy goals. 
As an authoritative regulatory instrument, the National Heritage Resources Act, 1999 
incorporates the use of such tools as part of its multi-pronged approach to the attainment of 
policy objectives. Section 21 of the Act authorises parliament to make an appropriation to the 
South African Heritage Resources Agency which is intended to enable the same to perform its 
functions and exercise its powers in accordance with the dictates of the law. Apart from the 
said appropriations, the Act further prescribes that both the Minister and Member of Executive 
Council concerned may provide direct financial incentives intended for the conservation of 
heritage resources in order to promote the purposes of the legislation. Furthermore, Section 40 
of the Act authorises SAHRA to provide grants or loans to certain bodies and individuals in 
respect of any project construed to be contributing to its purpose. Such funding is provided out 
of the National Heritage Resources Fund established by Section 40(4) of the act specifically 
for such purposes. There exists a possibility that such loans can also be provided without 
interest according to Section 40(3)(b)(ii). The fact that these finance based instruments are 
provided under the tutelage of a regulatory instrument, and by implication meant to advance 
its course as an authoritative instrument for policy implementation, implies that such incentives 
can be construed as regulatory in nature. The provision of such incentives takes place within 
the context where threats for punishment for failure to alter one’s behaviour according to the 
dictates of the regulatory instrument, exist as a real option should such voluntary behaviour not 
be adequately solicited.     
The act also authorises heritage authorities to levy specific user fees in respect of services 
provided. Both the South African Heritage Resources Authority and Provincial Heritage 
Authorities are authorised by Sections 21(c) and 25(l) to charge certain fees for rendering such 
services as the processing of applications, conducting investigations, production, acquisition 
and marketing of specific products as well as the provision of relevant information.  
Information based policy tools are attempts by governments to influence and alter behaviour 
of people by means of transferring relevant information from policy actors particularly in the 
policy implementation arena (Craft 2011:2). To a limited degree, the Act also incorporates 
within its architecture as an authoritative if regulatory tool, the usage of specific information 
based policy instruments for the attainment of set policy goals. Section 25(2)(l) authorises 
heritage authorities not only to create and register a badge or emblem, but also to affix or 
display it on areas protected by the Act. By the same token, Section 27(17) states that wherever 
appropriate, designated heritage sites must be marked with a relevant badge, thus conveying 
important information about its status, and soliciting a particular behaviour from potential 
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actors in the policy implementation arena. Equally, heritage authorities are also authorised to 
“publish, or by any other means make available or distribute in any form, or cause to be 
published or distributed, any knowledge and information relating to the national estate and 
any of its functions or activities.” Apart from information dispensing policy tools, the 
regulatory tool also countenances the use of information gathering instruments often used to 
inform critical decisions aimed at the preservation of resources. Section 25(2)(a) for example 
provides for the use of research in the identification, assessment and management of heritage 
resources.  
4.5.4 MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN HERITAGE 
POLICY SECTOR 
Policy by its own nature is not static. New challenges emerge which sometimes require some 
revision of previous alternatives and interventions. Consequently, there is enough evidence to 
the effect that while adopting a characteristic incremental approach to policy making and 
implementation, South Africa is poised to embrace new policy directions in the management 
of the national estate. After ten years of democracy, the South African government embarked 
on an exercise aimed at reviewing the policies adopted since 1994 in order to monitor and 
evaluate their effectiveness. As part of this broad review, the Department of Arts and Culture 
started its own review of policies (Republic of South Africa DAC 2008:1). Consequently, the 
White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage as well as eleven pieces of heritage legislation 
administered by the Department of Arts and Culture are currently poised for a rigorous revision.  
The process of heritage policy revision has begun to produce some interesting documentation 
which seeks to solicit inputs from the heritage fraternity in a number of ways. In the first 
instance, the Heritage, Archives and Libraries Legislation Review published by the Department 
in 2008, outlines specific key heritage policy challenges which require attention from policy 
makers. Specific policy gaps have been identified in the White Paper itself and includes its 
silence on specific issues related to the management of heritage resources generally. To this 
extent the proposed revision recommends the development of a revised cultural policy. Part IV 
of the report focuses attention on the issues of governance and heritage institutions and virtually 
makes some recommendations which include the review of seemingly overlapping institutional 
mandates of such government agencies as the Department of Arts and Culture, the National 
Heritage Council and the South African Heritage Resources Authority; the composition of 
governing bodies of heritage agencies etc. (Republic of South Africa 2008:80-82). Part V of 
the report shifts focus from the review of organizational policy instruments in the form of 
heritage agencies and institutions to the actual review of authoritative policy tools in the form 
of heritage laws. Specific recommendations are made for the review of specific sections of 
heritage legislation.  Six specific sections of the National Heritage Council Act, 1999 (namely 
sections 4, 5, 6, 10, 12 and 13 are recommended for review in order to effect the required 
revision of the composition of the Council and its mandate (Republic of South Africa 
2008:134-136). By the same token, twenty seven sections of the National Heritage Resources 
Act, 1999 are highlighted for attention in order to effect the required changes which among 
other things are necessitated by the context within which the legislation is administered. 
107 
  
There is evidently a new focus on and interest in living heritage which has since brought about 
a policy framework to guide the management of such heritage in South Africa. As a result of 
this renewed interest, the Department of Arts and Culture has come up with a draft of the 
National Policy on South African Living Heritage in 2009. In keeping with the already 
established tradition in the South African heritage policy process, namely the incremental 
approach to policy development and implementation, the draft policy envisages a strong 
deployment of a multiplicity of instruments for the effective implementation of heritage policy. 
While there is a strong presence of organizational, treasure based and to a lesser extent 
information instruments in the draft policy, it also places a high premium on the participation 
of local communities in the management of living heritage. The rational for such an approach 
is caused by the fact that the policy itself is intended to enable what is already driven by 
communities (Republic of South Africa National Policy 2008:15).   
Government’s commitment to the New Growth Path which in essence envisages the creation 
of 5 million jobs over a period of ten years in South Africa, and a renewed emphasis on the 
role on the contribution of creative industries to the realisation of this policy goal are now 
evident. On the 14th and the 15th of April 2011, a consultative conference was held by the 
Department of Arts and Culture with the sole aim of aligning creative industries with South 
Africa’s New Growth Path announced by the President. The Minister’s foreword to the report 
of this conference aptly describes its primary intention. “The consultative conference 
“Mzansi’s Golden Economy” on the contribution of the arts, culture and heritage sector to the 
implementation of the New Growth Path took place at the Newtown Cultural Precinct on the 
14th and 15th of April 2011. The conference was the first step in a process of government 
engaging with artists, and practitioner, business, labour and civil society to ensure that, 
through our collective work, the sector drives social cohesion and economic growth. (Republic 
of South Africa (2011: iii).  
Out of the seven areas of concern raised by the conference, at least two are of particular 
relevance to this study. These are matters concerned with stakeholder relations and funding of 
the sector. With reference to the former the consultative conference observed that government 
among others is construed as prescriptive, regulatory and controlling in its dealings; and this 
has the tendency to alienate actors in the arts, culture and heritage policy implementation arena 
(Republic of South Africa 2011:69). With respect to funding, conference did not only highlight 
the general outcry regarding funding in the sector, but further highlighted concerns around the 
bureaucratic and cumbersome nature of the application processes involved as well as lack of 
transparency with criteria and guidelines used to allocate such funding. The observations and 
proposals made in respect of the challenges observed in the sector are indications of new policy 
directions to be taken by government in relation to the industry; and in this context it is 
reasonable to expect explorations of avenues in the design, deployment and streamlining of 
new and existing incentives in the sector. 
4.5.5 CRITIQUE OF THE POST 1994 CORPUS OF HERITAGE LEGISLATION 
While it is true that the progressive post 1994 corpus of heritage legislation has incrementally 
brought about positive changes in the management of the national estate compared to previous 
108 
  
policies, the fact that the possibility of reviewing such legislation is already mooted in heritage 
circles is indicative of some of the inadequacies evident in it. It is beyond the scope of this 
study to interrogate comprehensively some of the gaps already implicit in this policy. The 
present section will highlight some positive and negative critiques highlighted over time from 
different perspectives with regard to the deployment of regulation as a policy instrument in 
heritage management. 
In as far as the implementation of heritage policy is concerned, the post 1994 heritage 
legislative regime has virtually continued the tradition of a strong reliance on the deployment 
of authoritative instruments in the form of law. South African scholars have different takes on 
this characteristic dependence on the milder form of regulation as a heritage policy instrument. 
The KwaZulu-Natal archaeologist, Gavin Whitelaw for example recognises what he regards as 
interesting developments in the content of the National Heritage Resources Act, 1999. On the 
one hand, for Whitelaw (2000:59) the act promotes research into living heritage; and also 
makes provision for impact assessments. For Whitelaw the net result of this new development 
in the nature of law as a regulatory, if authoritative policy instrument is that it has since afforded 
the South African Heritage Resources Authority a greater compliance role when compared to 
previous legislative protection regimes.  
Basing his argument on Section 5.7 of the Act in particular, Whitelaw (2000:60) concludes that 
the regulatory tool in question virtually recognises the existence of different value systems by 
among other things establishing that in the identification, assessment and management of the 
national estate, particular cognisance should be taken of relevant cultural values and indigenous 
knowledge systems. However, Whitelaw indicts the instrument that while it demonstrates 
recognition for the multiplicity of value systems, it nonetheless propagates a fundamentally 
empiricist significance grading system which considers the phenomenon of significance to be 
intrinsic within the heritage resource concerned; rather than being accorded to the same by the 
people or interest groups. He argues, “Indeed, the whole idea of grading heritage resources 
against defined assessment criteria seems at odds with the principle of devolving responsibility 
to the lowest level and I suspect that it will not be possible to do so unproblematically.” 
(Whitelaw, 2000:61) 
According to the scholars of the then Potchefstroom University for CHE in South Africa, Kotze 
and Jansen Van Rensburg (2003:15), the National Heritage Resources Act, 1999 is the central 
legislation regulating heritage management in South Africa; and to that extent ushers in a 
paradigm shift to cultural heritage protection and the conservation thereof. The two scholars 
argue that compared to previous protection regimes, the said legislation is transformational, 
comprehensive, well-structured and effective in enforcing desired action. However Kotze and 
Jansen Van Rensburg (2003:20) indict this piece of legislation on two counts. They argue that 
the objectives it envisages to attain are ambitious and idealistic and may prove difficult to 
achieve in the South African context where poverty and a less stable economy and corruption 
are common. Secondly, they also observe that while it is commendable that the regulatory tool 
provides space for community participation in the implementation of the same, the scope for 
such participation and obligations thereof are not made clear.  
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The University of Pretoria rock art scientist, Ndukuyakhe Ndlovu is critical of the effectiveness 
of legislation as an instrument for the protection of South African cultural heritage resources. 
Ndlovu argues that the inclusion of living heritage in the National Heritage Resources Act, 
1999 is not an improvement from previous legislation. He perceptively points out that the Act 
itself is not necessarily about the preservation of living heritage. On the contrary, “it is about 
protecting and conserving sites that have a connection with living heritage, in order to provide 
access to those who may wish to perform various ritual activities.: (Ndlovu, 2011:32).  
For Ndlovu (2011:33) two important challenges have impacted negatively on the 
implementation of cultural heritage legislation; and they are the lack of community 
involvement and the challenges encountered when the legislation has to be enforced. When 
considering the nature of governance that heritage legislation seeks to engender, Ndlovu further 
indicts current heritage legislation that it is still entrenched in colonial times. “What is difficult 
to comprehend is the post-colonial legislation that is still embedded in colonial times. This 
‘fortress’, top-down approach, has not provided a reasonable success for cultural heritage 
managers.” (Ndlovu, 2011:33). Ndlovu is critical of the marginalization of African values and 
principles in the development of heritage legislation in South Africa and its reactive 
implementation. He interestingly notes that the Eurocentric physical bias or approach evident 
in contemporary heritage legislation in South Africa militates against the effective participation 
of communities in its implementation.  
The critiques levelled against the predominance and over reliance of the use of law as a 
regulatory policy instrument are not only legitimate, but also enlightening. For example, any 
policy implementation endeavour which relegates critical values of the targeted actors will not 
be effectively implemented. Policy is by its very nature, a value laden enterprise and ignoring 
such values spells disaster for public policy implementation in particular. However, not all the 
criticism levelled against reliance on legislation can be accepted without caution. For example, 
it is not always true that public policy implementation failure can always be blamed on the 
choice of instrument and by implication its ineffectiveness for successful implementation. 
Policy implementation is often influenced by a number of factors other than the choice of 
instrument alone.  
Secondly, probably as a result of our own past, in a country like South Africa, there is always 
the possibility to regard top-down approaches to such processes as policy formation and 
implementation as altogether wrong and undesirable. Both these stages of the policy process 
have to do with the exercise of delegated power in a democracy. For public policy to be 
authentic and legitimate, an important position should be accorded to the policy actor who has 
been mandated by the electorate to exercise that power, even in instances where such 
responsibility has to do with the management of the relevant constellation or network of actors 
in the implementation arena. The quest for bottom up approaches in the policy process should 
not seek to violate standard democratic practice by altogether rejecting the authority of the 
policy maker. 
Thirdly, a careful examination of heritage policy in South Africa since the post Union era in 
1911 to the present does display a strong reliance on the use of authoritative policy instruments 
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such as the law. However, as the above analysis of different heritage protection regimes has 
demonstrated, the design of such tools countenances the inclusion of other policy 
implementation instruments such as treasure-based, organizational and to a lesser extent, 
information instruments of public policy. Some of these tools by their nature are intended to 
solicit a bottom up movement in the implementation of policy.  To that extent, a combination 
of top-down and bottom up approaches cannot be ruled out in the architecture of heritage 
legislation used in South Africa, and its relevance for implementation.   
4.6 CONCLUSION 
The present chapter has sought to analyse the development of heritage policy in South Africa 
particularly from the prism of the deployment of policy instruments intended to effect and 
structure policy. As early as 1911, there is clearly a reliance on the authoritative, if regulatory 
instruments in the implementation of heritage policy. With the advent of the 1923 heritage law, 
there is evidence of nuancing authoritative regulatory policy instruments with the inclusion of 
other critical governing tools aimed at enhancing effective implementation. The 1923 heritage 
legislation introduces for the first time, an agency which under the auspices of a line function 
state department is responsible for specific heritage management functions. The tradition is 
carried on by successive pieces of legislation well into the democratic dispensation. The 
incremental approach adopted by South African heritage policy gave rise to the inclusion of 
other policy instruments within the framework of legislation over time. The subsequent chapter 




     CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND APPROACHES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The philosopher, Alfred Habdank Skarbek Korzybski once observed, “If the map shows a 
different structure from the territory represented…. then the map is worse than useless, as it 
misinforms and leads astray” (Hofstee, 2006:107). In scientific inquiry, results can only be 
accepted if the scientist concerned demonstrates how conclusions were derived.  Science is 
science simply because the results are verifiable. The present chapter presents a map that will 
be used to arrive at reliable conclusions about this study.  The first section of the chapter 
presents the research design the study will adopt. Attempts will be made to rationalise the 
philosophical biases of the approach and the steps through which the design unfolds during its 
application. The chapter will describe how the adopted methodology is to be applied during 
the inquiry. Effort will be expended to describe the techniques to be used when collecting data 
and how it is going to be analysed. A sizeable amount of space will be accorded to the 
explanation of the model of analysis to be used and its suitability for the research design 
adopted. The penultimate section of the chapter will deal with ethical considerations followed 
by the conclusions based on the foregoing. 
5.2 ADOPTING A RELEVANT RESEARCH DESIGN FOR THE STUDY 
In order to investigate the extent to which incentives are used as policy instruments to solicit 
adequate community participation for heritage policy implementation in the post 1994 South 
Africa, the current study has adopted a qualitative research paradigm known as empirical 
phenomenology; and will take the form of case studies. Empirical phenomenology is an 
approach to scientific inquiry informed by specific assumptions which shape the study of this 
nature. 
5.2.1 BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND STEPS OF EMPIRICAL PHENOMENOLOGY 
The main thrust of the approach is to seek to ground scientific explanation on the structure of 
meaning (i.e. the first level constructs) of those who are being studied. The overriding 
philosophical rationale undergirding the approach therefore is that the actors’ perspective, that 
is the subjective perceptions or views of those who are being studied, remain central and are to 
be safeguarded as the basis on which theories or second level constructs will be developed at a 
later stage of the inquiry. The approach is built on the assumption that the world investigated 
by social scientists is socially constructed and for this reason it is of utmost importance that the 
constructions of actors being studied are inevitably taken as a starting point for any scientific 
analysis. The approach also acknowledges both the role of theory and unintended consequences 
in the inquiry.   
Evidently, empirical phenomenology has a strong philosophical foundation and owes its 
ultimate provenance from the philosophical phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938); 
and Martin Heideger (1889-1976). It’s most immediate origin lies with Alfred Schutz who 
brought phenomenology to the social sciences. The Swiss academic Patrik Aspers has 
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developed a seven step Empirical Phenomenology (Qualitative Research Methodology) based 
on Schutz’s philosophical sociology. The approach provides a sound scientific foothold for 
conducting empirical and phenomenologically oriented social inquiry.  
Basically, the design of an empirical phenomenology oriented study unfolds in seven critical 
steps. In keeping with common parlance in the application of the approach, the first step in this 
study consists of defining the research question. Given the background of heritage policy 
implementation obtaining in the country as outlined earlier on, the important challenge that 
must be raised in this regard. That is, “It is uncertain to what extent are incentives used to 
solicit community participation in heritage policy implementation in the post 1994 South 
Africa?” Heritage resources are protected and preserved so that they will be bequeathed to 
future generations.  This fundamental principle suggests that ultimately heritage resources 
belong to the various communities within which they are found, cherished and considered 
valuable. For this reason it can be concluded that even privately owned heritage resources are 
in some sense, communally owned because they are of value to the community within which 
they are found and have to be protected by. Private owners of protected heritage resources are 
themselves, members of a given community. Individuals and organizations targeted by the 
policy as actors in the implementation arena belong to respective communities where such 
resources are embedded and owned. The aforesaid research question therefore operates from 
the premise that communities are important components in the constellation of actors within 
the policy implementation arena; and to that extent ways and means to solicit their meaningful 
participation in the policy process cannot be over emphasized.  The research question at this 
stage of the inquiry is the actual query to which the study seeks to provide scientifically 
verifiable answers and for that reason forms the essence of the current investigation. That is, 
the study seeks to determine the extent to which policy instruments called incentives are used 
in the implementation of heritage policy to solicit adequate participation from the constellation 
of relevant policy actors in the post 1994 era in South Africa.  
Subsequent to the definition of the research question, the inquiry conducted a preliminary study 
in order to ascertain the feasibility of undertaking the project and solve the question it poses. 
The preliminary study also enabled the process of gaining a comprehensive overview of the 
field of inquiry and being in a position to make informed and relevant strategic decisions 
regarding the project. Consequently, as a result of the complexity of the inquiry, the preliminary 
study has been inevitably multi-pronged. In the first instance, conferences, conference papers 
and discussions on heritage matters within South Africa have been consulted, and that has 
enabled keeping abreast with the prominent issues of concern in the industry as reflected in the 
discussions of such gatherings. Secondly, interactions with the various heritage activists and 
practitioners in the field were arranged to allow for the familiarisation with the relevant issues 
of concern in respect of the subject of inquiry. The third aspect of the preliminary study straddle 
over at least three areas of review already implicit in the topic chosen. The first section of the 
review focuses on the survey of policy implementation literature and its development over 
three generations of scholarship beginning roughly from the notable achievements of scholars 
in the seventies to the present.  The second leg of the review consists of the appraisal of the 
theory of incentives concept as used in a number of disciplines including economics, 
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organisation theory, psychology, environmental management, the knowledge economy and 
heritage management. The third aspect of the review focuses on the evolution of heritage policy 
in South Africa and focuses essentially on the analysis of various pieces of legislation and 
policy documents inclusive of reports. 
The third step of the design entailed the choice of a relevant theory which acts as a frame of 
reference for the entire theory-centric study. Where empirical phenomenology is used as a 
design for a research inquiry, it is imperative that the central role played by theory is 
acknowledged in the early phases of the study. In the context of this inquiry the central theory 
acting as a constant frame of reference centres on incentives as is indicated by the 
aforementioned thesis statement. The study adopted as its overriding theoretical rationale the 
fact that incentives are important tools that can be used to solicit adequate public participation 
in the implementation of heritage policy.  It is the theory of incentives which acted as a guide 
for the researcher to identify specific aspects of the topic relevant to the study. That is, the 
chosen theory assisted to focus the attention of the researcher on the first order constructs 
relevant to his study; and it is for this reason that the said theory acted as a scheme of reference 
for the inquiry. The theory of incentives chosen as a scheme of reference for this study was 
intended to fit, not only the research question to which answers are sought, but also the 
empirical evidence to be generated regarding the deployment of policy instruments in the 
implementation of heritage policy.  
Subsequently, the study interrogated the first order constructs as provided by the structure of 
meaning exhibited by research units or actors in the field of heritage policy implementation. 
Empirical Phenomenology as an approach to social research is bent on reaching, studying and 
describing first order constructs (that is, the structure of meaning) of the actors in the field of 
inquiry (Aspers, 2009:6). The first order constructs that were of interest to the researcher at this 
stage of the inquiry were those that are relevant or covered by the scheme of reference (theory) 
adopted for this study. In essence, the researcher has gathered information about what people 
in the field mean when they use certain words; and how those words relate to one another 
within a given structure of meaning in the context of heritage policy implementation. The 
researcher further sought to describe the meaning actors in the field attach to specific words 
they use to describe the application of incentives for policy implementation. At this step of the 
inquiry, an effort has been made to identify and describe specific theories actors themselves 
use in their implementation of heritage policies; and also identify the type of practices such 
actors engage in while implementing specific heritage policies.  
The empirical evidence generated at this stage of the inquiry was intended for use either in the 
formulation of a new theory of implementation or to alter or add an important dimension to an 
already existing theory. For this reason, access to the structure of meaning of the actors was 
not intended to prove or disprove an existing theory. This is primarily caused by the fact that 
there needs to be consideration to not enter into the field of study with preconceived theoretical 
frameworks which require to simply be filled with empirical data.  
The fifth step of the approach entailed the construction of second order constructs from those 
of the first level provided by actors. At this stage of the inquiry, the first order constructs, which 
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is the structure of meaning gleaned from actors in the field enabled the researcher to evaluate 
the chosen overriding scheme of reference; that is the relevance of incentives as instruments in 
the implementation of heritage policy. At this stage, the researcher sought to relate the first 
order constructs (the structure of meaning) of the actors in the field to the second order 
constructs that is the theory of policy implementation. This had the potential to result in the 
construction of a new theory, an alteration or an addition to an existing one. On the one hand, 
the theory of policy implementation created or the addition thereto must be understandable and 
be able to relate to the demands of the actors in the field of inquiry; so that in keeping with the 
empirical phenomenological bias of the study, such a construct is able to meet the requirement 
that it be grounded in the understanding of the actors in order to be legitimate. On the other 
hand the said theory or addition thereto must also be able to connect to existing implementation 
theory and be understandable to the relevant scientific community. This is the extent to which 
the theory created from the actors’ structure of meaning seeks to communicate at two levels. 
That is, it communicates to both the social scientists and actors in the field. 
The sixth step of the design focused on checking for unintended consequences. In the social 
sciences peoples’ actions sometimes have unintended consequences. In public policy 
implementation in particular, the deployment of policy instruments like incentives might give 
rise to developments which were not necessarily the intention of the policy maker or the 
legislator. The researcher at this stage of the inquiry has to identify specific unintended 
consequences relevant to the deployment of incentives and attach meaning to such 
consequences. 
Subsequent to checking unintended consequences, the inquiry sought to relate the evidence 
generated by research to the scientific literature and empirical field. Intent on safeguarding the 
perspective of actors in the field, which is the overriding philosophical rationale of empirical 
phenomenology, the researcher served the research report to actors in the field and the scientific 
community concerned. The aim of this exercise was not to seek consensus with regard to the 
conclusions made by the study. On the contrary, the internal validation of the report sought to 
enable the said actors to see themselves in the report and to enable them to identify with its 
content without necessarily agreeing to the conclusions made by the same. Having outlined the 
seven step blue print of the study, it is now time to attend to the actual methods and tools that 
were used to implement the design; and that is the focus of the next section of the chapter. 
5.3 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
The implementation of the blue print adopted in this study is discussed under three headings. 
These include research instruments, the data to be collected and the tool of analysis used to 
interrogate data. 
5.3.1 THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS 
Qualitative empirical phenomenology accords a central role to the researcher as an observer 
and interpreter. To this extent the researcher is according to this paradigm, an important 
instrument in the entire research process.  For this reason the actions and behaviour of the 
researcher in the current project sought to be as unbiased as possible in the descriptions and 
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interpretations of phenomena; and the fact that the design puts a high premium on the 
researchers ability to get as close as possible to the research subjects in order to generate 
acceptable and legitimate insider perspectives of reality also signals that high levels of 
objectivity had to be ensured. Objectivity in qualitative empirical phenomenology takes a 
different and unique form. In order to gain an insider perspective of the phenomenon being 
studied, the trust of research subjects needed to be gained, and a functional rapport established 
with them. To an extent, this was been achieved through attendance of relevant heritage 
conferences during the preliminary stage of the research process; and this approach continued 
as requests for interviews were made to the targeted subjects. The primary focus of the study 
was heritage managers in the public sector, the identification of which was informed by certain 
principles such as levels of enculturation and current involvement in the industry; as well as 
the extent to which such respondents were able to spend enough time in the interview 
envisaged. It is for this reason that accounting officers of relevant departments in the public 
sector did not form part of the contingent of interviewees for this study, since most of them can 
hardly find time to assist in the process of gathering data for such purposes. Based on the above 
mentioned criteria, ten (10) research subjects were identified and consented to the idea of being 
interviewed for the project. This approach was also complemented by snowballing sampling 
strategy; and the latter had the effect of winning the trust of interviewees immediately when 
they were made aware that the researcher has been referred to them by someone they know and 
trust.  
The second important instrument that this study used to operationalize the adopted design were 
unstructured in-depth individual interviews. This particular instrument is better suited to the 
nature of the research design which primarily aims to provide the insider perspective on the 
subject of inquiry. Basic individual interviewing therefore allowed each respondent to speak 
for him or herself without the constraints of a battery of questions determined by a 
predetermined hypothesis. The interviews were unstructured in the sense that while the 
researcher had a general plan about the inquiry, he did not use a specific set of questions which 
must be asked using specific words and posed in a particular logical sequence. The aim of the 
study is to generate rich narratives of the phenomena as provided by insiders; and to this extent 
a great deal of the talking had to be done by the respondent, while the interviewer’s role would 
be to first set the direction of the conversation and to make follow up questions on specific 
topics raised by the respondent.  
An advanced digital recorder was used to record the interviews with research subjects. But it 
is in the nature of recordings that they do not necessarily capture all the aspects of social 
processes. Therefore, as part of seeking to enhance validity and reliability of the study at this 
stage of the process, a reasonable amount of triangulation was done by means of creating 
extensive field notes to complement the audio recordings. The current study capitalises on 
interpretation and to that extent two sets of notes were made during the process of interviewing; 
and in instances where this is not feasible, such notes were made immediately thereafter. The 
researcher wrote notes which explained the environment within which the study was taking 
place. Included in this type of interview transcripts were extensive observation notes. The 
rationale for this type of notes is determined primarily by the nature of the study and the design 
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adopted. Empirical phenomenology as an approach to scientific social inquiry focuses on the 
study of first level constructs provided by subjects in the field, who are deeply embedded in a 
particular context.  
The strong contextual orientation in the nature of case studies as a research design therefore 
assumes that there are certain variables in that environment which have the propensity to 
influence the study’s units of analysis and by implication, the insider perspective such subjects 
provide. The fact that the design emphasizes the role and significance of rich narratives of 
phenomena, presupposes that such an environment must be adequately described so as to 
provide enough information about subjects and their respective settings. The second type of 
notes that were created to complement audio recordings consisted of theoretical memoranda. 
These are notes describing the specific theories which actors tend to use when explaining their 
implementation of heritage policies and the deployment of relevant policy tools.  
Consequently, the fact that extensive notes on the environment of the subject were created, also 
presupposes that the study entails a fair amount of observation as a third research instrument. 
Such empirical observation is not going limited to the environmental variables only. On the 
contrary, certain expressive movements during the interview were observed: exterior physical 
signs of the subject such as clothing; the physical location within which the subject operates 
(e.g. office ergonomics); the language behaviour of the subject (e.g. stuttering); the length of 
time the subject takes engaged in what she/he is doing.  
5.3.1.1 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE INSTRUMENTS 
The instruments chosen for this study have their own limitations. In the first instance, there 
existed a possibility that biased questions would be asked while interviewing subjects. In order 
to circumvent such bias, the probing questions which were asked during the interview, were 
follow up questions taking their cue from the themes already highlighted by the responses of 
the subject.   This enabled the possibility to elicit more information in a way that limits 
prejudice or bias. Secondly, good interviews depend largely on good listening skills. This was 
achieved by making conscious attempts not to look interesting and worthwhile to the subject 
such as is common in ordinary conversations. On the contrary, there was a conscious endeavour 
made to be more interested in what the respondent was saying and by allowing him or her to 
feel the silence which conveys the message that she/he is being listened to  carefully.  
Apart from the possibility of personal bias by the interviewer, which can easily impact on the 
data elicited, in depth interviews tend to be expensive and time consuming. To circumvent this, 
an attempt was made to combine business trips with interviews of various subjects. This helped 
in mitigating the cost of the undertaking.  
5.3.2 DATA 
One of the responsibilities of managers in the public sector is the development of relevant 
policies and the implementation thereof. This study focused on both the middle and senior 
management cadre of the public service within the departments responsible for heritage policy 
in South Africa. The same category of heritage managers in the public entities linked to the 
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National Department of Arts and Culture and its provincial counterparts also formed an 
important contingent of research units countenanced by the study. Such entities include the 
National Heritage Council (NHC), The South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA) 
and the Provincial Heritage Resources Authorities located in the targeted provincial 
administration. This presupposes that in the identification of a relevant sample for the study, a 
combination of techniques was applied. Sampling was primarily purposive in the sense that the 
identification of research subjects was based on a specific criteria and also informed by the 
researcher’s knowledge of the population concerned and purpose of the study. The amount of 
time and other resources available for this project inevitably imposed some limitations on the 
study in the sense that it was impossible to interview the entire population of the group targeted. 
Not all the managers in the departments responsible for heritage matters and the relevant public 
entities were interviewed. For this reason, the study focused on managers in the National 
Department of Arts and Culture and the provincial department responsible for heritage matters 
in the Free State.  The province selected represent the mix of both rural and urbanised contexts 
within which heritage policy is implemented in South Africa. Purposive sampling was 
augmented by snowballing where research units suggested other subjects worth interviewing 
within the specified organisations.   
The data collected consisted of audio recordings which were transcribed as well as field notes 
generated from unstructured interviews conducted with research subjects. While there are 
obvious strengths in respect of the data collected in the sense that it was provided by individuals 
responsible for public policy development as well as overseeing its subsequent implementation 
within the public sector, it was of course biased in the sense that the actual ‘street level 
bureaucrats’ consisting of lower rank heritage officials and practitioners at the coal face of 
public policy implementation were not being interviewed. By the same token, individuals who 
are involved with heritage matters who cannot be described as public managers since they 
belong to various interest groups and NGOs dealing with heritage matters were also not 
interviewed and this too may have resulted in some bias because the data collected represent 
the official perspective on the subject of study.  
5.3.3 THE NALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA COLLECTED 
In order to turn data to evidence and information, this study used the Processes, Factors and 
Institutions Model (PFI Model) for analysing case studies (Mnculwane and Wisssink, 
2014:100-102). The said model is a new tool suggested for case study analysis and has never 
been used before. In keeping with common parlance applicable where an unfamiliar tool is 
used for research purposes, there is a need to briefly explain how it is going to be used to 
analyse data generated by the study; and that is the focus of the subsequent section of this 
chapter. 
5.3.4 ANALYSING PROCESSES AFFECTING POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: AN 
INFLUENCE FROM PROCESS THEORY 
According to the philosopher Seibt (2003:vii) processes constitute human experience and 
characterise such phenomena as nature, social reality and cognition. Despite the fact that 
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processes are central to human experience, they are not usually reflected on theoretical 
descriptions of domains dealing with phenomena germane to the aforesaid fields. But process 
thinking or process theory provides a dynamic procedure geared perspective on reality as 
opposed to a static depiction of human experience. In process thinking events and occurrences 
are construed and described as consequences of specific input states which give rise to certain 
outcomes or output states following a certain process. Both the processes and the resultant 
outcomes can be duplicated and for this reason there are specific necessary conditions which 
must be present for such outcomes to be attained. 
 The nature of policy formulation processes 
Policy process research is a study dealing with complex interactions which involve public 
policy (Schlager & Weible, 2013:389). Operating from the premise of a process oriented 
ontology the PFI Model identifies and highlights specific policy processes affecting the success 
of implementation. Taking particular cognisance of the paradigms yielded by scholarship over 
time, the model as a tool of analysis will be used to determine the extent to which the top-down 
mechanistic approach, or the bottom up slant, or the combination of paradigms were employed 
in the development of the policy. Using the PFI model as a tool of analysis in this particular 
manner is primarily informed by the understanding that the type of paradigm adopted by the 
policy maker at the policy formulation stages of the process, inevitably determines the extent 
to which that particular initiative will be implemented. A classical mechanistic approach to the 
development of public policy, for example, will give rise to an understanding of 
implementation as an automatic function inevitably flowing from the dictates of policy actors 
located high up the echelons of power in a given administration. Equally, there may be specific 
approaches to policy implementation arising from either an exclusive bottom up approach to 
policy making or from a combination of paradigms. Guided by the overarching frame of 
reference (that is theory) chosen by the relevant research design, the PFI tool will be used to 
analyse the first order constructs depicting the processes engaged in during the policy 
formulation phase of the process. That is, what sorts of words are used in the research subjects’ 
structure of meaning to refer to such processes? What theories of policy formulation are 
depicted or implied in the structure of meaning of the research subjects interviewed and what 
policy formulation processes do they depict? What are the types of policy instruments 
countenanced by the processes involved in the formulation of heritage policies?   
 Management and administration of policy plans, programmes and projects 
The second category of phenomena analysed using the model are processes engaged in while 
managing policy plans, programmes and projects. Of great importance in the analysis of such 
policy processes is the application of relevant management functions in the implementation of 
the initiative. Using the model the researcher will seek to analyse how specific interventions 
intended to implement the initiative are planned. Planning as a function of management has 
more to do with how implementation strategies are designed. Every strategy entails the setting 
of clear and achievable goals to be attained, designing the relevant steps to be embarked upon 
in order to achieve set goals, as well as the allocation of relevant resources for the 
implementation of the strategy. The second critical aspect of the management processes 
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analysed entailed how leadership and motivation are provided to enable effective 
implementation of the initiative. The type of leadership provided in this regard will be to a 
large extent informed by the nature of policy formation processes engaged in during the 
development of the initiative. Thirdly, the management aspect as a critical component of the 
model will seek to speak to the processes involved while organizing for the implementation of 
the policy through programmes and projects.  Three aspects of the organizational dimension of 
management will be the focus in this type of analysis.  In the first instance, there is a sense in 
which organizing has to do with public institutions established by legislation to execute the 
programmes of government. This is the political dimension of organising. This aspect of the 
analysis therefore sought to scrutinise and describe the organisational arrangements instituted 
by government to implement its heritage policies in particular. The model was also used to 
focus analysis on the technical aspects of the organizing processes of management. Of interest 
in this regard is the way in which managers bring about efficient organisational structures for 
the implementation of policy. But organising is also a human relations functions and for this 
reason the analysis also focused on how policy actors are organised to cooperate in order to 
achieve common objectives, what lines of conduct and group relations are created to facilitate 
effective implementation of policy programmes and projects. The analysis of management 
processes focused on measures of control. This among other things entailed analysing the 
actual monitoring of activities in order to ascertain the extent to which planned activities are 
progressing as planned. The control function is actually a process on its own and involves such 
activities as communication and interaction, measuring and personal observation. Lastly 
analysing management processes engaged in the execution of policy interventions will also 
involve how certain aspects of the policy are implemented as projects with a limited life span. 
This is critical since management by means of project requires its own set of peculiar and 
specialised skills in order to be successful.  
 Monitoring and evaluation of policy progress 
For effective implementation of policy initiatives effective monitoring and evaluation 
processes of policy progress must be in place and this forms another critical dimension of 
analysis. Effective monitoring is made possible by good strategizing during the planning stages 
of the process. Analysis in this regard focuses attention on how progress is being monitored 
and policy impacts evaluated.  There is a general tendency in government to focus exclusively 
on the practice of monitoring outputs in relation to inputs provided; that is simply monitoring 
for compliance. In the analysis of data for the purposes of this study, a conscious attempt has 
been made to seek to identify processes engaged in by the bureaucracy to implement various 
paradigms of evaluation such as clarificatory evaluation28 and process evaluation29. The 
unstructured in-depth interviews conducted solicited specific data relating to the types of 
                                                 
28 Clarificatory Evaluation is a term coined by the University of Stellenbosch school of evaluation to refer to a 
type or phase in the evaluation process where the focus is on clarifying and making explicit the often implicit 
logic or structure of programmes. Part of the distinguishing features of this type of evaluation is its reliance on 
the use of logic frames to assist in the conceptualising of relevant programme theories. 
29 Process evaluation refers to a type or phase in evaluation where the focus is on the processes engaged in during 
the implementation of the programme or policy. Impact evaluation has more to do with the evaluation of impacts 
the implementation of policy has on its environment. 
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evaluation processes engaged in by the relevant units of government in order to ascertain the 
amount and type of progress made in the implementation of relevant policies.  
 Policy shifts and adjustments 
Another critical set of processes which the model identifies for analysis pertains to the reality 
of policy shifts and adjustments. During the implementation of public policies, there are 
changes and shifts which occur as a result of different implementation loci and other contextual 
realities. The analysis of data also sought to identify and richly describe such dynamic shifts 
and relevant adjustments made in the process.  
 Impact of policy outcomes 
The last set of data analysed were the specific processes relating to policy outcomes. This 
aspect of policy implementation process analysis assessed the impact of policies by 
determining important changes which might have taken place as a result of the implementation 
of the initiative. Research data which tends to yield some insight to the changes in target areas, 
beneficiary groups and targeted sectors came under scrutiny.  Part of this data might be giving 
an indication not only of the changes which might have occurred in the status quo as a result 
of the initiative, but it may also give a clue about the gap between the intended outcomes and 
real impacts as perceived by the actors in the field. Furthermore, when policies are 
implemented they bring about both intended and unintended consequences. The study has taken 
cognisance of the existence of data bearing credence to both types of phenomena.  
5.3.5 THE ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION: AN 
INFLUENCE FROM ATTRIBUTION THEORY (SITUATIONISM) 
Taking its cue from social psychology’s theory of situational factors (attribution theory) often 
referred to as Situationism, the model focuses the attention of the researcher on the analysis of 
data yielding some information on the external situational factors influencing the 
implementation of a given policy alternative. A policy intervention is in essence a theory of 
social change intended to impact on the behaviour of targeted actors in the policy 
implementation arena so that such behaviour is congruent with the set goals of the intervention. 
To that extent policy implementation has a lot to do with individual or group behaviour. 
Research in the area of Social Psychology has established that there is a sense in which human 
behaviour is not necessarily attributable to internal dispositional causes. On the contrary there 
are external situational factors which impact on how individuals or even groups of individuals 
behave, think and interact with others thus bringing about specific behaviour patterns and 
actions from such actors.  
 Influence of macro environmental factors 
According to the systems approach to management, managing is a complex phenomenon 
consisting of complex interrelated variables which collaborate in the attainment of set 
objectives. Inevitably, the environment within which the task of managing organizations and 
processes being managed form an integral part of such factors. By the same token, management 
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processes characteristic of the policy formulation and implementation phases of the policy 
process are inevitably impacted upon and shaped by a variety of macro environmental 
influences which include such phenomena as political, social, economic, cultural, legal factors 
and others. The use of the adopted tool of data analysis focuses the attention of the researcher 
on the specific data yielding such information about the macro environmental factors 
influencing the implementation of policy. The researcher has been looking for any clues in the 
data yielded which give an indication of specific political, social, economic, legal, cultural 
factors which are construed by actors in the field as influencing their implementation 
endeavours one way or the other.  
 Impact of the developmental stage of the nation 
Another critical set of factors affecting policy implementation are those features characteristic 
of the stage of development of a given nation, relevant communities or groups targeted by the 
intervention. Development is a complex multi-layered phenomenon and carries connotations 
of the desire and need to catch up with countries that are already advanced and industrialised. 
Finding appropriate remedies for dealing with weaknesses and maladies of progress where 
development complements progress economic growth and capacitation forms part of the 
process 
Therefore, there is a sense in which the implementation of policy is negatively impacted upon 
by low levels of development within the target population; which renders targets unable to 
maximise the benefit intended by the intervention because they lack the necessary expertise 
and infrastructure required for effective implementation.  For example, in order to manage 
policy plans, programmes and projects, specific managerial skills are required; and in situations 
where actors in the implementation arena lack such skills, effective policy implementation will 
not be realised. To this extent therefore, the adopted model of analysis focused the attention of 
the researcher on the type of data which indicates levels of development within the recipient 
groupings targeted by the policy.  
 The influence of policy resources 
Policy processes involving monitoring and evaluation of policy implementation progress are 
by their  nature complex and demanding. The PFI model highlights the fact that for any measure 
of success in this front, actors in the implementation conduit would require specific policy 
resources such as capacity and economic resources as well as skills in public policy analysis. 
Most countries, particularly developing countries like South Africa have limited resources in 
this regard; and these factors will impact negatively on the implementation of policy. The 
researcher has identified data indicative of these phenomena and subjected it to relevant 
analysis and description. 
 Policy instruments 
The instrumental approach is used in the social sciences to discuss the manner in which 
individuals and organisations deliberately influence the processes of society (de Bruijn and 
Hufen, 1998:11). In public administration in particular, the instrumental approach is primarily 
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concerned with the translation of policy pronouncements or intentions into viable 
administrative action. To this extent, policy instruments are the means to an end. That is, they 
are the means through which an objective (policy goal) is achieved. On the one hand, an 
instrument is an object (e.g. laws and administrative directives); whereas on the other hand, 
some policy instruments have the character of activities which are intended to influence 
specific societal processes.  
Different approaches exist in the critical study of policy instruments. The classical approach 
maintains that it is the instruments which structure the course of the entire policy process; more 
particularly the implementation of the intervention. The instrument-context approach modifies 
this stance and proposes that both the characteristics of the instrument used and the contextual 
variables where instruments are applied impact on the policy implementation process. The 
contextual approach introduces a further modification in the assumed importance of tools by 
underscoring the fact that the policy instrument used in the implementation of the intervention 
is one among a multiplicity of variables determining the course of the policy process (De 
Bruijin and Hufen, 1998:15-16). 
Using the PFI Model as a tool of analysis the focus has been on the type of data yielding 
information on the specific types of governance tools used to implement heritage policy. 
Attention was paid particularly to the data providing evidence on the deployment and use of 
organizational, information-based, financial and authority based policy instruments as 
mechanism employed to give effect to policy. Policy shifts and adjustments can also occasion 
the choice of new policy tools to avoid errors of the third kind when policies are implemented 
in different loci. For this reason, policy instruments chosen as a result of such changes and 
modifications were identified and subjected to analysis and rich narrative based description. 
The analysis further interrogated the manner in which the said types of policy instruments are 
nuanced to take substantive and procedural forms in their usage.  
 Commitment to modern management sciences 
The evolution of management science over time has virtually given rise to new management 
techniques and approaches which come in handy in public policy management. Data indicating 
the commitment of actors in the implementation arena to such things as strategic management, 
project management, monitoring and evaluation paradigms and techniques will be identified 
and analysed in order to give an indication to the management practices employed by relevant 
implementing actors in the execution of policy. 
5.3.6 ANALYSING THE INSTITUTIONS AND ROLE PLAYERS CHARGED WITH 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: AN INFLUENCE FROM INSTITUTIONAL AND 
MANAGEMENT THEORIES 
Institutionalism as a theory approaches the study of politics from the perspective of the 
influence that institutions have in shaping policy and governance; while on the other hand as a 
social theory, institutionalism will develop a sociological view of institutions and seek to study 
how such structures interact with one another as well as how they affect society in general. 
Evidently, in the study of policy implementation, institutions and various individuals whose 
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thinking may have been shaped by their membership or relationships with various 
organisations and structures of society, engage in the various stages of the policy process. The 
implementation phase is by no means an exception to this rule.  
On the one hand, the PFI model takes its cue from this theoretical approach. On the other hand, 
there is also a sense in which this aspect of the model takes its inspiration from the advances 
which have been made in management theory. Network management theory in particular 
emphasizes the fact that a concerted effort is required from various actors in the policy game 
in order for policy implementation to be a success. A proper management of actors in the policy 
implementation arena is therefore considered to be important for effective policy 
implementation and the attainment of set policy goals. Cooperation and collaboration among 
various policy actors in the policy implementation arena does not happen automatically. On 
the contrary, it requires the application of specific network management strategies by the 
network manager concerned.  
The model of analysis lastly focuses the attention of the researcher on the data indicating the 
institutions and the constellation of other role players charged with the responsibility of 
implementing policy; as well as how these institutions and individuals collaborate in the 
implementation of the policy alternative.  Such data is subjected under rigorous analysis in 
order to yield the required information. 
 Representative political and democratic structures  
The model focuses the attention of the researcher on the type of data yielding information about 
the representative democratic institutions of government responsible for the development of 
heritage policy. For this reason, data dealing with the role played by the law making bodies in 
the national and provincial local spheres of government were considered of utmost importance 
for this study. Although the current inquiry does not have a special focus on local political 
structures, it nonetheless took cognisance of the data indicating the role played by institutions 
of that level in the policy process.  
 Policy making institutions and mechanisms 
Apart from representative political structures, a number of other institutions take part in the 
crafting of public policy and how the entire policy process is managed. In a policy environment 
where organisational policy instruments play a vital role, data indicating the role played by 
such structures in the policy process were highlighted and subjected to analysis and description. 
 Bureaucracy and implementing agencies 
There is evidently a huge role played by the bureaucracy and other implementing agencies in 
the monitoring and evaluation of public policy in general. Both cabinets, nationally and 
provincially as the executive wings of government as well as various implementing agencies 
play a decisive role in this phase of the policy processes. Data indicating the role played by 




 Clients, actors, street level bureaucrats 
In the constellation of actors responsible particularly for the implementation of public policy, 
clients, actors and street level bureaucrats in particular have a particular role to play; and thus 
determine the extent to which a given policy will be effectively executed. Coalitions of 
individuals as well as organisations affected in some way by the policy have the potential to 
influence the way in which a given government intervention is implemented. To this extent the 
identification of influential clients and coalitions from the potentially large number of possible 
actors related to the policy is important for effective implementation (Brynard, 2005:20). In 
fact, the political and social weight of various clients and coalitions in the policy arena has the 
tendency to determine the extent to which their cooperation may be considered necessary for 
the effective implementation of policy (Knoepfel et al. 2007:192) Therefore, the economic, 
social and political standing of a given actor is an indication of the importance of the role a 
particular stakeholder is likely to play in the process of policy implementation.  
Street level bureaucrats have the potential to re-invent policy as it gets implemented, more 
particularly in various loci with different contextual dynamics. This reinterpretation and 
reinvention of policy by actors on the ground gives rise to policy shifts and adjustments which 
are often dictated by the strong contextual orientation characterising the different 
implementation loci within which the intervention is implemented. The model of analysis used 
for the study focused the attention of the researcher on the type of data yielding useful 
information about the impact of such actors, clients and street level bureaucrats in the 
implementation of heritage policy. 
 Networks and coalitions 
In the policy field, government has to deal with a number of public, semi-public and private 
actors whose activities must be steered towards the attainment of policy goals. As a matter of 
fact, government depends on this policy network for successful implementation of its policies. 
Previously, the notion of policy networks was mooted when analysts discussed policy failure 
in the sense that it was the resistance of interests of members of such networks which was 
construed to be standing on the way for effective policy implementation. However, the network 
perspective on governance matters turns this understanding upside down by underscoring the 
fact that government is fundamentally dependant on individuals, groups and organisations for 
the effective implementation of its policy interventions; hence the necessity of developing 
appropriate skills and strategies for managing such constellations of policy implementation 
actors.  
The model of analysis used then enables the researcher to focus attention on the data indicating 
the existence of such networks in the heritage policy implementation arena; and how are such 
actors induced to cooperation. Data indicative of specific blockages to collective action and the 
extent to which actors are aware of policy goals is also important at this stage of analysis. Of 
critical importance as well in this scheme of things is the data which provides evidence 
regarding the commitment of actors to implementation, the absence of important actors in the 
relevant implementation arena, the existence of actors whose presence prevents the 
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participation of other critical actors, as well as data indicating the level of discretionary power 
exercised by members of the coalition. Research data indicating the nature of skills and 
strategies used to manage networks and coalitions was also the focus of analysis in this study.  
5.4 CONTENT ANALYSIS AND CODING OF DATA 
The data generated by the interviews was transcribed in the original language in which it was 
provided by the research subject. In a multi-cultural society like that of South Africa, the 
preservation of the language of the interviewee is critical because it enables the analysts to 
understand the perspective of the subject within the informant’s culture. The level of analysis 
embarked upon in this study focused on words, key phrases and strings of words used by 
research subjects when describing their reality. Guided by the frame of reference provided by 
the theory and the different aspects of the model of analysis used, the researcher formulated 
specific codes under which data was codified and analysed. Codes which seem to belong 
together during the process of analysis was grouped under relevant families and properly 
analysed as such. However, there may be categories of data which do not necessarily fit under 
the codes established, yet have the potential to enable the researcher to discover new and 
surprising aspects of implementation. Space was created for noting such phenomena with the 
intention that it could easily be suggested for further research.  
The qualitative paradigm adopted for this study required the researcher to code more for 
existence than for frequency. In order to code data efficiently, the researcher diligently read 
and reread the texts generated by the interviews30. This was done in order to enable the 
researcher to make sense of all the relevant patterns and themes which were emerging from the 
data collected.  
5.5 THE SUITABILITY OF THE PFI MODEL AS A TOOL OF ANALYSIS FOR THE 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH PARADIGM 
The current study is not intended to prove or disprove a particular hypothesis. On the contrary 
it seeks to gain the ‘emic’ perspective on the subject of inquiry and thus add to existing theory 
or create a new theory altogether which should inform the implementation of heritage policy 
in South Africa. The rationale for using this model is premised on the following advantages 
and strengths:- 
 The model is better suited to the qualitative paradigm and will enable the researcher to 
gain the emic perspective on the reality of policy implementation which is the goal of 
the study 
 Public policy implementation is a complex undertaking and the attempts to understand 
such complexity have brought about a variety of fairly complex theoretical approaches. 
To this extent therefore, the model presents a simplified attempt at understanding 
implementation which seeks to combine the important aspects of the theoretical 
developments made thus far. 
                                                 
30 The researcher personally transcribed the data collected and this exercise was intended to further enhance 
familiarity with the material as it is also another way of reading the same. 
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 The model does not subscribe to the notion that implementation is a simple 
administrative process where implementers only execute what the policy maker has 
enacted and to that extent is in keeping with contemporary thinking on the complexity 
of implementation. 
 There is a strong contextual orientation in the model which makes the interrogation of 
case studies and the comparison thereof manageable.  
5.6 INHERENT LIMITATIONS OF THE METHOD  
The first limitation evinced by the design adopted relates to the characteristic nature of case 
studies as methods of collecting research data for analysis. Case studies are often confined to 
a limited sample and this might cause problems with the general application of the findings 
made by the study. To circumvent this shortcoming, an attempt was made in the study to select 
a representative sample of research subjects for interviewing. Research subjects were identified 
in various organisations operating in diverse socio-cultural backgrounds and organisational 
settings.  
The second limitation of the chosen design lies in its use of unstructured interviews for 
soliciting data to be analysed for the study. Empirical Phenomenology seeks to gain an insider’s 
perspective on reality and this presupposes that the interviewer must be directly involved in the 
situation with the respondent. This situation can result in the researcher exercising a fair amount 
of control on the respondent; thus raising issues with bias on the part of the interviewer. 
Unstructured interviews can be time consuming and labour intensive. This inevitably raises 
questions with the cost that will be incurred during the process of undertaking the study.  
5.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The ethical principles espoused by the university in so far as conducting research is concerned 
were strictly adhered to during the course of the study. First, access to the respective interview 
subjects was secured fairly. That is interviewees’ consent was sought before interviews were 
conducted with relevant research units. The said consent was solicited among others, by 
truthfully informing the research subjects about the purpose of the study. While consent was 
sought, effort was expended to assure subjects that their identity will remain anonymous, thus 
ensuring their right to privacy. The researcher avoided manipulating research subjects during 
the process of interviewing, and all research units were treated with the dignity they deserve as 
human beings. Second, information acquired during the process of research has been used only 
for purposes of this study as agreed upon; while the results of the study has been shared with 
actors in the field as well as with the scientific community as per the dictates of the 
methodology adopted for the study. Third, reasonable steps have been taken during the process 
that potential physical and emotional harm is prevented while conducting research.  
5.8 CONCLUSIONS 
In an attempt to explain how the findings of the study were be arrived at, the present inquiry 
adopted a qualitative phenomenological approach research paradigm and takes the form of a 
case study. When describing the strategy that the study has adopted, space has been accorded 
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to the exposition of the design and its suitability for probing answers to the identified research 
question. The inherent limitations of the methodology were highlighted and ways to circumvent 
the characteristic shortcomings of the blueprint cited.  The subsequent chapter is a presentation 
and analysis of the data collected during field work.  
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                         CHAPTER 6  
                                 DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The primary aim of this chapter is to present and analyse the data generated by case studies 
during field work which seeks to answer the primary objective of this inquiry; namely 
ascertaining the type of incentives used by managers in implementing heritage policy in post 
1994 South Africa. Data presented and analysed was generated from ten case studies 
represented by ten managers from different levels of public management in the South African 
public service. In depth unstructured interviews were held with the ten respondents whose 
responses were digitally recorded and later transcribed for analysis. The PFI model generated 
by Mnculwane and Wissink (102-103), was used to analyse case studies. The chapter begins 
with shortened profiles of managers interviewed. This section of the chapter is intended to 
provide a general overview of the type of managers data was derived from, and the indication 
of the scope of their daily activities. Subsequently findings derived from the analysis of data 
are presented under specific themes. The penultimate section of the chapter is a discussion and 
interpretation of the findings under three specific sub-themes of the aforesaid composite 
research objective. Lastly, conclusions based on the foregoing are made. 
6.2 ABRIDGED PROFILES OF MANAGERS INTERVIEWED 
The heritage managers interviewed are in charge of a number of programmed policy 
implementation interventions in the relevant government departments and their entities. From 
the sample identified, 20% of the managers interviewed represented Senior General Managers 
while another 20% consisted of General Managers. To this extent, the bulk of managers 
interviewed (40%), represented the Senior Management of the public service, while the middle 
management service consisted the remaining 20%. Of the managers interviewed, 40% of these 
research units were departmental bureaucrats while the majority (60%) came from the public 
entities linked to the National Department of Arts and Culture. From this sample, 60% of the 
interviewees were male while the remaining 40% consisted of women.  
Respondent #1 is a middle aged female deputy director responsible for implementing projects 
linked to the management of living heritage in the national Department of Arts and Culture as 
the following extract from the interview held demonstrates. The interview took place in the 
departmental boardroom which provided a serene if conducive environment for this type of 
inquiry. 
Introduction by Researcher:- I’m just wondering if we cannot begin by Sis31 Hlengiwe just 
explaining herself. Who is she? What sort of work are you doing here? What you are 
responsible for? Maybe let that be our starting point, if you don’t mind. 
                                                 
31 The term belongs to that category of sibling terms of endearment often used among Africans in South Africa 
when addressing a female as though she were your sister to show respect. Hlengiwe is not her real name. It is also 
regarded as a gesture of respect to address someone as though you were not directly speaking to him or her. 
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Respondent #1:- (Gently) OK. (Clears her voice a bit) I am responsible for e… implementing 
living heritage32 projects. E…. e… as well as and commemorations like for instance Freedom 
Day33, Heritage Day34, Women’s Day. Ya. The Day of Reconciliation35.  
Researcher:- So all that falls under your, your, your responsibility as it were? 
Respondent #1:- Yes. 
Respondent #2 is a specialist working in the area of liberation heritage and associated with the 
National Heritage Council (NHC), a creature of statute linked to the National Department of 
Arts and Culture. He has been involved in this type of work since the advent of democracy in 
South Africa and to that extent involved in numerous projects aimed at preserving that specific 
aspect of the national estate. He was interviewed in the boardroom of the entity in Pretoria. 
Researcher:- Ya. Now that’s about it. That’s about it. And maybe firstly, can you just begin by 
telling me what sort of work you are doing because we are going to describe whatever we are 
discussing within that context. 
Respondent #2:- O K. I now….. in my current assignment, I look for places that prove that 
freedom was not free. And I work with many very talented and knowledgeable and powerful 
people to create or package that as a network of places that bear testimony to South Africa’s 
struggle. We call them the liberation route or matrix or whatever. And we work towards a 
selection of them, for maximum domestic protection in terms of the National Heritage 
Resources Act, and recognition in public as places of importance, not only to those who played 
a role but to all South Africans. And then we also work towards a selection of them for world 
heritage listing; and in that context we then interact with people in South Africa and in other 
African countries because South Africa’s freedom was obviously, the closing of a chapter in 
human history of the colonial period; and probably what Dubois had talked about the problem 
of race to characterise the twentieth century. So anyway it concludes the colonisation process 
that was happening throughout Africa. We locate it in that context. Previous to that, we had 
the opportunity to help create institutions like Robben Island, like Mandela Museum. So you 
will be able to safely say that, for just about two decades my work has been about identifying, 
preserving using heritage of the liberation struggle, in the mainstream or mainstreaming it 
basically in public policy, in practical implementation and other kinds of ways, to varying 
                                                 
32 In the context of post 1994 heritage management in South Africa, living heritage is understood as comprising 
the intangible aspects of inherited culture and includes such phenomena as cultural tradition, oral history; 
performance, ritual; popular memory; skills and techniques; indigenous knowledge systems; a holistic approach 
to nature, society and social relationships.  
33 Freedom Day is a post 1994 public holiday in South Africa commemorating the advent of democracy as a result 
of the elections held on April 27, 1994, a watershed moment which ushered in the new dispensation. 
34 Heritage Day is celebrated on the 24th of September of each year in South Africa and seeks to create an occasion 
for celebrating the various cultures characterising the country’s landscape. During apartheid South Africa, in 
particular the practice and promotion of heritages of various social groups was not balanced and hierarchically 
arranged, with heritage belonging to previously marginalised groupings relegated to the periphery and often 
discouraged.   
35 Reconciliation Day is celebrated on the 16th of December of each year. It has its ultimate origins in the old 
South Africa when the Afrikaners celebrated their victory over the Zulu Army at the Battle of Blood River 
(Ncome) in 1838. In the new dispensation the day is used to entrench reconciliation among various race groupings 
in South Africa.  
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degrees. Ya. So either at executive or at technical level. So that’s how I come in. So obviously, 
from time to time CEOs and other people in the roles that I was holding before get required to 
make input to the national policy. And now I work purely as a technical specialist in this field. 
Previous to that executive roles are cross cutting. Ya. That is the context. 
Respondent #3 is a middle aged male Senior General Manager who has been working with the 
various policy initiatives and interventions since the inception of the National Department of 
Arts and Culture twenty years ago. He has wide knowledge in all the critical aspects of heritage 
management both within the country and in the global arena. He has over the last twenty years 
personally experienced and directly contributed in various ways in the evolution of heritage 
policy in the relevant department. He was interviewed in his office in Pretoria, which provided 
a quiet environment without any disturbances and appeared prepared for the interview. 
Respondent #4 is a middle aged married female working as Divisional Manager of the South 
African Heritage Resources Authority (SAHRA), a statutory body the primary objective of 
which is to coordinate the identification and management of heritage resources comprising the 
national estate in South Africa. Prior to her current assignment she served as a Provincial 
Manager of SAHRA for the Mpumalanga Province. She was interviewed in the boardroom of 
Ditsong National Museum of Natural History in Pretoria where her offices are located. 
Respondent #5 is a middle aged Senior Manager in the National Department of Arts and 
Culture who has been Head of Policy in the Heritage Branch of the said department for a 
number of years. He was interviewed in the departmental boardroom in Pretoria; in an 
environment conducive to the task. He has, over the years coordinated and directly contributed 
in the development of various policies within the department.  
Respondent #6 is a General Manager responsible for heritage matters in the National Heritage 
Council. He has a law background and is the second most senior public manager in the entity, 
very knowledgeable about heritage management and has been involved in a number of country 
wide heritage initiatives and interventions. He was interviewed in the entity’s boardroom in 
Pretoria which provided a conducive environment for this type of inquiry.  
Respondent #7 is another middle aged female at the time working as Deputy Chief Executive 
Officer of Freedom Park, an entity which is a cultural precinct aimed at celebrating South 
Africa’s heritage linked to the National Department of Arts and Culture located in Pretoria. 
She has been involved in numerous community engagement initiatives linked to the park. She 
was interviewed at her office at Salvokop in Pretoria where the park is located. 
Respondent #8 is a heritage policy analyst with a PhD in the field and currently specialises in 
the area of heritage crime. She currently works for the National Heritage Council and was 
interviewed in her office which provided us with a  quiet, if conducive environment for the 
inquiry. Like other respondents, she was prepared for the interview. She is also doing some 
work to assist non-governmental organisations working in the area of heritage in the country. 
Respondent #9 is a Senior Manager responsible for heritage matters in the South African 
Heritage Resources Agency and is located in Cape Town where the interview was held in his 
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office. He has vast experience in the industry and the entity which he has served for many 
years.  
Respondent #10 is a relatively young energetic and innovative senior manager in the Provincial 
Department of Sports, Arts, Culture and Recreation in the Free State Provincial Government. 
He is responsible for heritage, museums, and language services in the province as his 
introduction of himself during the interview explains.  
Introduction by Researcher:- …. So, one is therefore seeking to find out from managers, if 
there are other ways other than the command and control paradigm as it were that they use to 
solicit participation. I therefore thought it might be helpful to try ask managers to help me in 
the project; hence my request earlier on………….. I haven’t prepared any questions, because 
I just wanted to have a very relaxed kind of interaction. I may have to make follow up questions 
if need be. But maybe, if you will, I can just request you to start by introducing yourself, I’m so 
and so and I’m involved in this and that; then continue as you feel led. 
Respondent #10:- I see. Well, my, my name is Nhlanhla Kheswa36. I’m working for the, the 
Free State Department of Sports, Arts, Culture and Recreation. And my position is the Director 
responsible for heritage, museums and language services in the province.  
Prior to his current assignment, he has had extensive experience working for SAHRA in the 
province. 
6.3 WHAT TYPE OF INCENTIVES DO MANAGERS USE WHEN IMPLEMENTING 
HERITAGE POLICY IN THE POST 1994 SOUTH AFRICA? 
The primary objective of this inquiry was to ascertain the extent to which heritage managers in 
the South African public sector use incentives in order to solicit adequate community 
participation in the implementation of heritage policy.  
6.3.1 DEPLOYMENT OF INCENTIVES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY   
Public managers do not only manage projects aimed at implementing policy; but they are also 
policy analysts; thus architects of policy development. For this reason, one of the primary 
duties of management in the public sector is to engage in the development of relevant policies; 
and by implication the choice of relevant instruments to express adopted policy positions and 
assist in the ultimate implementation thereof. Incentives are policy instruments and as such are 
normally decided upon at the policy development phase of the process. Data indicates that the 
link between incentives as policy instruments that need to be decided upon during the policy 
formulation stage on the process on the one hand, and the implementation of the initiative on 
the other, is a phenomenon not readily appreciated and understood by heritage managers in the 
South African public sector. This has the tendency to create a situation where some managers 
do not necessarily see the relevance of any inducements to solicit effective participation from 
actors in the execution of heritage policy because implementation is taken as a given. 
                                                 
36 Not his real name 
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Eh… maybe kufanele ukuthi ngiyi understende kahle i-question; ukuthi ngoba for me 
to be able to help, kufanele ngi understende iquestion, because you talking about i-
policy. Now, where I don’t understand, is where you begin to talk about incentives. 
Eh… because anyway i-policy that government, eh… formulates i-aim yakhona ukuba 
kusuke mhlambe kufanele ukuthi kube khona i-implementation ethile.37 (Respondent 
#3) 
Evident in this response by a Senior General Manager in the administration is that as long as 
one speaks of policy, the said manager understands what is being talked about and referred to. 
But immediately policy is linked to incentives as an instrument to assist its implementation, 
the manager concerned fails to see the assumed link. Implicit in this observation is the 
assumption that the authoritative declaration of policy from above, should spur actors to action 
without any recourse to incentives. This mechanistic approach to the policy process is 
buttressed by a predominate reliance on the use of legislation as a tool that is enough to 
encourage targets to action. This is clearly demonstrated by the assumption that the policy 
environment provided by the White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage, 1996 and its 
transformative agenda are enough incentives to induce participation from targeted actors, and 
for aligning their behaviour with relevant policy goals. The need for transformation in the 
socio-political landscape is understood by this manager as providing fertile ground for 
implementing heritage policy which seeks to bring about change in the status quo bequeathed 
by centuries of marginalisation and oppression. 
Eh… for instance I mean within the Department of Arts and Culture, we are working 
within a policy environment eh… ey-White Paper for instance; which was eh… 
promulgated in 1996; which made specific policy recommendations; eh.m… I am sure 
you would understand that you know in 1996 we were still a transition from pre-1994, 
and the overriding theme was transformation, the overriding theme was the redress of 
past imbalances. And of course how do we begin to ensure that we reclaim i-culture 
yethu which had been kind of downtrodden or marginalised for a very long time. And 
of course new constitutional imperatives like the freedom of artistic expression and all 
those kinds of things. So am just saying that, at the broad level, you know, there was 
that White Paper. Now I want to understand you ukuthi, if you talk about incentives,.. 
so that I will then maybe begin to address myself to that.38 (Respondent #3) 
                                                 
37 Eh… maybe I need to understand the question clearly because for me to be able to help, I need to understand 
the question. You are talking about policy. Now where I don’t understand is where you begin to talk about 
incentives. Eh… because anyway policy that government, eh… formulates, its aim is that it must be implemented 
somehow 
38 Eh… for instance I mean within the Department of Arts and Culture, we are working within 
a policy environment eh… provided by the White Paper for instance; which was eh… 
promulgated in 1996; which made specific policy recommendations; eh.m… I am sure you 
would understand that you know in 1996 we were still a transition from pre-1994, and the 
overriding theme was transformation, the overriding theme was the redress of past imbalances. 
And of course how do we begin to ensure that we reclaim our culture which had been kind of 
downtrodden or marginalised for a very long time. And of course new constitutional 
imperatives like the freedom of artistic expression and all those kinds of things. So am just 
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In a sense, the policy environment of the new dispensation is regarded as providing the citizenry 
with an opportunity to reclaim what they know once belonged to them; thus nullifying any 
relevance for inducements to encourage participation. The words like new constitutional 
imperatives highlight the understanding that authoritative pronouncements are to a large extent 
providing not only the mandate for managers, but also enough reason for targeted actors to 
participate without being induced. 
The reasons provided by respondents for the inability to comprehend and appreciate the 
relationship between incentives and policy were manifold. As demonstrated above, some 
managers do not see the link because they assume that implementation follows automatically 
from promulgation. Others give the impression that their failure to see the connection is caused 
by the tricky, if complex nature of the relationship between incentives and policy. The 
association is not only considered problematic, but it renders the deployment of incentives an 
afterthought, thus rendering the capacitation of actors targeted by the policy negligible.  
No, I initially wanted to establish, exactly what you mean by incentives. Perhaps that 
example that you gave from the SAHRA Act it’s a good example. Ehm… it’s a tricky 
one; but I can say with confidence from where I am sitting that at this point in time 
incentives have been an afterthought of policy making. Eh.. You make policy because 
you want to create a framework in which certain things ought to be done. Eh..m… 
empowering the people that are affected by those policies has often not been a 
consideration. (Respondent #5) 
The phrase “… from where I am sitting at this point in time…” must be understood within 
context in the sense that the manager in question is responsible for managing heritage policy 
development processes in the relevant department. This would suggest that he could not cite 
an instance in his daily engagement with matters of policy in the department where the 
deployment of incentives was considered a priority to assist implementation.    
There are other instances where the polysemy nature of incentives as a term is considered as 
one other cause for failure to link the concept to policy and by implication to its 
implementation. 
And you defining incentives in what way? And I mean, I’m not being pedantic. It’s just 
that people of your world use words to mean different things. (Respondent #2). 
Therefore, when incentives are mentioned as it were in the same equation with policy, heritage 
managers in the South African public sector do not immediately see any immediate connections 
between the two phenomena. This presages that where such managers are involved in heritage 
policy development initiatives, they are not readily disposed to contemplate and consider the 
deployment of any inducements in the architecture of such policies. Incentives are in essence 
policy instruments used not only to express policy positions but also to implement them. The 
scarcity of attempts made by managers to deploy incentives during policy formulation reveals 
                                                 
saying that, at the broad level, you know, there was that White Paper. Now I want to understand 
you if you talk about incentives,.. so that I will then maybe begin to address myself to that. 
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the nature of the relationship existing between policy makers and the governed and depict the 
kind of social control implicit in this phase of the policy process.  
6.3.2 INCENTIVES USED BY MANAGERS WHEN INTRODUCING PROJECTS TO 
COMMUNITIES 
Evidence generated by the study indicates that when managers begin to programme policy 
initiatives for implementation, they immediately realise the need for recourse to some form of 
inducement to elicit the required response from actors. The complexities germane to public 
policy implementation force managers to contemplate and deploy specific types of incentives 
to gain entry to targeted communities. Apart from the establishment of Steering Committees to 
assist in soliciting buy-in and participation from local communities, managers depict a strong 
reliance on the usage of the language of beneficiation as an incentive par excellence to elicit 
the coveted acceptance from targeted communities. Managers are of the view that people need 
to see the value of what is being introduced to their community in order to be prompted to 
participate. This becomes important where government erects the relevant heritage 
infrastructure with the intention of monumentalising the contribution made by prominent 
leaders of communities particularly in the struggle for liberation and also to preserve living 
heritage attached to critical sites. Incentives used at this phase of the policy process are 
commensurate with the fact that South Africa is still a developing country and faces a myriad 
of socio-economic challenges. 
But of course what is an incentive for people to participate? And I just think that one 
thing that eh…. one language or the vocabulary that should dominate your, the 
discourse, in terms of the discussion with the community, they must first and foremost, 
see the value of what you bringing there. More particularly from the developmental 
point of view.  (Respondent #3) 
The respondent in question highlights the benefits that accrue to the project as the language 
and the vocabulary that should dominate discourse in this phase of the policy process. It is 
regarded as “… the one thing…” which means that it is elevated above everything else that can 
be used to encourage targeted actors to participate. Surprisingly, it seems that once heritage 
managers are faced with the intricacies of actual programming of policy options for 
implementation, they are faced with exigencies which require a change of paradigm. The same 
manager who did not immediately link incentives to policy earlier on because implementation 
was regarded as automatic after promulgation, suddenly realises the relevance of inducing 
participation. To this extent benefits clearly targeted to beneficiaries in a developing country 
or context, such as job creation where both skilled and unskilled labour will be required as the 
project unfolds, are regarded as an important inducements to solicit community participation. 
So first and foremost, people must then say to themselves, “What is this initiative 
bringing to us as people here? And, and once they are very clear in their minds that o 
k the setting up of a museum in this  particular locality, has got various positive 
ramifications, in the form of, you know, it could be job creation. Some people would 
say, “Oh of course this is gonna bring about job opportunities. Those job opportunities 
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some of them could be temporary, in the form of the construction of the……. Some of 
them are gonna be long term job opportunities because once your institution has been 
set up, it needs to be operational. So you would have to have a curator, you know, 
people who are gonna maintain, cleaning. You would have to have a wide range of job 
opportunities that are more permanent than temporary. (Respondent #3) 
The same category of development oriented incentives is also evident where managers seek to 
encourage communities to preserve certain types of living heritage. The desire to create 
factories in the rural areas where indigenous foods will be cultivated and processed, and where 
the material used to create indigenous clothes will be produced is understood by heritage 
managers in the South African public sector as having a potential for job creation.  Such a 
potential is implicitly leveraged by managers to encourage rural actors to participate in the 
projects aimed at encouraging the consumption of indigenous food staffs.  
And it will also create jobs because e…most people come to Gauteng or town to look 
for work. So if there are factories where this… and land where they are planted, 
processed in a factory, it will create jobs for .. for the rural people. And also for clothes 
because they, for instance, the traditional clothes are not manufactured. If you are a 
Mopedi the clothes are note manu… the material is not manufactured there. Somebody 
owns that factory. So they will like to have the ability to manufacture the material for 
their own indigenous foods. They need funds, they need products, they need a factory 
and they are eager to produce what they… they know. Ya. (Respondent #1) 
For this reason, right from the onset, heritage managers will ensure that prior to the actual roll 
out of the project, local communities are sensitised about the potential that a structure like a 
museum has for encouraging cultural tourism in the area. 
And the whole issue of tourism, eh…. The cultural tourism that the area, you know, is 
not gonna be the same in that there will be people coming from different parts of South 
Africa, different parts of the world, to come and see this. So these are the things that, 
you know, right from the beginning, right from the onset, they need to be well packaged 
for the community so that right from the start they know what is in it for them. It’s not 
about you as a national department, coming to do something in here, eh…. From the 
policy position of from a bigger or wider government imperative. But the wider 
government imperative should dovetail with interest of the local community. 
(Respondent #3) 
The educational value of establishing memory institutions in particular is also highlighted as 
another important incentive encouraging participation of targeted actors. While the 
establishment of such heritage institutions is understood by managers as useful in aligning the 
behaviour of targeted communities and actors with relevant policy goals, the thinking among 
managers is that memory institutions enhance the knowledge economy of such communities. 
This too is regarded as an incentive encouraging meaningful participation from young and old 
alike in heritage policy implementation. 
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But apart from that the educational value of the particular institution that you are 
setting up, eh… local communities are not gonna be the same, because they would be 
having a resource, even school children in that particular area, will then have an 
opportunity of knowing what a museum is. But also they will become conversant with 
the theme and the.. you know, of that particular museum; and the story line that informs 
the museum.  (Respondent #3) 
Data generated from case studies gives an indication that even managers who are of the view 
that there is a lopsided emphasis placed on consultation than on inducing communities and 
actors to participation, acknowledge the fact that the language of beneficiation is more often 
than not used as the primary incentive to solicit action. This was a characteristic phenomenon 
particularly among heritage managers with either a legal background or those who approach 
heritage management from the prism of liberation heritage in South Africa. 
Similarly when we are talking about honouring say, unsung heroes and heroines of the 
liberation struggle, through infrastructure development that is biased towards 
affirming a legacy of a particular person. It could be the O R Tambo Garden of 
Remembrance in Nkantolo; it could be the Nelson Mandela Museum; it could be the 
Steve Biko Centre of Memory; consultation will take place widely in communities. This 
is the initiative that we want to come up with as government. But immediately they’re 
saying, as communities you stand to benefit. We will create many jobs for you. We will 
deal with unemployment through employing locals. So that becomes a trade off with the 
local communities ….they will support this government initiative. We are honouring 
one of your own; there…………but besides that, besides …….multi-purpose centre to 
which you will have access. The trade-off becomes one that says you will have jobs, you 
will be employed; others will be permanently employed, while others will be involved 
in the construction of the centre itself. There are certain levels where maybe locals will 
be involved in the management of the structure, they get roped in and all that. 
(Respondent # 6) 
Managers working in the area of liberation heritage in South Africa, and whose particular brief 
is to look for places in the country which prove that liberation was not free; and as a matter of 
consequence, seek to package such nodes to a liberation route for maximum protection and 
world listing, also concur that leveraging benefits and managing peoples interests is a critical 
incentive for inducing participation among diverse actors and communities. Managers involved 
in the creation of the Robben Island Museum for example are a case in point in this regard. 
They were conscious of the fact that adequate participation from targeted actors and 
communities would be effected by conducting a rigorous stakeholder analysis which will reveal 
their respective interests so that they are managed properly in the roll out of the project to 
maximise participation and buy-in. These communities include holders of such special 
religious heritage as Maziah Communities of the Western Cape, ex-prisoners associations, 
business people and others of note. A specific set of incentives commensurate with such 
groups’ interests were deployed to draw them to participation.  
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 … and remember at that time I don’t think even BEE was defined in the way that it is. 
So we had to define our mechanism that how it is going to work. And I think, it ended 
up for example, being that the…… when a ferry company had to be partnered with, if I 
remember correctly, or when the memorabilia that you sell at the shop, had to be 
sourced, you then had to take into account business that have, that demonstrate a link 
with to that particular community.  (Respondent #4) 
Even in instances where monuments in particular are faced with the threat of demolition and 
the prospect of being vandalised, which is a common feature in South African heritage resource 
management, the rhetoric of local beneficiation plays a prominent role in the solicitation of 
communities and targeted actors to participate in the implementation of projects aimed at 
restoring and protecting the national estate, managers take recourse to potential beneficiation 
as an instrument to draw the required participation from locals. A case in point is a memorial-
cum-museum located at a place called Piet Retief in the Mpumalanga Province which had been 
vandalised and required repairs. The stakeholders implicated in the site itself included the 
Dutch Reformed Church, the local amakhosi, The Department of Land Affairs and the local 
municipality. After the monument in question had been restored the Provincial Manager 
responsible for the project resorted to beneficiation to ensure that members of the community 
protect the structure. As soon as the work of repairing had been completed, the manager in 
question had some advice to give to the local authority to ensure protection of the structure. 
And then I said this is the area, we are done with it, it’s been repaired. Now everything, 
the ball is in you court guys. You will have to create some sort of a, heritage awareness 
of trying to restore areas like this in your area, as a municipality I am giving you advice. 
You will lock this place, you’ll get the keys. People who are coming here for viewing 
the place, they will have to pay an x amount. But it’s just a suggestion that they must 
take care of it themselves. Then, from that amount, or the amount from the municipality, 
you will give schools around the area, maybe for three months, to come and clean this 
area, and give them maybe five hundred rands; that they can do for their own school. 
And then you alternate, rotate per year. Maybe three months or two months, depending 
on the schools that are around here. Also the school kids will be able to come and 
appreciate what is happening. (Respondent #4) 
What is evident is that during the policy development phase of the process managers do not 
readily appreciate the connection between incentives and policies; while at the stage where 
projects aimed at implementing enacted policy positions are introduced among targeted 
communities, heritage managers in the South African public sector exhibit a characteristic bias 
towards the usage of developmentally oriented incentives effected by the socio-economic 
challenges the country faces as a developmental state. The packaging and subsequent 
leveraging of all these benefits understood to accrue to the project, are clearly an afterthought; 
and have not been contemplated and designed during the policy formulation stage of the 
process. On the contrary, they form part of the strategies invented by heritage managers faced 
with the complexities and exigencies of policy implementation in a dynamic environment 
characteristic of a developing country like South Africa. In a sense, these are incentives which 
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can only make sense and elicit the required behaviour from targeted actors faced with the 
challenges of underdevelopment and the concomitant ills associated with joblessness.  
6.4 INCENTIVES DEPLOYED BY MANAGERS BEYOND PROJECT INITIATION 
Apart from inducements aimed at soliciting buy-in from communities during the project 
initiation stage, data generated by the inquiry indicates that managers use a variety of other 
incentives to ensure continued participation in the policy process. Even at this stage of the 
process there is no evidence suggesting that such policy instruments were carefully 
contemplated and planned for during the policy formulation stage. Managers adopt them by 
default as a result of challenges encountered during implementation.  They are prompted by 
exigencies of heritage policy implementation and are simply used in the programming of the 
relevant initiative to draw actors to meaningful participation.   
6.4.1 INTANGIBLE INCENTIVES USED BY MANAGERS TO ENCOURAGE 
PARTICIPATION 
Evidence provided by data indicates that heritage managers often leverage values intrinsic in 
some heritage resources to induce targeted actors to participation. In a context where values of 
marginalised communities were relegated in the policy process, their leveraging as incentives 
to draw communities to participate is often emphasised by managers. 
6.4.1.1 RECOGNITION AND PROMOTION USED AS INCENTIVES 
Both recognition and promotion are some of the incentives used in the global heritage 
management sphere to engender the required participation from communities. Given the South 
African context where the management of living heritage (i.e. performing arts, various social 
practices and rituals, indigenous knowledge belonging particularly to previously marginalised 
groupings in the country) was not well balanced and often discouraged, heritage managers in 
the post 1994 dispensation make use of recognition and promotion as incentives to leverage 
the support of communities and aligning their behaviour with set policy goals. The provision 
of relevant information about the nutritional and medicinal values of indigenous foods and its 
promotion are regarded as important catalyst to encourage their consumption among targeted 
communities and changing particular stereotypes communities may have against the cultivation 
and subsequent eating of such dishes. 
For instance e…. indigenous foods. We have just completed an indigenous food project. 
The purpose of that project was to promote the cultivation and consumption of 
indigenous food, because these days people consume e… a lot of western food, e… 
because it’s readily available and it’s associated with being rich. If somebody visit me 
and I prepare e… bogobe39 and morogo40, they think I am not sophisticated or I am 
poor. So people have tended to eat western food which are … don’t have nutrients and 
                                                 
39 This is an African cuisine (soft porridge) used among certain indigenous communities in South Africa. 
Sorghum, maize or millet flour is poured into boiling water and then the mixture is stirred creating a soft paste 
which is cooked very slowly thereafter until ready for serving. 
40 Morogo is a wild African spinach often harvested by traditional communities for purposes of consumption.  
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are high in fat. Whereas our food have nutritional benefits and medicinal.” 
(Respondent #1). 
In order to encourage even the urbanised sophisticated black elite to consume traditional foods, 
living heritage managers have outsourced the creation of the recipe book for traditional foods 
such as morogo and mopane worms41 to consultants, which will provide the necessary 
information regarding not only its nutritional content, but also how to go about preparing such 
dishes. 
And the project, the indigenous food project, they are also going to publish a… a recipe 
book, because some people claim to say they don’t know how to cook, for instance 
morogo. And the indigenous food recipe book will also have nutritional analysis, for 
instance, it will say mopane worms have got vitamin B and C, just to promote e.. this 
food to our communities… (Respondent #1) 
The intention of managers in the National Department of Arts and Culture is to make 
indigenous food available in ordinary supermarkets like Shoprite. However, the fact that such 
products have not been standardised accordingly to certify their quality hampers their 
accessibility through such outlets. As another attempt made at providing the required technical 
assistance to ensure the desired quality of such products and their availability from such 
supermarkets, managers in the department have made arrangements with South African Bureau 
of Standards (SABS) to certify that mopane worms meet the quality standards prescribed for 
such products. 
…its important this food should also be sold at Shoprite. And use e… rural women e… 
who... there is ample land to the rural area to plant this and sell it E… the company 
also is talking SABS to regulate e… to standardize mopane worms because they had 
tried previously to sell this food in e…. for instance Shoprite, but they will be told that 
the soil was not examined, there are rules and regulations. So there is a need for these 
private companies to assist the rural e… you know, e… products so that they can 
continue to preserve our culture. (Respondent #1) 
There is also evidence provided by data to the effect that there is a sense in which heritage 
managers create space for skilled individuals to provide their services free of charge in the 
implementation of heritage policy in the post 1994 South Africa. The fact that these experts are 
not drawn from poor communities often means that they do not want to be remunerated for the 
services. They do not come from social groupings who were previously marginalised and do 
not necessarily hope to make a living out of the expert assistance and advice given. Their 
participation is elicited by their sense of civic duty. 
Most heritage practitioners are not interested in material benefits. To them as long as 
they do what they have to do. (Respondent #9) 
                                                 
41
This is a caterpillar found in Southern Africa originating from the Gonimbrasa Belina species of the moth. 
Mopane worms when cooked are an African cuisine known for its high protein content among some traditional 
communities in South Africa.  
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6.4.1.2 INTRINSIC VALUES LEVERAGED AS INCENTIVES TO INDUCE 
PARTICIPATION 
There are case studies which provide data indicating that heritage managers understand and 
use certain values as incentives to spur targeted actors to participation and aligning their 
respective behaviour with heritage policy goals. There is a clear attachment of spiritual values 
to the preservation of one’s heritage which is then carefully used by managers as an important 
incentive for people to preserve their heritage. While some managers concede that legislation 
does provide for the deployment of tangible if direct incentives in the form of treasure based 
financial instruments, they equally affirm that generally speaking, the use of what they regard 
as intangible incentives is more common in soliciting participation from communities. 
Operating from the premise espoused by the relevant preamble of the heritage legislation, 
managers point out that the heritage being preserved belongs to communities and government 
only acts as a custodian on their behalf. For this reason, communities are encouraged to take 
pride in their heritage and the preservation thereof. This will contribute to their own spiritual 
upliftment and nation building as primary benefits which will accrue to their participation in 
the protection of heritage.  
But in general we rely on peoples pride in their heritage. I think that’s an inside 
incentive that we use is to say, we are custodian it’s not my heritage … ; but it’s your 
heritage. Therefore take pride; and the legislation is quite clear in the preamble that 
we are trying to encourage communities to look after their heritage and be very proud 
of their heritage. So it’s more of a spiritual if we speak in religious terms, spiritual, 
emotional, kind of incentive to say, this is your heritage, you are a community living 
close to it. By promoting your heritage, these are the benefits. Firstly, it’s an issue of 
nation building, spiritual upliftment… (Respondent #9) 
The observation by this respondent that they “… rely on peoples pride in their heritage”, is an 
indication that latent intrinsic values that targeted actors have are used as an incentive to induce 
participation. This is regarded as an “inside incentive” the leveraging of which is understood 
to be mandated by legislation. 
The interrogation of case studies also gave an indication that there are heritage managers in the 
South African public service who are persuaded that the primary incentive for a people, a 
country, a community or a society to identify and value its respective heritage is not necessarily 
the money it will generate. These managers are sceptical about the use of economic spin offs 
as the primary reason for communities to engage in preservation and protection. 
So, but our government with its focus on job creation and economic development, which 
is important, I am not saying it’s not important, sometimes diminish the heritage to a 
tourism activity that can be sold; and that create a job; instead of, as  something that 
is just part of being a person. And as you know that a lot of ICH42 is actually restricted 
to specific people, especially sacred and ritual sacred spaces. You can’t sell that, there 
is no way you can turn that into a product without actually destroying it. So, I suppose 
                                                 
42 ICH refers to Intangible Cultural Heritage 
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what sometimes I also think it’s the sensitivity towards heritage for heritage’s sake. 
(Respondent #8) 
The intrinsic values of heritage are in this instance again used as the primary incentive why 
communities should participate in the preservation of their heritage. While national imperatives 
germane to a developing country are regarded as important, the feeling however is that they 
tend to turn heritage into commodities, thus destroying it. Heritage must be preserved “for 
heritage sake.”  
Managers observe that the important incentive for people to preserve their heritage is the 
protection of their identity which according to these managers establishes firm ground, the kind 
of terra firma, on the basis of which communities are enabled to engage with other influences 
and challenges.  
And we… ….a lot of us say that, heritage, the incentive for a people a country, a society, 
a community to identifying and value its heritage, is not the money it will make them. 
You can make more money selling fat cakes or whatever else; is in the protection and 
promotion of their identity, is on the establishment of firm ground, terra firma, out of 
which to engage with other things; they choose to, with a confirmed identity, and a 
sense of wherefrom and whereto and whereat. (Respondent #2) 
In this instance the identification and protection of one’s heritage is synonymous with the 
preservation of one’s identity, a value that people, countries, societies and communities should 
learn to treasure and use as a tool for any type of social engagement. To this extent communities 
which stand firm on their heritage are construed to have the ability to survive any technology 
by adapting and internalising it easier; they have a keener sense of direction and their historic 
mission as a people; and are able to resist leaders who change national direction as a result of 
being enticed by incentives elsewhere, eventually succumbing to detrimental external 
influences. 
But the first thing is to understand that communities that stand firm on their heritage, 
in the long term, can survive with any technology and can adapt and internalise it easier 
than communities that don’t stand firm on their heritage. Secondly, that people who are 
firm on their heritage are………….have a keener sense of the direction they are moving 
to, their historic mission; and so it’s less easy for leaders to unilaterally change 
directions in response to any incentives they have elsewhere or harms they want to 
avoid, because there is a populace that’s got a sense of what they want; and what the 
historic mission is… (Respondent # 2)  
There is also a sense in which the desire to gain the required political mileage among 
communities is identified as one other intrinsic reason why such policy actors as Mayors and 
District Mayors participate in the implementation of heritage projects. Managers observe that 
if mayors and district mayors realise that the project in question is going to provide them with 
political mileage, they tend to participate readily; and heritage managers in the provinces tend 
to exploit that as an incentive to solicit the participation of such actors. A case in point in this 
regard is the Free State province. 
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And also we have made it a point that the person that we have appointed here to head 
this PRHA43, it’s a Secretariat, he was a mayor. He was a mayor, remember heritage, 
I still maintain that heritage and politics are inseparable; that’s exactly what is 
happening. They are inseparable. I remember once we came to the ministry of heritage, 
also politicians they want to know what is in there for us. They also want to shine, to 
say, we have declared this you know, while I was still a mayor. Yeh.. you know. And 
also you know that the people political, the political leader, this grave will be 
declared…………. will be declared, but it’s a mileage to a political leader. It profiles 
him. (Respondent #10)  
6.4.2 INCENTIVES DIRECTLY DEPLOYED TO INDUCE TAGRETED ACTORS 
There is also evidence to the effect that managers often deploy certain incentives directly to 
actors whose behaviour they want to align with set policy goals. Data generated exhibit the 
following trends in this regard:- 
6.4.2.1 PROVISION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE  
The provision of specific technical expertise to targeted actors in the heritage policy 
implementation conduit is another important incentive used more particularly in attempts 
aimed at preserving living heritage in the form of performing arts among indigenous 
communities. This phenomenon is clearly demonstrated in the appointment by the department   
of a heritage trust Zindala Zombili, to organise local, regional and national dance competitions 
aimed at preserving traditional dance skills and traditional music through performance and 
documentation. The initiative also provided technical expertise to such groups in areas of 
managing copyright and contracts.   
For now we… e…. on an annual basis we support the Zindala Zombili44 Competitions. 
They have e… local, regional and national completions. They go to different areas and, 
and, and document. The winner will participate in the provincial. After provincial they 
participate in a national competition. So they also teach them about marketing e… 
copyright, contracts and ya. So they also give them those skills because they realise 
that most of indigenous music e…. practitioners don’t have that aspect. They will just… 
they are just preparing for next time they sign contracts they know they have to read, 
they must understand you don’t just sign your music. (Respondent #1) 
The provision of such technical skills is also evident where organic intellectuals are drawn to 
assist students in the music faculties of local universities on how to manufacture traditional 
music instruments and to play them; and are induced with stipends in return. On the other hand, 
young students reciprocate the gesture by exploring possibilities of circumventing challenges 
                                                 
43 PHRA refers to a Provincial Heritage Resources Authority, a creature of statute tasked with the overall 
identification and administration of heritage resources in the province. 
44 This is a Zulu proverb literally meaning they are both of the same age. It is used when two competitors are neck 
and neck in their respective competition against each other. It has its ultimate origins (sitz im leben) in the sport 
where two bulls lock horns in a tense fight.  
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posed by acoustics when traditional music instruments are played in larger spaces for bigger 
audiences.  
… we also did a project with the University of Venda; Fort Hare; and Zululand. The 
initial project was to do, to document indigenous music and oral.. and, and oral history. 
But the initial funding necessitated that the project expand because with indigenous 
music you need to also find out about the plant for a certa… let’s say uhadi45i, e…. 
where do you get it? How do you manufacture it? And also there is clothes, they … the 
types of clothes that they wear e… facial make up, and also there were also asked to 
try to modernise the instrument because some of them for instance you can play in a 
small room you can’t play in a big room. So the universities were encouraged to e…. 
let the youth be involved in the manufacturing of… at the University of Venda they 
would also invite practitioners who had not gone to school to come and teach music 
students about a, a specific instrument, a traditional, e… indigenous instrument. And 
then they will give them a stipend. (Respondent #1) 
6.4.2.2 DEPLOYMENT OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVES 
Data generated by the study indicates that there is an extent to which treasure based policy 
instruments are also used to ensure adequate participation of actors in the implementation of 
heritage policy in the post 1994 South Africa. When asked about how academics in the music 
departments of universities respond to the initiative where the department enlists their 
participation in the promotion and recording of indigenous music, where organic intellectuals 
are roped in to come and teach, one heritage manager responded as follows. 
Mh….. They are grateful for e… financial assistance. Because for instance, music 
department, e… like maybe they get the lowest e.. funding at a university. So this assist 
because of this project they were able to pay a stipend for somebody, who has never 
e… studied music or am instrument in a university to come and teach. So if a department 
didn’t participate in this that would not have been done on their own.. … ya. So the 
participation of the department e… really assisted.  (Respondent #3) 
Such instances where direct financial incentives are deployed by government to draw the 
participation of these centres of higher learning, demonstrate how incentives are used by 
managers to enable private institutions to join forces in the implementation of government 
policy. 
Evidence gathered during the interrogation of case studies reveal that in both line function 
departments responsible for heritage matters in government as well as in the relevant Quasi-
Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisations (QUANGOS), established for the similar 
purpose, the use of financial incentives to induce communities to participate is a common 
feature. Community outreaches conducted by the Freedom Park in particular are a case in point 
in this regard. There are instances where the standard government’s supply chain management 
systems cannot be effectively applied with traditional protocols where heritage policies are to 
                                                 
45 Uhadi is a bow like musical instrument used among the Xhosa people in the Eastern Cape. 
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be implemented among slightly rural communities where deals to secure specific goods and 
services are often arranged without the relevance of three quotes prescribed by the stringent 
supply chain management procedures of the public service. 
But the other things that you find is that when you go to communities, say for our 
outreach, we do mobile exhibitions and outreach, we go to communities. In terms of 
government, if you want, say it’s an accommodation you need three quotations. If you 
were to do a marquee or a tent, you know you need an invoice. In communities they 
don’t work like that. I come to you family, you’ve got a tent. “Can I use your tent?” 
Five hundred is fine. Those systems do not work. So we have tried within our policies 
to accommodate those procurement, without necessarily diverting from our PFMA. 
(Respondent #7) 
Faced with the challenge that no standard rates were available even from the Department of 
Public Service and Administration (DPSA), on how to remunerate organic intellectuals in 
instances where they get consulted for their knowledge of Indigenous Knowledge Systems on 
which Freedom Park is grounded, specific rates were designed by managers of the entity to 
induce participation of such intellectuals in the organisation’s implementation endeavours. In 
order to formulate the special rates for such policy actors, managers consulted with senior 
individuals within the relevant Communities of Practice who provided the grading criteria they 
normally used to rate different levels of traditional healers. The intention was to professionalise 
and remunerate organic intellectuals accordingly and for that reason the consultation resulted 
in the formulation of guidelines which meant that such policy actors were paid on the basis of 
their seniority using the set criteria. 
… but we try to create incentives for example, we had what we called an IKS Committee, 
Indigenous Knowledge System, where it was strictly elders within communities because 
we needed their wisdom. Now for Freedom Park if I talk about our designers, you have 
standard rates, you know how to pay a researcher, a senior researcher or whatever, 
how much to pay them. You know how to pay an exhibition developer; there are set 
rates. You go to your Public Service you see those rates are there. But how do you pay 
a traditional healer or a leader. How do you pay my grandmother who is so 
knowledgeable? You don’t have those rates. It becomes…, because we used to do these 
things to say how much…. because I can’t, for example, we paid millions to the so 
called professionals, to the so called conventional intellectuals; but if you look at how 
much we paid our organic intellectuals, who are basically the core of what we are if 
we talk heritage at Freedom Park; very little; which is an abuse, because we say 
Freedom Park is foregrounded by Indigenous Knowledge Systems.(Respondent #7) 
The deployment of treasure based financial instruments commensurate with the experience of 
organic intellectuals consulted for specific purposes is therefore regarded by public managers 
in the South African heritage resource management fraternity as helpful in drawing in actors 
to share their wisdom and knowledge in the implementation of government policy. The 
consultation with senior practitioners of respective communities of practice regarding 
appropriate remuneration for service rendered is not only a measure taken to avoid abuse, but 
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it is also aimed at affirming specific community values in the implementation of government 
policy. There are instances where heritage managers in the public entities in particular 
collaborate with the Department of Science and Technology to expedite the certification and 
accreditation of communities of practice so that they can be remunerated accordingly for the 
services they provide when implementing heritage policy. The payment itself is also 
understood as an acknowledgement of values previously marginalised in the mainstream of 
heritage management in previous dispensations.  
The knowledge holders are not acknowledged, how do you acknowledge them? So we 
had to devise a means where we say, we are going to set specific rates for organic 
intellectuals. At one level we, for example, we were also working now with the 
Department of Science and Technology on the Certification and Accreditation of what 
we call Communities of Practice. For example with the traditional healers we had to 
say to their leaders, to say, how do we determine the level? You have senior junior, like 
in any profession. How do I pay these healers? And they gave us guidance to say how 
you differentiate? So they will tell us that if a healer has got so many years’ experience 
and does one, two, three, you rate them… they have got their own terminologies. So 
through that we had to formulate our internal, well it was not necessarily a policy. But 
a guideline document to pay organic intellectuals because we wanted to professionalise 
and remunerate. So that if we sit with them we pay them per hour like anybody will 
charge us. And we had to determine the rates for example, we consulted bo Credo 
Mutwa, bo Mama Masuku; and Credo will be at a higher level. He’s a senior healer 
than any other healer. So we had to differentiate but working with them to determine 
those rates; but also equating those to the academic, to say, if they say this healer or 
this traditional leader is at this because; because you will have your indunas, I don’t 
want to use the western…… Yes, they have their own hierarchies sometimes of 
seniorities; and we had to say how do we then equate this to the professional, 
conventional professional so that, if I’m taking this Kgosi’s46 time; and is giving these 
valuable inputs, how do we remunerate? (Respondent #7) 
 
Direct financial incentives are not only deployed where specific traditional wisdom is solicited 
for preservation. There are also occasions where experts with scarce heritage skills are required 
for effective heritage policy implementation. The said specialists are drawn from communities 
who were not previously marginalised and had enough access to training in such fields as 
underwater heritage, and as gun specialists. A case in point in this regard are instances where 
the South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA) seeks to secure the services of gun 
experts to advise on the disposal of guns collected from communities before they are destroyed 
by the South African Police Service (SAPS).  
In some instances we will have, for example there is this mass destruction of guns 
because of the laws. Now some of these guns are of heritage value and we say to 
                                                 
46 Kgosi means Chief. 
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government and the police, before you destroy these guns, have somebody to come and 
assess and those that are of cultural significance, you keep them. And what we do then 
with the specialists, because few people are specialists when it comes to guns; we just 
give them honorarium and then in some instances we have to fly them, or buy them food 
for their lunch; it’s a sort of SNT, which is to encourage them… (Respondent #9) 
The Free State Provincial Government’s Department of  Sports, Arts Culture and Recreation., 
responsible for heritage matters in the province has come up with innovative ways to induce 
communities to report heritage crime concerning the destruction of heritage buildings. 
Incentives are provided for whistle blowers in this regard. 
But we raise awareness in schools, we raise awareness also when we have public 
participation; when we are about to declare a site; to say to the people, some, if you 
suspect that a building is older than sixty years47, and you suspect that it is being 
demolished without a permit, these are our contact details; contact us immediately; and 
we can give you something in terms of that. And we have made a budget allocation so 
that when you come and report that particular building, then we can give you up to five 
hundred rand. Those are some of the incentives that we are giving to the members of 
the public. And it has been working because now, before people can start even to 
demolish a building, when they see the bulldozers and they see, you know the whole 
preparation around the demolishing of a building, we know. We receive a telephone 
call that are you aware about this building, I suspect it’s older than sixty years. Did 
they apply for a permit? You say no. We rush immediately to see what is happening. 
(Respondent #10) 
While there are some of these experts who would not require to be paid for their service, data 
also gives an indication that some of them may not be employed and would require some form 
of tangible financial inducement to enable them to participate.  
But I guess some of them are not working. So then by giving them the honorarium is to 
say to them, thank you for your intellectual property and you are assisting us. 
(Respondent #9) 
Another form of direct inducement by using financial incentives is the provision of grant in aid 
by government through public entities linked to the line function departments responsible for 
heritage matters in the country. Government has strategically placed the National Heritage 
Council (NHC), so that it deals with funding issues. Requests for funding are received from 
members of the public through applications. Advertisements are publicised in the newspapers 
to solicit such applications. Specific initiatives aligned to government’s goals are cited for 
funding in the advertisements. The NHC is an example of an implementing institution which 
                                                 
47 Buildings older than sixty years are regarded as heritage property in South Africa and are protected by law. 
Section 34(1) of the National Heritage resources Act, 1999 states that, “No person may alter or demolish any 
structure or part of a structure which is older than 60 years without a permit issued by the relevant provincial 
heritage resources authority.” 
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countenances in its scope of operations, the use of financial incentives as governance tools to 
induce targeted actors to action and participation. 
And there are other people who also write to request funding, there is one of the 
institutions, National Heritage Council. They also once a year roll out in the 
newspapers e… that if you need funding on one, two, three, you can, you can e… apply. 
(Respondent #1). 
While the South African Heritage Resources Agency does not exclusively and primarily rely 
on the use of financial incentives to encourage participation, managers in the entity are aware 
that the National Heritage Resources Act, 1999 mandates them to provide funding to 
community based heritage projects. Managers in the entity are adamant that it is not individuals 
who must be funded but bearer communities executing specific community projects. 
Eh, when it comes to heritage resources management, there, the legislation has a clause 
where we expected to provide financial incentives; not to individuals but to projects. 
Focusing on community projects. Ya, you sort of identify a site. Let’s talk about 
Emakhosini48 which might be familiar to you; and then saying communities around 
there want to develop Emakhosini; but they do not necessarily have the financial 
muscle. So legislation does allow us to provide these financial incentives toward the 
management of heritage resources. But in general we rely on peoples pride in their 
heritage. I think that’s an inside incentive that we use is to say, we are custodian it’s 
not my heritage … (Respondent #9) 
Evidence generated by case studies gives an indication that there is an intention within 
government to establish a fund aimed at preventing heritage assets of national significance  
from either leaving the shores of South Africa, or remaining in private hands which do not 
necessarily have the resources to maintain them as an integral part of the national estate. 
Managers exhibit a certain measure of frustration and disappointment when realising that such 
policy proposals have not been accompanied by attempts to raise the necessary funding for 
such purposes. 
You know that in terms of the SAHRA Act, eh….m.. there was supposed to be a fund 
created by the National Ministry.; and this fund was aimed at ensuring that if there is 
a heritage asset of national significance that currently resides in private hands, and the 
private individual for a number of reasons whether they do not have resources to keep 
or maintain it or for profit motivations they want to dispose of that asset, that eh, the 
framework was that, I mean, the heritage asset has to remain within the country. 
(Respondent #5)  
Despite the fact that the establishment of such a fund has not been realised, there is evidence 
that attempts to either buy off potential buyers of heritage assets have been made albeit in a 
                                                 
48 Emakhosini is sometimes known as the Valley of the Kings because most Zulu Kings before King Shaka were 
buried in that area and to that extent it is regarded as sacrosanct by the Zulus. 
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fairly erratic, reactive and ad hoc manner in the sense that affluent citizens and individuals have 
been approached to provide the necessary funding to secure the asset in question. 
But, let’s say for example it’s a work of art and eh… auctions in London eh, where it’s 
likely to generate more income… in fact it has happened on quite a number of occasions 
where private individuals have sold a heritage asset to someone overseas. And the 
Department has been approached on an ad hoc basis to say that, there is this significant 
eh, eh, eh, heritage asset, it’s about to leave the country, can you do something about 
it? And what has happened I think the Department has thought and approached this in 
an ad hoc manner, maybe approach certain individuals eh, that they deem to have 
resources that they must assist to buy off eh, these other buyers. And I know that three 
years ago there was a concerted effort to create such a fund that would be there to make 
sure that if there is something of significance that has been sold or has the potential of 
leaving the country, the state can buy off that potential buyer. (Respondent #5)  
While on the one hand, attempts have been made to prevent heritage assets to fall in private 
hands and eventually leave this country for museums elsewhere, similar endeavours are also 
made to secure heritage property located within the country, yet owned by foreign nationals. 
The frustration experienced by heritage managers in this regard is twofold. On the one hand 
there is evidently a clash of interests between government and these nationals.  
The other area that we looked at is the issue of heritage in private hands. There is no 
national policy that speaks to that. The building in which the late Steve Biko was 
assaulted, the Sanlam Building, it’s a very important national site for the country but 
is yet to be declared as such. Why? Because the owner, some rich, what is his name, he 
is Port Elizabeth, I forgot his name. He is an Irish. He…this building is dilapidated, it’s 
still there, it’s still firm, but dilapidated. Yes, maybe he owns half of the empty buildings 
that are in Port Elizabeth. He has so much money. All he is saying is that he wants to 
refurbish and make them look good and make them office space. Or others he would 
want to create housing and accommodation for people and all that, flats. (Respondent 
#6)  
On the other hand proprietors of such assets inflate their prices exorbitantly when government 
is the potential buyer; and this provides evidence that the willing buyer, willing seller policy 
has also confronted some challenges in the area of heritage resource management in the post 
1994 South Africa. Attempts made by government for example to secure the building where 
the Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko was assaulted in Port Elizabeth is a also a case in 
point cited by one manager in particular.  
And he is saying, look, if you want the building I can sell that for you. He says, you give 
me say twenty million for that building that is worth maybe four million as government, 





6.4.2.3 THE USE OF GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE 
The success of pilot projects aimed at the preservation of living heritage in particular has 
motivated managers in the South African Public Service to begin mooting possibilities of 
government to government assistance as another form of possible incentives to stimulate and 
foster participation of implementation actors at the lower levels of the heritage protection and 
management echelons. This strategy is considered to have potential to strengthen participation 
at the local level of heritage policy implementation because it will ensure that incentives are 
deployed closer to the clients being serviced by the department. 
For me I think more funding should be done because as national we are far away. 
Maybe also because, so give municipalities -or encourage municipalities because they 
are there – to also e… you know, use local products to develop communities, because 
they are there they are eager. Because people come here from far, whereas they could 
have just gone to their local municipalities to say, maybe if there is synergy between 
national and e… and share ideas that ok, these are the projects that we have done as 
national. In your, your municipality, or in other municipalities e… you know how… 
then we discuss how to take it forward. Ya. (Respondent #1) 
The cascading of resources to the local level as has been alluded to earlier on is also occasioned 
by virtue of the fact that managers from the national department of arts and culture are 
conscious of the fact that intergovernmental relations at the loci of implementation are 
important for the success of service delivery and participation of actors and targeted 
communities.  
6.5 INCENTIVES DEPLOYED AS PART OF A MULTI-PRONGED STRATEGY  
The study seeks to determine the extent to which incentives are used by heritage managers in 
the post 1994 South African public service; and part of that composite objective entails 
determining how specific incentives are deployed in the process. Data gives an indication that 
while heritage managers in the democratic South Africa evince a certain measure of awareness 
about the relevance and use of incentives as instruments aimed at assisting effective heritage 
policy implementation, there is an indication that incentives are not supposed to be deployed 
in isolation from other tools of governance. This is clearly corroborated by instances where 
heritage managers interviewed tended to show a bias towards the use of authority based 
governing tools together with the deployment of specific incentives. Responding to a probe 
seeking to explain the focus of the interview to a senior manager attached to a public entity 
linked to the National Department of Arts and Culture, the response acknowledging the 
relevance of the inquiry gives an impression that there is a sense in which managers might find 
it easier to resort to incentives when they are mandated by legislation which seeks to express a 
particular policy position on the matter.     
Thank you for that I think it’s an interesting kind of area you want to research on. Also 
because of the well-known dictum that when you want to come up with legislation, that 
should be informed by policy. (Respondent #9) 
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For this reason, sections of the heritage legislation understood by managers to mandate the use 
of incentives in policy implementation are referred to as something that provides the rationale 
for their deployment.  
O k. Eh, when it comes to heritage resources management, there, the legislation has a 
clause where we expected to provide financial incentives; not to individuals but to 
projects. Focusing on community projects. Ya, you sort of identify a site. Let’s talk 
about Emakhosini which might be familiar to you; and then saying communities around 
there want to develop Emakhosini; but they do not necessarily have the financial 
muscle. So legislation does allow us to provide these financial incentives toward the 
management of heritage resources.  (Respondent #9) 
There is also a sense in which other managers tend to give the impression that the fact that the 
South African Heritage Resources Act, 199 has never been coasted makes the provision of 
relevant incentives difficult. An observation made by a heritage manger from the Free State 
Department of Sports, Arts, Culture and Recreation refers to this phenomenon.  
Basically what in fact I can answer your questions about incentives with regard to 
policy implementation, heritage. I will start by saying the current act, the National 
Heritage Resources Act, is not coasted; so it’s difficult to implement the National 
Heritage Resources Act. I think that is the first step, that the developers of that 
particular act, they did not consult thoroughly.  (Respondent #10) 
Even managers who think that incentives do not form the bedrock of heritage policy 
implementation point out that the current legislative regime regulating the heritage industry in 
South Africa indirectly insinuate and infer the deployment of incentives as relevant instruments 
to effect implementation. To this extent, policies are understood to be mechanisms or 
instruments which enable certain things like the use of incentives to happen as an attempt to 
empower those impacted upon by policy.  
You make policy because you want to create a framework in which certain things ought 
to be done. Eh..m… empowering the people that are affected by those policies has often 
not been a consideration; eh…m but eh….m, I can say with confidence that the 
implementation for example of the National Heritage Resources Act, The National 
Heritage Council Act, and some aspects of the White Paper on Arts, Culture and 
Heritage, have indirectly eh….m, insinuated, inferred the importance of having inbuilt 
mechanisms, structures, majors to empower those affected and impacted by policy. I 
will start by giving you the example of SAHRA. You know that in terms of the SAHRA 
Act, eh….m.. there was supposed to be a fund created by the National Ministry.  
(Respondent #5) 
While in the main, heritage managers associated with the South African Heritage Resources 
Agency (SAHRA) which is a statutory body whose particular brief is the coordination of the 
identification and management of heritage resources in South Africa, regard people taking 
pride in their heritage as an overriding encouragement for them to participate, they nonetheless 
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concede that the relevant heritage legislation prescribes the deployment of direct incentives for 
community projects. 
O k. Eh, when it comes to heritage resources management, there, the legislation has a 
clause where we expected to provide financial incentives; not to individuals but to 
projects. Focusing on community projects. Ya, you sort of identify a site. Let’s talk 
about Emakhosini which might be familiar to you; and then saying communities around 
there want to develop Emakhosini; but they do not necessarily have the financial 
muscle. So legislation does allow us to provide these financial incentives toward the 
management of heritage resources. But in general we rely on peoples pride in their 
heritage. I think that’s an inside incentive that we use is to say, we are custodian it’s 
not my heritage as Dumisani Sibayi; but it’s your heritage. Therefore take pride; and 
the legislation is quite clear in the preamble that we are trying to encourage 
communities to look after their heritage and be very proud of their heritage. So it’s 
more of a spiritual if we speak in religious terms, spiritual, emotional, kind of incentive 
to say, this is your heritage, you are a community living close to it. By promoting your 
heritage, these are the benefits. (Respondent #9) 
It is clear that heritage managers in South Africa seek to avoid a reductionist deployment of 
incentives in the policy process; and for that reason they are used as part of a composite multi-
pronged strategy involving the usage of other equally important policy instruments like 
regulatory and organisational tools of governance.  
6.6 INCENTIVES AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
There were instances where managers pointed out that the use of incentives in heritage policy 
implementation has the potential to give rise to certain unintended consequences. The fact that 
some incentives are more likely to turn heritage resources into commodities to be 
commercialised is noted as one critical consequence arising from the deployment of 
inducements to encourage participation. Government is sometimes indicted for focusing on job 
creation and economic development in a way that sometimes diminishes the value of heritage 
and reducing it to a mere commercial commodity  
O k. So, out of Intangible Cultural Heritage. And actually the concept of heritage itself, 
is the protection and preservation of heritage; and I see a specific link with the 
safeguarding of heritage. Safeguarding of heritage is not about documentation, it’s 
about the continuance of the ritual, the performance, the language. It is to ensure that 
a fair environment where it can be transferred from generation to generation. So, but 
our government with its focus on job creation and economic development, which is 
important, I am not saying it’s not important, sometimes diminish the heritage to a 
tourism activity that can be sold…  (Respondent #8) 
Other managers felt that incentives, particularly those leveraged as benefits that will accrue to 
actors if they participate in the implementation of policy, can create an unwanted dependency 
leading to a dereliction of civil duties by members of targeted communities. To this extent 
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managers are keen on circumventing such dependencies and by emphasising the role of 
intangible incentives over against direct inducements. 
But one hopes that that it is not going to create a dependency syndrome. And that 
dependency syndrome can only be changed when you say to people we are giving you 
this but there is a bigger price and that bigger price is your heritage being conserved. 
That is the incentive that we have so far.(Respondents # 9) 
Providing technical skills to heritage communities is also considered as an important incentive 
to ensure effective participation among targeted actors. There were instances where managers 
felt that the deployment of heritage experts among communities in order to provide the required 
technical skills has the propensity to cause an unwanted dichotomy between ordinary actors in 
the implementation conduit and professionals. If this relationship between lay practitioners and 
heritage experts is not properly managed, managers fear that it can among other things lead to 
high ‘technisization’ of the policy process thus engendering polarisation in the implementation 
arena. 
The way I see policy, one of the problems with policy is that there is that distinction 
being made, as if a person who is an expert in the field can…, is seen as negative 
towards the community; while today actually one of the requirements is to be able to 
work with communities. So is that necessarily? I think government tends to think in two 
streams instead of how can they use the professionals as one of the channels to 
implement policy. (Respondent #8) 
6.7 DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION 
The above analysis has provided some answers to the primary objective of this inquiry.  
6.7.1 WHAT TYPE OF INCENTIVES ARE USED IF ANY? 
Data generated provides answers to three critical areas of the composite objective; namely what 
type of incentives are used by heritage managers in the post 1994 South Africa to solicit 
adequate participation in the implementation of heritage policies from targeted actors.   
Evidently, heritage management in the South African public service depicts a range of 
incentives shaped and determined by contextual realities of a developing country. In the first 
instance the classification is based on two salient features. That is, the location of the incentive 
vis-à-vis the recipient; whereas on the other hand they are based on the physicality of the 
incentive or lack thereof. 
6.7.1.1 INTANGIBLE, INTRINSIC AND VALUE ORIENTED INCENTIVES USED BY 
MANAGERS 
There is evidently a salient, if latent value orientation in these types of incentives leveraged by 
heritage managers in South Africa to ensure the bottom-up movement in the implementation 
of heritage policy. While it is true that values are generally an important aspect of every 
conceivable policy process, it needs to be pointed out that their instrumentality in the context 
of the South African policy process, clearly assumes incentive dimensions as a result of the 
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fact that previous dispensations have largely side-lined such values and relegated them to the 
periphery. The fact that previous models of heritage management have bequeathed a legacy 
where the administration and management of living heritage resources in particular was clearly 
imbalanced as a result of the history of apartheid and the hierarchical grading of social groups, 
has virtually meant that leveraging the dormant values enshrined in such treasures, is to an 
extent construed by both managers and targeted actors as a kind of incentive with a potential 
to elicit the required participation. This is evidently part of the reason why one Senior General 
Manager in the administration actually cited the fact that redress of imbalances of the past 
should provide a necessary incentive for South African communities to participate in heritage 
policy implementation projects, because there is now an opportunity afforded by the new 
constitutional democracy to value that which has been previously “downtrodden and 
marginalised for a very long time” (Respondent #3). This is an appeal to the prospective actor’s 
sense of civic duty which is a kind of incentive often used in patriotic organisations to garner 
support for a particular course and align people’s behaviour. 
In this instance, while the values are intrinsic in the culture of bearer communities, it has taken 
extraneous recognition by the authorities to activate those suppressed values and use them to 
align behaviour and induce the necessary action. To this extent the following value oriented 
incentives were therefore cited by managers and used in their policy implementation 
endeavours:- 
 Recognition and promotion of health values as an incentive inherent in African 
Traditional Cuisines (ATC) ranked high in the agenda of managers implementing 
living heritage policies of government. Traditional foodstuffs like bogobe, morogo and 
mopane worms for instance were cited as not only nutritional but also medicinal 
comparatively speaking. To this extent health benefits associated with the consumption 
of such foods is leveraged to elicit participation from targeted actors in the 
implementation conduit.  
 
 Linked to recognition and promotion as a form of inducement in the heritage policy 
process is the endeavour to create space for organic intellectuals to contribute to the 
implementation of policy which emerged as yet another critical inducement particularly 
among communities of practice. When asked what motivate rural women in particular 
to participate in the promotion of traditional foods, one manager noted that it was not 
only the recognition of the knowledge they possess, but also the provision of space or 
forum to pass knowledge “… because they are proud of it and know the value.” 
(Respondent #1). Similarly, the creation of the Robben Island Museum and declaration 
of the same as a heritage site created space for political ex-prisoners, ex-warders who 
may not have had a chance to participate directly in the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, “… to be able to talk about things they were never able to talk about.” 
(Respondent #2) 
 
 Instilling a sense of pride about people’s heritage which emphasises the 
psychological benefit linked to the participation of communities in the implementation 
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of heritage policies, is also mentioned by managers as a kind of intrinsic, intangible and 
value oriented inducement to initiate the much desired bottom-up movement in the 
policy process. The reference by one General Manager to people taking pride in their 
heritage as a “… spiritual, emotional kind of incentive..” (Respondent #9), is one such 
example of the psychological orientation of pride as an inducement to rally actors 
around a particular policy objective and be willing to implement. Incidentally, the South 
African socio-political context bequeathed by the past also provides fertile ground for 
leveraging this value-incentive with a measure of success. The instilling of a sense of 
pride is also linked to advocating the preservation of heritage for heritage’s sake as yet 
another incentive for people to participate in the preservation of Intangible Cultural 
Resources (ICH), without necessarily diminishing “… heritage to a tourism activity 
that can be sold...” (Respondent #8).   
  
 Heritage as a terra firma for engagement with one’s social reality has also featured 
somewhat as a kind of value oriented intangible inducement that can be leveraged by 
managers to elicit the needed participation from actors. Such a firm ground used a basis 
of engagement provides communities and individuals “… with a confirmed identity, 
and a sense of wherefrom and whereto and whereat.” (Respondent #2) 
 
 Potential for political mileage is also used by managers to engage such critical 
stakeholders as mayors and members of executive councils in active participation in the 
implementation of heritage policy. Their involvement in the formal declaration of 
heritage resources is sometimes understood by these actors and heritage managers as 
an occasion for politicians “… to shine…” (Respondent #10); and find occasion to boast 
and improve their respective profiles which increases chances for re-election in the 
subsequent electoral period.  
6.7.1.2 EXTRANEOUS INCENTIVES 
The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP), capacity development conference 
paper 8 cited earlier on (i.e. Section 1. 6.4) defined inducements as external interventions which 
are designed and established with the sole aim of motivating individuals, groups or even 
organisations to adopt a particular behaviour, aligned to the goals of the incentive giver. To 
this extent it has also been established in the course of developing this dissertation that 
incentives are used in a variety of policy fields precisely for the same reason as cited by the 
UNDP paper. The incentives yielded by data in this category are located outside the locus of 
implementation and are external interventions aimed at influencing and aligning behaviour 
accordingly. To this extent they are directly given. 
 Substantive direct financial incentives which include such inducements as the 
honoraria paid to specialists who will be able to assess arms caches and identify those 
that are of heritage significance before they are destroyed by the police “… because 
few people are specialists when it comes to guns…” (Respondent #9). There are also 
incentives in the form of standardized rates paid to holders of indigenous knowledge 
systems aimed at professionalising the payment of organic intellectuals and bring them 
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on a par with conventional intellectuals. They also include incentives paid to whistle 
blowers who assist in preventing heritage crime before it is even committed. Grants in 
Aid (GIA) are also an important type of incentives used in the public sector to induce 
the required participation from stakeholders. Both line function departments and Quasi-
Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisations (QUANGOS) linked to them 
occasionally provide grants to “… other people who also write and request funding…” 
(Respondent #1); whereas the thought of cascading financial incentives to the local 
sphere of government to prevent the citizenry from travelling long distances “… 
because as national we are far away.” (Respondent #1), is also being mooted. There 
are also grants provided to universities’ departments of music to appoint organic 
intellectuals who have “… never e… studied music or am… instrument in a university 
to come and teach.” (Respondent #3); Apart from grants in aid intended for community 
projects, there are direct financial incentives designed to buy off potential buyers of 
heritage property out of the country; or to acquire critical heritage property residing in 
private hands. Provision of technical assistance in the form of expertise required by 
communities for preservation of heritage resources also featured in the mix of 
incentives used. Private entities are deployed by the National Department of Arts and 
Culture not only to document aspects of living heritage but also to help bearer 
communities with skills in marketing and dealing with issues of copyright to prevent 
exploitation. 
 
 Indirect incentives:- these include economic spin offs that are understood to accrue to 
the introduction of specific heritage projects within communities and include potential 
for job creation, educational benefits, boosting of cultural tourism. Included in this 
category of indirect inducements with an economic orientation are incentives paid in 
kind to individuals whose expertise are solicited for effective policy implementation. 
They include flying specialists with scarce skills from various destinations in the 
country to assist in specific tasks related to matters of compliance in the administration 
of resources; and buying them lunch, which are incentives aimed to act as “… a sort of 
SNT, which is to encourage them.” (Respondent #9) 
Having given some indication regarding the type of incentives heritage managers in post 1994 
South Africa use in their policy implementation endeavours to solicit adequate participation 
from relevant actors, data generated also sought to answer the related question regarding the 
modus operandi used when such incentives are deployed.  
6.7.2 HOW ARE INCENTIVES DEPLOYED? 
Data provides some evidence regarding the attitude managers have towards incentives at the 
various stages of the policy process. 
6.7.2.1 Incentives deployed at the policy development phase 
Data provides no evidence for any attempts by public managers engaged in the development 
of policies to deploy any incentives at this stage of the process to assist implementation.  
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Managers interviewed did not give any indication that in their participation in the formulation 
of policies, incentives are also considered as critical instruments to assist implementation. 
There is clearly a mechanistic understanding of policy implementation without any clear 
recourse to incentives as governance tools aimed at assisting the execution of heritage policies. 
This in some sense points to a characteristic lack of policy analysis skills among public 
managers in the post 1994 South African public service.   
6.7.2.2 Incentives deployed at project initiation phase 
Faced with the challenges in the loci of heritage policy implementation, public managers take 
recourse to the use of certain incentives as part of the attempt to programme policies for 
implementation. The incentives adopted at this phase are largely adopted by default. They are 
mainly intended to affect and align aspects of deliberations engaged in by government and 
communities in order to introduce projects. The incentives used at this phase are further shaped 
and informed by the developmental needs of recipient communities like job creation and others.   
6.7.2.3 Incentives used post project initiation 
A sizeable amount of both direct and indirect, substantive and procedural incentives are 
resorted to at this stage of the policy process. They too are largely adopted by default and were 
not clearly designed and thought through at the formulation phase; and to that extent are an 
afterthought of policy formation. They are part of managerial strategies adopted during the 
programming of policy to deal with challenges experienced in the various implementation loci.  
6.7.2.4 Incentives mandated by the legislative framework 
Not all the incentives deployed by managers during the implementation phase of the process 
are resorted to by default. Heritage managers of the South African public sector evince a 
characteristic penchant for using specific legal mandates for actions they adopt. This is also 
evident in their attitude towards incentives. The fact that the South African Heritage Resources 
Act, 1999, has not been costed is advanced by some managers as reason for their inability and 
reticence to readily deploy incentives in the implementation conduit; as noted by one 
respondent, “…. so it’s difficult to implement the National Heritage Resources Act.” 
(Respondent #10). Implicit in this observation is the assumption that even if incentives were 
used, it would be difficult to quantify them in view of the fact that no costing exercise of the 
same has been done.  
Direct incentives such as Grants in Aid are contemplated and used by some managers in the 
public entities attached to the line function department responsible for heritage matters because 
a mandate for such action can be located by implementing managers in the relevant legislative 
framework. “O k. Eh, when it comes to heritage resources management, there, the legislation 
has a clause where we expected to provide financial incentives; not to individuals but to 
projects. Focusing on community projects.”(Respondent #9) There is a sense therefore in 
which managers tend to show a particular bias to legislation even in instances where incentives 
are contemplated. This presages that a regulatory instrument like legislation is construed to be 
the right context within which incentives are to be deployed. To this extent incentives in 
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heritage management in South Africa are used together with other policy instruments like 
legislation. 
Interestingly, this observation raises an important question in the light of what has been 
highlighted above as findings regarding the use of incentives in heritage management in South 
Africa. That is, if there is no evidence to the effect that mangers readily link incentives with 
policy development as mentioned above, how is it then that there are some instances where 
legislation is construed by some managers to mandate the use of inducements in certain 
circumstances? Evidence provided by data generated provides some tentative answers to this 
question. Data indicates that in the formulation of heritage policy at least during the transition 
in South Africa, those who were involved relied heavily on international best practice as a 
benchmark.  
Yet international trend is that ya, ………… so when we draft policies. It’s o k in 1994 
we relied on Canada and Australia on most of the policies; but now we are beginning 
to say, e, e, let us look at these policies. (Respondent #9)  
The observation of this Senior Manager linked to SAHRA gives an impression that the 
legislative framework crafted in the early days in the immediate post 1994 period in South 
Africa, took much of its cue from the global arena. This therefore presages that whatever 
incentives appeared in the content of the legislation taken as a benchmark in the process, were 
also transplanted to the South African context. Far from being the innovation of South African 
heritage managers, the inclusion of incentives in the legislative framework could well be as a 
result of international best practice emulated from countries with fairly advanced heritage 
management models cited by the manager in question.  
Coupled with that it can also be indicated that another possible answer to this vexing question 
could well be the tendency to outsource to consultants the drafting of policies as the same 
manager cited above observed. Having realised a gap caused by the fact that SAHRA did not 
have a policy or guidelines which inform the entity on how to go about consulting with 
communities when policy positions are mooted, the said manager observed as follows. 
But we don’t necessarily have a policy, it’s just a legal framework; but the policy, no 
there is no policy. Ya, we struggling, and that policy let me just say, we have a biggest 
challenge on policy guidelines when it comes to public participation. How do you…, 
when do you say that now we have consulted. And as a result, internally we are 
struggling and we want to get somebody from outside to draft a policy for us as to how. 
And also the whole confusion of …  should this be  a policy, must it be regulations, must 
it be guidelines? Ya. Into ezino-Professor Cloete49 lezi. I-Policy.50(Respondent #9) 
The task of developing policies and deciding whether it is in fact the guidelines or regulations 
that are required to deal with the identified policy gap is understood by this manager as beyond 
                                                 
49 Professor Fannie Cloete is a South African policy scholar who has had very wide experience in the field both 
as a consultant and as a university lecturer.  
50 The observation “Ya. Into ezino-Professor Cloete lezi. I-Policy.” Loosely translated would read, “Yes these are 
the things which can only be done by people like Professor Cloete. 
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the competence of ordinary public managers like him within the organisation, and the relevant 
managers in the line function department to which the entity is linked. To this extent he regards 
this as a highly technical task requiring the competence of individuals like Professor Cloete. 
6.7.2.5 Incentives are used by managers as part of a multi-pronged strategy 
Evidence indicates that when managers make use of incentives as policy instruments, they are 
used together with other tools of governance for effective implementation.  Of particular 
significance in this regard is the combination of incentives with authoritative regulatory 
instruments like enacted legislation in the form of acts of parliament and white papers. The 
latter in particular is considered as providing the framework par excellence for heritage policy 
implementation because within the national Department of Arts and Culture in particular, 
senior managers conceive of their responsibility as that of “… working within a policy 
environment eh… ey-White paper for instance, which was promulgated in 1996 which made 
specific recommendations…” (Respondent #3)  The deployment of incentives within a 
regulatory legislative framework is also attested to by the manager from SAHRA when 
contemplating the mandate to use inducements as prescribed by law. (Respondent #9) The 
deployment of incentives is contemplated within the environment of heritage legislation as 
though inducements were to be used within such a context. In a sense legislation prescribes 
that only communities and not individuals should be induced and supported by incentives.  
6.7.3 WHICH ACTORS ARE TARGETED BY INCENTIVES IN THE POLICY 
PROCESS? 
Data generated by the study indicates that a variety of actors are targeted by incentives used by 
public managers in South African public service to encourage participation in the 
implementation of heritage policies. They are as follows:-  
Public Actors 
 MEC’s and District Mayors 
 Provincial Departments responsible for Arts and Culture 
 Schools and universities 
Private Actors 
 Organic intellectuals  
 Conventional academics 
 Students 
 Rural women 
 Experts with scarce kills required  
 Private companies 
 Artists 
 Informers on the ground 
 Private owners of heritage property 




 Local bearer communities where resources are embedded 
 Religious communities regarded as holders of heritage of a special kind  
 Communities of practice 
 Community Based Organisations  
 
 
Figure 6(i): Deployment of incentives 
In essence, out of the seventeen types of actors generally targeted by incentives in the post 
1994 South African public sector 3 (i.e. 17.65%) are coming directly from the sector itself; 10 
(i.e. 58.82%) are private actors; whereas 4 (i.e. 23.53%) are communities. One of the 
indications this state of affairs gives is that where incentives are used to induce participation in 
heritage management, heritage managers in the post 1994 South African public service evince 
a characteristic bias towards using private actors; thus demonstrating a salient feature of the 
New Public Management (NPM) paradigm. Most of the incentives deployed in this category 
of targeted actors are direct financial inducements of one kind or the other.  
6.8 CONCLUSION 
The chapter began with an abridged profile of each of the respondents interviewed for purposes 
of generating enough data to be analysed in this study. Subsequently data received from the 
interrogation of these case studies was duly analysed and brought about certain critical 
findings. Heritage managers in the sector do not readily link incentives to heritage policy and 
for that reason there is no evidence to the effect that efforts are made by these managers to 
choose relevant incentives during the development of relevant policies as instruments intended 
to assist the implementation of adopted policy positions. Immediate recourse to the use of 
Public Actors Private Actors Communities






















Constellations of policy actors induced by incentives to participate
Actors targeted by incentives in the post 1994 South African heritage management model
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incentives emerges during the actual programming of such policies into specific initiatives; 
thus indicating the adoption of such instruments by default prompted by the challenges faced 
at project initiation and beyond. While at project initiation incentives adopted are largely 
induced by the fact that South Africa is a developing country and dominates the discourse other 
incentives come in handy post project initiation. They included intangible incentives as well as 
inducements directly deployed to encourage participation. It was also discovered that 
incentives of whatever kind used by public managers in the sector were deployed as part of a 
multi-pronged strategy aimed at facilitating participation from a variety of stakeholders in the 
policy implementation conduit. There were also specific unintended consequences understood 
by managers as resulting directly from the use of incentives.  Ultimately the analysis concluded 
with a discussion of the findings and the interpretation thereof which provided three answers 
to the composite aspects of the primary objective of this inquiry regarding the types of 
incentives used, the modus operandi applicable in their deployment and usage, as well as the 





















          CHAPTER 7 
      CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous section of this dissertation presented the findings based on the analysis of data 
gathered from ten case studies, consisting of managers in the heritage sector of the South 
African public service. The current chapter presents critical conclusions and recommendations 
based on the analysis of the said data, and the answers such information provided to the primary 
research objective in particular; namely, “What type of incentives do public sector managers 
in the post 1994 South Africa use when implementing heritage policy interventions?” The 
chapter begins with the overall conclusion that in the case of South Africa as a developing 
country, incentives are critical for maximum participation in the entire heritage policy process. 
Subsequently, subsidiary conclusions aimed at elaborating on, as well as buttressing and 
nuancing the principal conclusion are made followed by pertinent recommendations. Lastly 
conclusions are made based on the foregoing.         
7.2 PUNCTUATING THE ENTIRE POLICY PROCESS WITH INCENTIVES 
The analysis of data in the previous chapter has led to a conclusion that the deployment of 
incentives, although currently adopted by default compelled by exigencies of public policy 
implementation, is a phenomenon that should characterise the entire process from policy design 
to evaluation. In a sense, incentives as policy instruments, should be a preoccupation of policy 
makers right at the design phase of the policy process where decisions regarding the appropriate 
choices are made; and this inevitably leads to such inducements deployed throughout the 
heritage policy process in the post 1994 South African public sector in order to ensure a 
sustained participation from relevant actors in the policy implementation conduit. This 
becomes even more relevant if one takes particular cognisance of the fact that the majority of 
people from whom maximum participation is solicited in the post 1994 South Africa, were 
previously systematically marginalised from relevant policy process as a result of both 
colonialism and apartheid. 
To this extent a wide spectrum of inducements are available to the heritage manager as 
indicated by the said data. Intangible and value oriented incentives such as recognition and 
promotion of health values inherent in African Traditional Cuisines, as well as potential for 
political mileage, are some of the incentives indicating that the scope of incentives in this 
category of inducements is wide for a creative manager who understands the values of the 
targeted community. Apart  from such intrinsic latent values existing as it were in some form 
in the loci of heritage policy implementation, other extraneous inducements in the form of such 
phenomena as substantive direct financial incentives and indirect incentives often relevant to a 
developing country like South Africa are of interest as heritage policy is implemented.  
The South African heritage sector has quite an array of actors whose participation in various 
policy initiatives needs to be solicited. Consequently, the choice and design of specific 
incentives currently used to elicit positive responses from such actors includes inducements 
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clearly designed to entice public and private actors as well as communities in general. Private 
actors constitute a larger portion of the constellation of actors whose participation is sought in 
the heritage policy implementation arena, and this in itself should inform decisions that are 
made about the right incentives to be deployed on this particular front. 
While data generated and analysed provides adequate indication regarding the deployment of 
relevant incentives at project initiation and shortly thereafter; there is no evidence generated 
from the same lending some credence to the use of incentives at the evaluation phase of the 
policy process. This is a critical gap signifying on the one hand, that once policy outputs have 
been delivered, not much practical thought and effort is expended by managers to evaluate the 
relevant processes and the worth of such policy programmes (i.e. programme evaluation) in so 
far as their impact on recipient communities is concerned. The gap also indicates that there 
aren’t enough comprehensive systematic attempts made in the heritage sector to evaluate the 
actual content of policies and their impacts (i.e. policy evaluation). The overall conclusion that 
inducements need to be deployed in the entire heritage policy process in South Africa 
presupposes that policy physicians concerned have the necessary skills to meet the rigours of 
policy analysis in order to make this a reality; and this realisation-cum-deduction inevitably 
leads to the following conclusion. 
7.3 A LACK OF ADEQUATE POLICY ANALYSIS SKILLS  
South Africa is a developing country; and for this reason it is still characterised by a chronic 
shortage of public policy analysis skills among its junior and senior management cadre. 
Consequently, the data generated and analysed in this study bears witness to this shortage of 
requisite skills among heritage managers in the South African public sector. While it is true 
that the current inquiry focused its attention exclusively on public managers within the heritage 
fraternity of the public service, there is enough scope for extrapolating the findings to all the 
different sections of the sector. It would seem that heritage managers are not unique in this 
regard; on the contrary, they are a microcosm, a sample indicating the state of affairs in the 
entire public service of the young democracy.  
Incentives belong to this category of phenomena classified in policy studies as policy 
instruments or governing tools. Policy instruments are by definition the techniques through 
which a state seeks to attain its goals; and are in that sense a subject of great deliberation 
throughout the entire policy process, but more so at the policy design stage of the development 
(Howlett, 2011:22). The inability to immediately see the link between incentives and policy, 
as well as the relevance of such inducements for the ultimate implementation of the chosen 
policy alternative, indicates that while public policy making is to a large extent the 
responsibility of managers in the bureaucracy, the latter are ill equipped to deal with intricacies 
involved in the design of policies where different policy instruments will have to be chosen to 
assist and shape implementation. This lack of policy skills at the critical stage of the policy 
process indicates that those who are entrusted with the implementation of government policy 
are not armed with the necessary tools to govern. Given this scenario therefore it would seem 
that the lack of relevant policy skills inevitably has the propensity to impact negatively on 
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service delivery, simply because those who are entrusted with responsibility to govern, lack 
the relevant technical skills of state craft.  
The mechanistic approach to policy that is sometimes shown by managers as data indicates, 
coupled with a somewhat lopsided emphasis placed on regulatory policy instruments in the 
design of policy is indicative of a number of critical phenomena in relation to governance. In 
the first instance, the choice of appropriate policy instruments has the tendency to reveal the 
relationship that those who govern have with the governed. The top-down mechanistic 
approach therefore gives an impression that not much effort is expended by policy designers 
to critically think about empowering those targeted by policy, so that there is a bottom up 
movement initiated, a phenomenon which augers well for ultimate implementation. A 
conscious attempt to deploy appropriate incentives at the policy design stage of the process 
would be a clear indication that incentives are not an afterthought, and that a bottom up 
movement is entrenched right from the initial stages of the process to the end.  
Secondly, the bias towards the use of authoritative regulatory instruments (sticks) at the 
expense of ‘carrots’ which is somewhat implicit at the earlier stages of the policy processes as 
revealed by the analysed data, is also a clear indication of an interesting phenomenon in public 
policy analysis. One of the reasons why such instruments may be preferred by managers may 
be the ease with which such governing tools are created and used; and not necessarily their 
effectiveness. The fact that South Africa is a developing country with scarce resources 
presupposes that there is a great possibility that authoritative regulatory policy instruments will 
be used much more frequently in the expression of policy and implementation thereof because 
they are comparatively speaking, cheap to deploy and use. The report of the Australian National 
Incentives Taskforce of the Environmental Protection and Heritage Council puts it rather aptly 
when it observes that, 
In an environment with limited resources, regulation may appear attractive because it 
appears relatively ‘cost free’. Government can simply ‘require someone to do 
something’. That may be the reason that regulation has traditionally been the 
predominant conservation tool in some countries, including Australia.  (EPHC, 2004:3) 
There is also a sense in which the choice of instruments at the policy design phase of the process 
is dependent on the managers’ skills in the art of agenda setting. One of the primary 
responsibilities of heritage managers as policy physicians is to carefully structure the social 
problem for which a policy is desired, so that the appropriate governing tools are selected 
during the policy development stage of the process. There is a sense in which this structuring 
of the challenge identified during agenda setting, informs the content of policy, and how it has 
to be implemented. For example, if a social problem identified is structured by relevant 
managers as a need, it will be of dire necessity that heritage managers begin to determine the 
type of instrument that will be required to effect and implement the mooted policy position. 
There will definitely be instances where such a structuring is likely to indicate to managers that 
in order to solicit maximum participation in the implementation of relevant policy programmes, 
a specific type of incentives will inevitably come in handy; and thus necessitate the inclusion 
of such instruments in the set of governing tools contemplated for that purpose right at the 
164 
  
initial stages of the policy process. The lack of policy analysis skills therefore among heritage 
managers in the South African public service indicates that the choice of tools during policy 
design is often limited to authoritative regulatory policy instruments usually devoid of any 
consideration of meaningful incentives to induce targeted actors to desired action.   
7.4 ABILITY OT USE ONE’S IMAGINATION AND CREATIVITY IN THE CHOICE 
AND DESIGN OF INCENTIVES 
Data analysis has provided evidence that while it is true that the choice of incentives and the 
deployment thereof as policy instruments, is to a large extent a  technical undertaking that 
requires skills in policy agenda setting and policy design in particular, it is also equally evident 
that there is a  wide scope of incentives that can be considered as policy instruments to assist 
heritage policy implementation; and that a number of options and choices are available in this 
regard, depending among others, on the unlimited imagination and creativity of the policy 
physician in question.  It is precisely this ability among managers to conjure up mental images 
and create them which has informed the emergence of many an incentives used by managers 
identified by this study.  
An inventory of incentives adopted by managers in the South African heritage sector although 
the majority of which have not been contemplated and rationalised at the policy design stage, 
lends credence to this conclusion that the choices available largely depend on the analyst’s 
imagination and creativity. The following categorisation of incentives used bolsters this 
conclusion:-  
Economic incentives 
 Permanent and temporary jobs 
 Local plants processing indigenous food stuffs  
 Local plants manufacturing indigenous clothes 
 Emergence of local cultural tourism 
 Opportunities created for local private sector business entities 
 Market creation for traditional food stuffs in major supermarkets 
 Provision of the requisite technical assistance to actors 
 Relaxation of stringent supply chain procedures in the acquisition of goods and services 
among traditional communities 
 Appropriate rates for remunerating organic intellectuals for their services 
 Standardisation of indigenous foods by the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) 
Direct Financial Incentives 
 Stipends provided to learners 
 Financial incentives provided to private companies 
 Provision of financial incentives to universities 
 Providing financial incentives to community projects 
 Provision of honoraria to holders of scarce heritage skills 
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 Rewarding informers of potential heritage crime 
 Grants in Aid 
 Buying off private potential buyers of heritage artefacts about to leave the shores of the 
country to foreign lands 
 Cascading of financial resources to the local sphere of government 
Social benefits  
 Enhancement of the local knowledge economy through memory institutions (e.g. 
museums) 
 Dissemination of information through booklets to promote traditional foods and clothes 
 Platform for religious expression 
 Provision of platform to organic intellectuals 
 Leveraging a sense of pride among communities 
 Heritage as a terra firma for engaging with the socio-political reality 
 Provision of political mileage 
 Formal accreditation (certification) of  holders of indigenous knowledge  
 Recognition and promotion 
 
Figure 7(i): Distribution of heritage incentives 
 
 
The fact that some of these incentives are currently being mooted by managers (e.g. local 
industrial plants to be engaged in the processing of traditional food stuffs), is yet another 
demonstration indicating that with creative managers, there are unlimited options for choosing 










relevant participation from communities (36%) consists of economic incentives. Of particular 
note is the fact that evidence provided by data analysis does not indicate that these incentives 
have in some way been contemplated and adopted as a result of rigorous agenda setting prior 
to design; and as a matter of consequence none of them were adopted at the policy formulation 
stage of the policy process. If anything, they were all adopted by default when heritage 
managers were faced with the complexities and exigencies of project initiation and 
programming for implementation during the subsequent phases of the policy cycle as indicated 
by data analysis. In a sense, they all owe their ultimate origins in the imagination and creative 
capacity of implementing managers.  
This conclusion is further reinforced by the remaining two categories of incentives used. Out 
of the 9 types of incentives (i.e. 32%) deployed as direct financial incentives, only two (i.e. 
provision of financial incentives to community projects and Grants in Aid) are in some way 
mandated by some form of legislation, thus giving an indication that they were to some extent 
chosen and adopted at the policy design phase of the policy process as data indicates. However, 
if the observation that most of the policies and instruments of the transition period in the new 
democracy were to a large extent the result of benchmarking on international best practice and 
to an extent the product of consultants, it will be difficult to credit South African post 1994 
managers with the kind of resourcefulness and creativity advocated here even in the existence 
of these pre-meditated governing tools. The majority of these types of incentives (i.e.77.8%) 
originate from the genius and the imagination of implementing managers in the public service. 
Out of the nine types of incentives in whose deployment by managers accrue specific social 
benefits, only one (i.e. the enhancement of the local knowledge economy through memory 
institutions), might account for incentives intentionally planned at the policy design phase of 
the process. Consequently, it would seem that out of the twenty eight types of incentives 
adopted and used by heritage managers in the post 1994 heritage management in South Africa, 
only three (10.7%), which is approximately a third, bear some semblance of having been 
contemplated at policy design phase, and can claim some amount of legitimacy from 
legislation.  
7.5 DEPLOYMENT OF INCENTIVES AND MANAGEMENT PARADIGMS 
Specific conclusions can be made with regard to the deployment of incentives in the policy 
process and the characteristic paradigms of public management currently in vogue. Careful 
consideration will have to be made with regard to such management approaches as managing 
for outcomes (i.e. Result Based Management), Total Quality Management (TQM), as well as 
Network Management. 
7.5.1 INCENTIVES AND MANAGING FOR OUTCOMES  
There is evidence that heritage managers in the post 1994 South African public service by 
default adopt certain types of incentives when introducing policy programmes in targeted 
communities. The deployment of such inducements is motivated by the complexities involved 
when wanting to gain entry into communities and solicit timeous buy in for new initiatives. To 
this extent, the type of incentives used at this phase of the policy process are shaped by the 
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contextual realities of South Africa as a developing country. Job opportunities which will 
accrue to the introduction of the project to a targeted community are understood by managers 
to be one of the incentives par excellence which dominate the discourse at this stage.  
Such a sudden change of paradigm exhibited by this new interest in incentives as policy 
instruments used at the project initiation phase of the policy process, present policy analysis 
with useful information. On the one hand, it is a clear indication that the deployment of 
incentives in the South African heritage sector should straddle through the entire policy 
process; and that the type of incentives used in the said process should be decided upon at the 
design phase, bearing in mind the exigencies and complexities that will be encountered during 
project initiation, implementation and evaluation. Evidently, incentives used by managers at 
the project initiation stage of the policy process are primarily intended to initiate relevant policy 
programmes in societies. On the other hand, the observation by heritage managers that 
consultation to lobby support from communities when projects are introduced is lopsided and 
often done at the expense of participation throughout the policy implementation process is 
characteristic of a focus on managing for compliance and outputs. The fact that the language 
of beneficiation is often used when such projects are introduced and, according to managers in 
the field, and that soon after the support for the introduction of projects has been attained, the 
entire process becomes totally bureaucratic, demonstrates that managers are much more 
concerned with issues of compliance and meeting targets specified in the strategic documents 
of implementing departments. In this sense, management processes engaged in to solicit buy 
in from communities and other actors in the implementation conduit, are concerned with 
compliance with specific performance indicators the attainment of which inevitably leads to 
the realisation of planned outputs.   
The characteristic exclusive emphasis on the delivery of outputs and the concomitant managing 
for compliance encourages the lopsided focus on lobbying communities for clearance at the 
expense of continuous meaningful participation in heritage policy implementation endeavours. 
This gives rise to a need to seek to design and deploy incentives within a new management 
paradigm, which is the managing for outcomes approach to public management; often dubbed 
the Result Based Management approach (RBM). Changing the paradigm from managing 
strictly for compliance to managing for results will equally focus attention on the realisable 
impacts which specific outputs bring about as heritage interventions are implemented. It is in 
this context where incentives decided upon at the design phase of the policy journey will be 
monitored and evaluated for effectiveness. In a sense, the conclusion made in this regard is that 
where incentives are deployed in the entire policy process, their choice and relative 
effectiveness will be understood and gauged in the context of a result based approach to the 
management of policy programmes.  
While outputs are not the ultimate goal of policy interventions, they are nonetheless important 
in the realisation of immediate, intermediate and ultimate policy outcomes. This therefore 
presupposes that the realisation of quality outputs is a prerequisite for the attainment of quality 
outcomes. Evidently, there are characteristic causal linkages existing between delivered 
outputs on the one hand, and outcomes on the other. Such a deduction therefore inevitably leads 
to yet another sub-conclusion that can be made based on the basis of data presented and 
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analysed in the previous chapter. That is, if the quality of outputs delivered has the potential to 
influence the quality of resultant impacts realised, then there is enough reason to deduce that 
managing the policy process for total quality (i.e. Total Quality Management (TQM) becomes 
an important function of the manager concerned. The primary concern of Total Quality 
Management is among others, the characteristic focus “on the quality of all the processes that 
lead to final product or service.”(Grobler, Warnich, Carrell, Elbert and Hatfield,  2002:114). 
Incentives are policy instruments used to generate adequate participation in the policy process, 
thus improving not only the realisation of quality outputs in the form of both goods and 
services; but the deployment of incentives throughout the policy process will inevitably 
improve participation and by implication the production of quality outputs and ultimate policy 
outcomes. In a sense the entire causal chain from policy design to evaluation will be managed 
for total quality to ensure the ultimate quality impact. 
7.6 KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION AND INTANGIBLE INCENTIVES 
There is a clear indication in the analysis of data that managers, although mainly by default, 
still employ the use of various types of incentives to enhance participation in the 
implementation of policy projects, long after they have been initiated in communities. This 
presupposes that at the design stage of the process, policymakers should expend a great deal of 
effort deliberating, interrogating and finally choosing relevant incentives that will be deployed 
in the various stages of policy with the aim of eventually realising the intended policy 
outcomes.  
In the first instance, data analysis has revealed that managers in the post 1994 South African 
public service often leverage specific values of previously marginalised communities and use 
them as incentives to engender effective participation from actors. The policy process itself is 
a value laden undertaking. This therefore indicates that it is of utmost importance that heritage 
managers should be conversant with basic values which inform targeted communities and 
actors in a given policy environment so that they stand a better chance at making use of such 
phenomena and leveraging them as incentives to elicit the required participation even from 
previously marginalised groups.  This will be yet another set of governing tools whose 
leveraging will ensure that the required bottom-up movement in the policy process is 
engendered. The assumed conversancy with such values will enable the manager in question 
to give them the required recognition and promote them as incentives. This is of utmost 
importance in a context where the management of living heritage like performing arts, social 
practices, rituals and indigenous knowledge systems of previously supressed groups was 
marginalised and often discouraged under previous regimes. Recognition and promotion of 
values will also ensure that heritage managers create space for organic intellectuals to play a 
measure role in providing the necessary knowledge as a policy subsystem, in the development 
of policy positions and the subsequent phases of the process.  
Therefore, insisting on the inclusion of values as incentives to induce participation particularly 
among previously marginalised indigenous communities also means that managers involved in 
the policy process may need to undertake a shift of paradigm in the way they approach the 
phenomenon of knowledge reception. The dominance of positivism as a mode of acquiring 
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knowledge will have to be supplanted by a view which seeks to include other knowledge 
systems where scientific objectivity is not the only way of knowing legitimised. To this extent 
values classified as intangible will also play a role in endeavours aimed at incentivising 
participation from traditional communities where intangible heritage is deeply embedded.  
7.7 INCENTIVES USED AS PART OF A MULTI-PRONGED STRATEGY 
Data analysis has given a strong indication that when incentives as policy instruments intended 
to express policy are used, they are deployed as part of a multi-pronged strategy which includes 
the use of other governing tools in the mix. This has been attested to by managers who affirmed 
that the fact that South Africa is a developing country makes it imperative that managers do 
not use a single approach in their policy implementation endeavours. While regulatory 
instruments are relied upon for effective implementation, the use of incentives is also regarded 
as part of the multi-pronged strategy employed in the management of policy plans and 
programmes. This therefore indicates that a reductionist approach to the use of incentives in 
heritage policy implementation is not suitable for post 1994 South Africa. On the contrary, 
incentives will function optimally when they are used in conjunction with other instruments to 
effect the desired changes in the unacceptable social challenge identified as requiring a solution 
of sorts.  
The bias towards authority based regulatory policy instruments like legislation, characteristic 
of the top down approach to the policy process demonstrated earlier in the policy development 
phase by respondents, is important for this study. The change of paradigm experienced by 
heritage managers from project initiation onwards, and the concomitant recourse to the use of 
incentives to elicit participation from actors is an indication that South African heritage 
managers in the post 1994 era are persuaded that incentives as policy instruments can be 
effectively deployed when they are part of a composite multi-pronged strategy to engender 
effective policy implementation. As Levitt (1980:167) observes, that different policy 
instruments express policy differently; and this is one of the reasons why they are used in a 
combination. To this extent, the complexities associated with public policy programming create 
space for supplementing authority based governance tools with the language of beneficiation 
as an incentive to elicit proper responses and align the behaviour of targeted actors with the 
goals of the policy. This suggests that incentives should be used in such a way that they are in 
concert with authority based instruments to effect the desired change of behaviour. In a sense, 
the exigencies of policy programming and implementation accentuate the limits of authority in 
engendering effective implementation and thus create space and opportunity to explore other 
relevant policy tools and management strategies like incentives. This phenomenon is clearly 
demonstrated where managers are confronted with the complexities of implementation and as 
a result begin to consider the deployment of incentives as a supplementary strategy in policy 
implementation.  
The study is premised on the assumption that there is a need to change from an exclusive usage 
of ‘sticks’ in soliciting compliance and alignment with policy goals during implementation to 
a model which also considers the deployment of ‘carrots’ to ensure maximum participation. 
The important contribution made by this study in this regard is that approaches to policy 
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implementation should not adopt a reductionist view with regard to the deployment of 
inducements in the policy process. To this extent, there is space for both ‘sticks’ in the form of 
authoritative regulatory policy instruments such as legislation; as well as ‘carrots’ in the form 
of specific inducements. While an overreliance on authoritative policy instruments has its 
limitations in soliciting maximum participation from the constellation of actors in the 
implementation conduit, they should still be part of the mixture of tools of governing used to 
align the behaviour of targeted actors.  
The combination of top-down and bottom up approaches creates space for the deployment of 
incentives as governance tools aimed at maximising policy implementation. That is, while the 
authoritative top-down dimension provides legitimacy to the policy process by according 
power to manipulate the policy process to actors accountable to voters in the exercise of such 
power, its combination with specific inducements as policy tools in particular, ensures that 
there is also an upward movement entrenched by the deployment of incentives spurring 
communities and the grassroots actors to relevant action. This presages that such critical 
phenomena as the decentralisation of power in the unfolding of the policy process, occurs in 
the context of a legitimately exercised central control as critics of the bottom up approach often 
argue. That is, the combination of authoritative regulatory instruments and incentives will 
ensure that a reductionist use of inducements does not necessarily equate to an overemphasis 
of local autonomy. If one recommends that the top-down authoritative approach to the policy 
process be maintained together with attempts to induce an upward movement by way of 
deploying incentives, is one simultaneously recommending that the mechanistic view of policy 
implementation needs to remain intact. The answer to this question is to the contrary. The 
mechanistic view of public policy implementation virtually understands the policy process as 
a close system not necessarily impacted by extraneous factors to determine its efficacy and 
effectiveness. The deployment of incentives challenges the view that policy implementation is 
a bureaucratic process devoid of external stimuli of sort. To this extent the failures of policy 
implementation are not attributable exclusively to management as critics of the top-down 
approach would legitimately observe. The retaining of the authoritative top-down dimension 
in the policy process is maintained first to ensure that a multi-pronged approach to the 
deployment of governing tools is made possible, thus avoiding reductionist tendencies in this 
regard; while at the same time it seeks to ensure that the policy action in question is still 
construed as government action, which is of utmost importance in a democratic setting. In a 
sense, while the authoritative top-down dimension movement is preserved, there are no 
intentions of regarding the process as wholly mechanistic as the position was in the first 
generation paradigm of public policy implementation.  
Although the synthesising tradition advocated by scholars in response to the bottom-up and 
top-down approaches to policy implementation cannot be regarded as a complete theory, there 
are some deductions that can be made from the foregoing as implications for this approach to 
the synthesis of the two paradigms. Elmore can be classified as belonging to that category of 
synthesisers who, in their attempts to combine the bottom-up and top down approaches to 
implementation, seek to create a single model of policy implementation. The conclusion of this 
thesis that the use of incentives is not advocated from a reductionist perspective has important 
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implications for the synthesising tradition as espoused by Elmore. The deduction creates space 
for the deployment of the command and control deployment of policy tools as well as 
incentives to initiate the bottom up movement in the policy process. This presages that while 
policy makers explore the type of incentives in particular that can come in handy in the 
implementation of policy at each stage of the implementation conduit, they should also seek to 
consider an aspect of backward mapping suggested by Elmore which will in essence seek to 
inform them about the most appropriate incentive structure that is likely to impact positively 
in changing the behaviour of targets and aligning it with policy goals. In a sense, the design 
and deployment of incentives together with other relevant policy tools should be informed and 
shaped by the considerations of both forward and backward mapping as Elmore suggested in 
his synthesising tradition, where the design and deployment of incentives inform both the 
authoritative forward movement characterising forward mapping, as well as backward 
mapping which takes seriously the targets of policy “… thus maximizing discretion at the point 
where the problem is most immediate.” (Elmore, 1979-1980:605)  
In the face of such evidence therefore, it can be concluded that legislation is an important part 
of the mixture of policy instruments which must be considered when incentives are 
contemplated for use as governing tools in the policy process. This conclusion has far reaching 
implications. That is, the inclusion of legislation in the mix will ensure that incentives chosen 
and deployed are clearly regulated in keeping with pertinent legislation. In an environment 
where corruption has the propensity to threaten effective service delivery, it becomes 
imperative that incentives deployed are mandated by legislation and the deployment guided by 
relevant regulations.  
7.8 POTENTIAL TO CAUSE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
There is a long established tradition in the social sciences that purposive action has the potential 
for generating unintended consequences (Merton 1936:894). Policy interventions are by no 
means an exception to this rule; and the analysis of data in the previous section of the 
dissertation has borne some witness to this characteristic phenomenon. The turning of heritage 
resources into commercial commodities in the process of deploying inducements is regarded 
by some as responsible for diminishing the value of heritage; and preserving it for heritage’s 
sake. The possibility of creating a dependency syndrome among communities and the potential 
for eradicating civil action, as well as the division that exists as a result of deploying experts to 
provide the scarce skills required for the effective protection and preservation of resources, 
express a concern among managers that there could well be unwanted consequences arising as 
a result of deploying and using incentives.  
Therefore, while the use of incentives to solicit buy-in and thus bring about effective 
implementation of policy interventions is required in the South African policy environment; it 
is also equally true that as purposive action, the use of incentives can give rise to a further 
challenge of creating unwanted consequences. This is a potential risk that must be managed in 
the policy process to prevent implementation failure as will be demonstrated in the relevant 
recommendations below.  
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7.9 ALIGNING INCENTIVES WITH INTERESTS OF ACTORS IN THE POLICY 
NETWORK 
According to Klijn and Koppenjan (2002:2), government is no longer the cockpit from which 
societies are governed; and for that reason policy processes are generally the product of an 
interplay between various actors in the public policy arena. According to these scholars this 
has been one primary impulse which led to the advent of Network Management in the evolution 
of management theory over time. The emergence of network management as a strategy for 
managing policy programmes and interventions implies that while there are many actors 
involved in the effective implementation of policy, government largely plays the role of 
managing the network of stakeholders involved. To this extent, the choice of incentives to be 
used when soliciting participation becomes even more complex because the identification and 
the attempt to respond to the interests and values of the constellation of actors in the policy 
process is no mean task. This becomes even more critical if one takes particular cognisance of 
the fact that the choice of policy instruments is itself a difficult undertaking fraught with many 
challenges. In this instance, it becomes imperative that in the context of heritage management 
in South Africa, the choice of incentives used is rationalised in accordance with the type of 
actors involved.  
Evidently, the analysis has clearly indicated that the constellation of actors in the heritage 
implementation conduit can be largely classified into three categories. Well over 50% (i.e. 10) 
of such actors are classified as private; and they comprise quite an array of actors consisting of 
individuals and groups from civil society. It would seem therefore that the majority of 
incentives deployed should seek to target these actors and the vexing question as to what type 
of inducements can be considered for this constellation; as well as how are they to be deployed 
and used are inevitably questions that need to be interrogated and proper decisions taken by 
managers at the policy design stage. The second largest category of actors (i.e.23.53%) 
comprises ordinary communities which include among others, bearer communities, religious 
communities, communities of practice as well as community based organisations (CBOs). The 
smallest number of actors (17.65%), who need to be induced somewhat in order to spur them 
to action and align their respective behaviour with policy goals belongs to the public sector. 
Decisions as to what incentives can be deployed in all these categories as well will have to be 
rationalised by managers involved. It is necessary that this category of incentives is discussed 
by policy physicians within the context of a sound intergovernmental relations for maximum 
impact.  
Consequently, what makes the task of choosing relevant, if appropriate incentives (i.e. policy 
instruments) even more complex, is the fact that other considerations apart from the type and 
nature of actors involved, also play a critical role. Such things as the definition and structuring 
of the problem requiring a policy intervention; the goals of the policy being mooted, and how 
these are going to be deployed, the values characteristic of targeted actors,  are all vexing 
questions that must be interrogated right at the design stage of the policy process. Adding to 
the complexity of the task of making the right choice of instruments, Hill (2009:178) observes 
that the determination of relevant policy instruments is not only dependant on such things as 




The findings arrived at as a result of data analysis in the previous chapter and the resultant 
conclusions deduced therefrom have indicated a number of recommendations that can be 
suggested to turn the current situation around, and enhance service delivery in the heritage 
sector in the post 1994 South African public service. 
7.10.1 RETHINKING HERITAGE POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Managers in the South African heritage policy sector will need to take particular cognisance of 
the fact that the much desired bottom-up movement needed to complement the traditional 
mechanistic top-down approach to the policy process, is to a large extent, a salient feature and 
innovation of the democratic dispensation; and as a matter of consequence, various 
inducements will be needed to motivate particularly those sections of the South African society 
whose participation was systematically marginalised and discouraged by previous regimes. 
The top-down approach to policy demonstrated a particular approach to governance 
characteristic of previous dispensations in the South African context. The exclusive use of 
authoritative and mechanistic top down approaches to the policy process was a characteristic 
feature of South African models of governance for centuries. This has been clearly 
demonstrated earlier in this dissertation where an attempt was made to account for the nature 
of policy making processes during the colonial era as well as during apartheid. In order to turn 
the current situation around and ensure that there is an effective and efficient delivery of 
services in the sector, Government in South Africa has to rethink its approach to heritage policy 
development processes.  A radical shift in the policy process is needed in the sense that, among 
other things, managers in the industry should insist and even invest their imaginative and 
creative abilities to choosing relevant incentives right at the initial stages of the process. This 
will ensure that incentives are not adopted by default during the subsequent phase of the policy 
process. In point of fact, the current approach in the deployment of incentives which begins at 
project initiation is devoid of any attempts made by the relevant managers to align such choices 
with the goals of policy and other pertinent considerations which should be the subject of the 
policy design phase of the process. Where the choice of incentives as appropriate governing 
tools is done at the policy design stage, such a choice will have benefited enormously from the 
rigours of policy agenda setting and related activities which seek to enrich the policy process 
as it unfolds.  
The recommendation to rethink heritage policy development in the South African public sector 
will mean among others, that incentives are deployed in the entire policy process; and the fact 
that such deliberations are engaged in at the design phase will also mean that appropriate 
inducements are deployed at every stage of the process to enhance effective community 
participation. This among other things will ensure that the current practice of using specific 
incentives at project initiation as well as in subsequent phases is a pre-implementation 
consideration. In this way government will then deal decisively with the criticism levelled that 
public managers in the post 1994 South Africa only think about inducing participation at 
project initiation as a result of complexities germane to implementation, and that subsequent 
to that the process thereafter becomes completely bureaucratic, and devoid of any meaningful 
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bottom-up movement. It has emerged in the analysis of data, that there is a sense in which the 
deployment of incentives in the policy process is understood by some managers as an act of 
empowerment to enable meaningful active participation in the policy process. The choice of 
relevant incentives engaged in at the design phase therefore will ensure that throughout the 
process, actors are empowered to participate, thus adding the required quality to each phase of 
the policy journey; and by implication enhancing the quality of policy outputs and their 
respective impacts.  
While different types of incentives are to be considered by heritage managers, it is also of dire 
necessity that every precaution is taken not to adopt a reductionist approach in the deployment 
of instruments at the design phase of the process. Deliberate attempts should be made to deploy 
incentives only as an important element of a multi-pronged strategy where other governing 
tools like regulatory policy instruments are also considered a critical part of the mix. Adopting 
a non-reductionist stance in the choice and deployment of policy instruments will also assist in 
minimising the risk associated with corruption in the deployment of direct financial incentives. 
The list of inducements that can be considered at this stage of the policy process is endless and 
will inevitably include quite a variety of both tangible and intangible inducements leveraged to 
align the behaviour of actors with specific policy goals. The targets of such incentives should 
include public actors, private actors as well as communities. 
Rethinking the heritage policy process would also mean that concrete steps are taken by 
managers to deploy and use incentives beyond implementation. This presages that inducements 
aimed at enhancing the quality of evaluations are also an important consideration and a brief 
of policy physicians in the heritage sector of the South African public service. It can be argued 
that the recommendation to deploy and use certain types of incentives at the evaluation stage 
of the policy process is among other things caused by the fact that South Africa is a relatively 
new democracy comprising of a majority of people who were previously systematically 
marginalised from critical decision making. It will therefore be important that every effort is 
expended to induce them to effective participation even at this stage, and thus enrich the policy 
process. This is even made more important by the fact that in some instances communities are 
often plagued by a characteristic apathy when it comes to involvement in relevant government 
policy processes.  
Evaluations of policy programmes in particular are often conducted for a variety of purposes. 
Even a cursory look at some of the paradigms of evaluation would give an indication that the 
bottom up movement is still of relevance at this phase of the policy process for effective 
programme evaluation; and to this extent appropriate incentives would need to be deployed to 
generate the said movement. In order to illustrate this, two examples are going to be cited which 
underlie the relevance of ensuring participation of actors in the evaluation of policies and policy 
interventions; and by implication the relevance of incentives in the process. The first example 
deals with the reason why policy and programme assessments are conducted in the first place; 




7.10.1.1 INCENTIVES AND SUMMATIVE EVALUATION 
Part of the reason why summative evaluation is conducted is to ascertain whether policies and 
policy programmes have indeed reached the intended beneficiaries and have produced the 
desired results (Rabie and Cloete, 2011:200). For this reason, it is difficult to think of any 
effective summative evaluation without meaningful participation of targeted beneficiaries who 
will to a large extent provide the relevant primary data for judging the worth of a given 
initiative. To this extent space for appropriate incentives to engender the much desired bottom-
up movement in the process must be created to elicit the right responses from such actors. This 
therefore places a heavy responsibility on policy physicians during the policy design phase of 
the process to be both creative and imaginative in choosing inducements that will come in 
handy when programmes and policies are eventually evaluated for their effectiveness and 
impact. 
7.10.1.2 EMPOWEREMENT EVALUATION AND THE ROLE OF INCENTIVES 
The second example of an evaluation whose nature presupposes maximum participation from 
targeted actors and beneficiaries in the policy process is empowerment evaluation. The latter 
as a type of assessment that has a strong developmental orientation. “It is designed to help 
people help themselves and to improve their programs using a form of self-evaluation and 
refection.” (Fetterman, 2004:1065) This type of evaluation therefore seeks to empower 
participants including consumers, clients and staff members to conduct their own evaluations 
with the help of an outside evaluator whose particular brief is to be coach and facilitator of the 
entire process.  
Three steps are involved in empowerment evaluation and include participants in the process 
defining their mission as their first task while facilitated by an outside evaluator.  The second 
step involves taking stock of what has happened by identifying and listing what they regard as 
the most important features and activities associated with the initiative. Participants then rate 
themselves as to how well they think they have performed each activity identified, which opens 
space for discussion among them (Fetterman, 2004:1067). Subsequent to the rating of 
programme participants they chart the way forward and plan for the future based on the results 
of the evaluation process.  
This paradigm of evaluation will inevitably require maximum participation from both 
beneficiaries and actors responsible for the implementation of a given policy programme and 
to this extent creates a fecund context for the deployment of relevant incentives to elicit that 
participation from other critical actors. 
7.10.2 ENCOURAGING INNOVATION AMONG MANAGERS 
It has been concluded that an unbridled imagination and creativity is one of the important skills 
that managers should have in order to consider the wide scope of incentives that can be used to 
encourage participation in the entire policy process. That is, informed by among others, the 
knowledge of the values of the targeted community, managers will be expected to use their 
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imagination and creative capacity to choose relevant inducements for each phase, right at the 
design phase of the policy process.  
Specific steps can be taken by government to ensure that the said imaginative and creative 
capacity is encouraged among managers. The observation made by the first Presidential 
Review Commission established by President Mandela in 1998, made an important observation 
regarding the evident policy implementation failures in South Africa. The finding made by this 
commission as alluded to earlier on signals the fact that problems in the new South Africa were 
not necessarily caused by the absence of policy. On the contrary, according to this commission 
the challenges experienced reflected problems of execution of chosen policy alternatives; and 
this is a concern often raised by many policy analysts in the South African context. The said 
report further makes an observation which is of great relevance for the purposes of making 
recommendations in this study. That is, implementation failure was caused by the lack of 
incentives designed for managers to do so. (South Africa (Republic), 1998: Section 3.2.4.4). 
The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery produced by the Department of 
Public Service and Administration in 1997, highlights the need to encourage innovation and 
rewarding excellence in service delivery within the South African Public sector. While this is 
recommended primarily for those public servants who “… perform well in providing customer 
service.” (South Africa (Republic), 1997: 16); it is recommended here that such rewards be 
also targeted to managers who in their daily engagements as policy physicians, display an 
amount of innovation and creativity that brings about effective incentives for deployment in 
the heritage policy process to enhance service delivery. In a sense, this will discourage the 
outsourcing of such fundamental functions to consultants who are not directly involved in and 
impacted upon by the exigencies of policy processes in the public sector. Rewarding innovation 
and creativity among managers will circumvent the over reliance on consultants often 
displayed by certain sectors of the public sector. 
7.10.3 EMPOWERING THE MANAGEMENT CADRE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
As a developing country and a relatively new democracy, South Africa is characterised by a 
lack of policy analysis skills among its management cadre in all its levels. The study has 
revealed that even among senior heritage managers the lack of advanced skills in policy is 
recognisable. This is an anomalous, if untenable situation if one takes into particular cognisance 
the fact that senior managers in the public services are by default, regarded as policy analysts 
who contribute enormously to the development of specific policy positions in the areas of 
service delivery they are in charge of. It has been noted above that one of the reasons why 
incentives are not contemplated as relevant policy instruments at the policy design stage of the 
process is caused by the fact that managers do not possess the necessary skills to engage 
effectively with matters pertaining to agenda setting in particular and by implication relevant 
policy design skills.  
Faced with such a situation therefore it is of dire necessity that the senior management cadre 
of the public service be provided with opportunities to acquire relevant policy skills which will 
enable them to participate meaningfully in the entire policy process and address the salient gaps 
identified in the management of policy. A number of options are available to government to 
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address this challenge decisively. One such alternative is about entering into a contract 
regulated by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between institutions of higher learning 
and government, wherein specific courses are going to be designed for the existing senior 
management cadre in the public service. Such institutions will then design specific modules 
which address specific policy skills identified as scarce in the service.  
It could well be that in some instances outsourcing the capacitation and further training of the 
public service management cadre may be considered ineffective for instilling the right ethos 
that government requires in order to excel in its performance. The second option available 
therefore is for government to provide in house training in this regard which will be tailored in 
accordance with its own specifications and values in mind; while simultaneously allowing it to 
inform and shape the curriculum strictly in accordance with its needs. For this reason the newly 
formed National School of Government provides a useful model of further skilling to its 
management cadre.  
In the array of streams available in the Leadership Programme of this institution is the 
Executive Development Programme (EDP), designed specifically for the Middle Management 
Service (MMS) cadre of the public sector. A closer look at the curriculum demonstrates that 
there is a clear focus on addressing the skills deficit in various areas of management including 
strategic management and public policy analysis. (South Africa (Republic), 2015:1) This 
option presents the best opportunity for government to professionalise its management cadre 
in a way that will impact positively to performance and service delivery in general. 
In order to solicit the right responses from managers so that they align their behaviour with this 
particular policy goal, it will be necessary for government to use both ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’. 
One way of doing this would be the provision of appropriate incentives for managers to register 
for such courses by subsidising their training. It would also be necessary to consider policy 
skills as one of the important prerequisites for possible upward mobility among members of 
both the middle and senior management cadre in the South African public service.  
Coupled with the acquisition of policy skills by managers, attempts should also be made to 
expose public sector managers to continuous training in Strategic Management, more 
particularly, Results Base Management (RBM) as opposed to managing strictly for compliance 
and outputs. According to the South African National Treasury, Results Based Management is 
a new phenomenon in public sector management approaches and paradigms.  
Up till recently, the focus has been on measuring and reporting on what we do and what 
we produce. The new focus extends this interest into the area of outcomes. It asks what 
we achieve with what we do. This does not mean that we shift the focus away from 
activities and outputs so that we are only interested in outcomes. RBM extends the focus 
so that all the elements are important. (South Africa Republic, 2014: 9).  
In a sense, managers will be trained to begin to appreciate the new management paradigm so 
that it begins to inform their respective management of policy interventions. They will have to 
be made aware that the new focus in RBM is ultimately on what we wish to achieve beyond 
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compliance and outputs as the following diagram adapted from the South African National 
Treasury demonstrates. 










Adapted from National Treasury South Africa 2014 
It is suggested that the original diagram as presented by the said Treasury (i.e. Fig 2(a), Section 
2.2 of this thesis), be adapted and modified as shown above (Fig 7(11). One of the vexing issues 
in public policy management and analysis is the slippery nature of the terminology often used 
when referring to outputs and their respective results. To this extent the word output is 
sometimes used interchangeably with outcomes thus creating some confusion. Referring to 
what needs to be achieved as outcomes may also be inadequate for the purposes of this thesis 
and also taking into consideration the South African context of public policy management. 
Given the foregoing therefore, instead of identifying what managers seek to achieve in the 
implementation of policy interventions as outcomes, it is suggested in this thesis that the word 
impact be used. There is a sense in which impact is often understood to be linked to quality 
other than quantity. For this reason, when a policy intervention is evaluated for impact, it will 
suggest that the outputs delivered by the programme are of such class and excellence that high 
quality impacts (i.e. results) are going to be achieved. Referring to outcomes as impacts and 
the link that the term has with quality will therefore presuppose that every stage of the model 
is managed for quality in order to achieve quality impacts.  
7.10.4 EVALUATION OF POLICY PROGRAMMES AND THE ROLE OF 
INCENTIVES 
The fact that managers are forced to adopt incentives by default, should also alert managers to 
the fact that when future policy positions are contemplated and current interventions evaluated, 
space should be accorded for the evaluation of the relevance of incentives in the entire policy 
process, thus informing subsequent policy design endeavours. This is important given that 







Evaluation of policy programmes is done primarily to ascertain their merit, improve 
programmes and generate knowledge. For this reason it would be helpful if evaluations 
conducted at specific intervals of the policy process, would also seek among others to evaluate 
the worth not only of policy interventions, but also such instruments as incentives which have 
been used to express policy and implement it. Considering the aforesaid cyclic nature of the 
policy process, adequate space is therefore afforded for managers to conduct different types 
and paradigms of programme evaluation, with the aim of assessing programme processes and 
impacts, and the role played by incentives in that context. Different paradigms and approaches 
are available to managers to conduct programme evaluation of this nature and include such 
phenomena as clarificatory evaluation, process evaluation and impact evaluation.51 During 
these critical phases of evaluating policy initiatives, attempts should also be made to ascertain 
the role played by incentives in the entire process, so that when new policy positions are 
adopted they are informed by the findings generated by the said evaluation.    
7.10.5 DEALING WITH UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF INCENTIVES 
Not all unintended policy consequences are bad. What presents a challenge for public policy 
analysis therefore are the undesired policy consequences; and for that reason managers should 
learn how to deal with them decisively in order to enhance the quality of the policy process. It 
is imperative that undesirable consequences of deploying incentives are dealt with because, 
depending on the analysis engaged in by managers in the public service, there is a great 
potential that they will have to inform policy agenda setting exercises of subsequent policy 
cycles. The author of this dissertation is suggesting the following model for the purpose of 
analysing the undesirable consequences of using specific incentives to elicit adequate 
participation of actors in the heritage policy process. The process consists of stages which are 
linear in nature. There could well be instances where some of the stages of the model are 
iterative and do not always follow a distinct linear pattern as reflected. 
A suggested model for dealing with undesirable consequences arising from the use of 
incentives in the policy process is known as the INCSD Model and the analyst begins by 
identifying (I) the undesired consequence and seek to describe its nature (N) as clearly as 
possible. Subsequently, the analyst attempts to understand what can be regarded as the causes 
(C) of the undesired consequence. This stage is followed by the assessment of whether the 
analyst considers the undesirable consequence to be of any significance (S) in the policy 
process; and then based on the decision made at this stage, the matter is deferred (D) to the 
agenda setting phase of the subsequent policy cycles.    
       
                                                 
51 Clarificatory Evaluation is a term coined by the University of Stellenbosch’s Centre for Research on Science 
and technology (CREST) to refer to a type or phase in the evaluation process where the focus is on clarifying and 
making explicit the often implicit logic or structure of programmes. Part of the distinguishing features of this type 
of evaluation is its reliance on the use of logic frames to assist in the conceptualising of relevant programme 
theories. Process evaluation refers to a type or phase in evaluation where the focus is on the processes engaged in 
during the implementation of the programme or policy. Impact evaluation has more to do with the evaluation of 


















Figure 7(iii):  Model for dealing with unintended consequences 
7.11 CONCLUSION 
This study highlighted the fact that conventional positivistic research often fails to understand 
the personal and phenomenological experiences of people, and in particular the fact that 
incentives as instruments in policy implementation requires a lot more attention by policy 
scientists and analysts, and that they could play an important role in resolving some of our 
existing problems with effective policy implementation. Although this study focused on 
Heritage Policy in South Africa, it revealed the phenomenological reality that incentives may 
have been neglected in the understanding of what makes policy management effective in the 
post 1994 context. While there are no conspicuous attempts by public heritage managers to 
decide on appropriate inducements at the policy design phase of the policy process, it can be 
concluded that the use of incentives should straddle through all the phases of the heritage policy 
process for effective implementation. To this extent an unbridled creative imagination becomes 
a pre-requisite for the said deployment of incentives, keeping in mind the need for upholding 
common values and the rule of law; while such a placement is considered within specific 
management paradigms for effectiveness. The acquisition of knowledge in the policy processes 
also underscores the limits of the conventional top-down approach towards the attainment of 
relevant policy knowledge, such as this phenomenological study, flies in the face of a dominant 
positivist approach to knowledge generation, thus emphasising the relevance of intangible 
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systems. A non-reductionist deployment of incentives as policy instruments also enhances their 
effectiveness. The study also points out as with all new paradigms, theories and mechanisms 
to improve policy implementation, the initial potential for unintended consequences is a 
characteristic feature of all policy implementation processes, including the heritage policy 
process. Therefore the alignment of incentives with the interests of actors in the policy network 
is of utmost importance. Specific recommendations arising from the conclusions reached were 
also highlighted and ranged from rethinking the entire heritage policy process characteristic of 
the heritage sector in South Africa to the development of a model aimed at assisting managers 
deal effectively with potential undesired policy consequences that may result from this 
proposed change in the manner in which incentives are employed. All of this requires us to 
rethink how we transfer the requisite and sorely needed policy analysis and management skills 
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